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ABSTRACT 
 
PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR IN ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS 
William P. Pajerowski 
Dan Polsky 
 
This dissertation studies how performance risk-based (i.e., value-based) reimbursement over 
total costs of care  in health insurance contracting affects how providers, specifically physician 
groups and health systems, determine marginal treatment choice and set the level of care 
provided to patients. Utilizing the widespread adoption of Accountable Care Organization (ACO) 
contracts by both commercial payers and Medicare, presented research explores changes in care 
delivery and health system organization when risks for total costs of care and satisfactory 
attainment of specific quality metrics (i.e. an ACO contract) are offered to providers. This 
dissertation proceeds in five parts. First, I review the substantial literatures related to the specific 
characteristics of ACO contracts in addition to the institutional details of such contracts 
themselves. Next, leveraging optimal procurement and auction theory, I present a theoretical 
foundation for considering ACOs as a form of incentive contract auction by Medicare and other 
insurers. This theoretical foundation motivates three principal empirical analyses of ACO 
contracts, each briefly explained in the preface, focused on changes in physician behavior 
following ACO contract adoption.      
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PREFACE  
 
This dissertation studies how performance risk-based (i.e., value-based) reimbursement over 
total costs of care  in health insurance contracting affects how providers, specifically physician 
groups and health systems, determine marginal treatment choice and set the level of care 
provided to patients. Utilizing the widespread adoption of Accountable Care Organization (ACO) 
contracts by both commercial payers and Medicare, presented research explores changes in care 
delivery and health system organization when risks for total costs of care and satisfactory 
attainment of specific quality metrics (i.e. an ACO contract) are offered to providers. This 
dissertation proceeds in five parts. First, I review the substantial literatures related to the specific 
characteristics of ACO contracts in addition to the institutional details of such contracts 
themselves. Next, leveraging optimal procurement and auction theory, I present a theoretical 
foundation for considering ACOs as a form of incentive contract auction by Medicare and other 
insurers. This theoretical foundation motivates three principal empirical analyses of ACO 
contracts, each briefly explained in this summary, focused on changes in physician behavior 
following ACO contract adoption.                  
The first principal analysis of my dissertation considers the effects of physician participation in 
Medicare Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), where unit prices are generally fixed. I utilize 
a number of publicly available panel data sources from CMS to review changes in physician 
administration of total services per beneficiary, specific procedures, and referral patterns to other 
physicians and health care providers more broadly.  
I next leverage commercial claims data from the Healthcare Cost Institute (HCCI) in the second 
principal analysis of my dissertation to evaluate the effects of competition amongst providers 
under a regime of mixed market-based and administered prices (i.e., negotiated prices). HCCI 
claims data are analyzed at the provider level in combination with physician ACO participation 
xiv 
 
data from SK&A, details of commercial ACO contracts (such as payer affiliations), and other 
sources. I examine how participation in a commercial ACO contract affects physician treatment 
intensity and determine if effects are generalizable across both Medicare and commercial 
populations.        
The impact of public payers like Medicare on negotiated commercial prices is well documented 
(Clemens and Gottlieb, 2013; Ketcham, Nicholson, et. al, 2013). However, the transition from 
“fee-for-service” to “value-based” payment models changes provider-insurer bargaining with the 
introduction, or modification, of a secondary objective in the form of quality. Gaining insights from 
earlier results, the final analysis of my dissertation considers positive and negative spillover 
mechanisms on payment and utilization of physician services across health care markets, as 
opposed to explicitly within a specific payer’s ACO or enrolled population.  I jointly examine 
whether providers participating in multiple ACOs are more effective and how physician 
participation in a Medicare or commercial ACO contract affects physician treatment intensity for 
commercial patient populations unaffiliated with those ACOs.  
Key empirical results highlight both the promise and pitfalls of early ACO contracts in public and 
commercial markets for physician services. Consistent with policy goals and theoretical 
predictions, physicians participating in Medicare ACO programs are found to significantly 
decrease marginal, per patient utilization of services, particularly specialist services. This effect is 
less evident under negotiated prices, where specialist s participating in ACO contracts are found 
to increase total payment and provision of services (in aggregate) following contract adoption, 
with no significant effects on per patient spending or service provision. However, both Medicare 
and commercial ACOs are found to effectively shift physicians away from per patient provision of 
discretionary services and procedures following contract adoption. In HCCI claims specifically, 
commercial ACO contracts are estimated to reduce per patient utilization for potentially elective 
medical services such as hip and knee replacements, ambulatory and minor procedures, basic 
and advanced imaging, and radiation therapy for prostate cancer.  
xv 
 
 
Demonstrating either selection effects in ACO adoption or potential cost-shifting, empirical 
analysis in Part V demonstrates unintended increases in spending and utilization for HCCI-
insurers’ enrollees by specialists following local market entry of a public or non-HCCI affiliated 
commercial  ACO contract. Only stand-alone commercial ACOs, and not those jointly affiliated 
with a Medicare ACO agreement, are estimated to significantly reduce the per patient commercial 
utilization of services provided by specialist physicians.           
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction, Background, and Overview 
Introduction 
The Institute of Medicine estimates that $765 billion dollars were wasted on national health care 
expenditures related to excess administration of services, fraud, and low-value care in 2013; 
$340 billon dollars was wasted on low-value care alone (IOM, 2013). From 2000 to 2013, 
Medicare spending per beneficiary for physician services increased by 67 percent, far surpassing 
growth in Medicare spending due to increases in reimbursement prices or inflationary 
adjustments. With services reimbursed under the physician fee schedule representing 12 percent 
of total Medicare spending (MedPAC, 2015), a major policy goal of ACOs is containing such 
volume growth and provision of low-value services. 
Policy reforms have in general taken two approaches to further incentivize quality and efficiency 
in health care markets: service-specific changes in reimbursement such as pay-for-performance 
schemes or readmission penalties and transition to capitated payments based around specific 
ACO type contracts for whole populations (Doyle, Graves, and Gruber, 2015). Initial evidence 
highlights the potential for ACOs to improve quality of care, patient satisfaction, and, in some 
cases, constrain costs (McWilliams et al., 2015, 2016; Song et al., 2014; Nyweide et al., 2015). 
However, it is not known what specific changes in behavior by physicians, if any, are driving 
these early results.   In their most recent work on the subject, Pauly and Burns question the 
promise of accountable care, drawing direct comparisons to the promotion and ultimate limits of 
managed care in past decades (2012). They argue that the success of ACOs will depend similarly 
to managed care on such organizations’ ability to target specific populations such as those with 
chronic disease for which care coordination will be cost-effective. Meanwhile, such organizations 
may also promote increased integration and decreased competition thus causing unintended 
consequences for health reform efforts. This dissertation seeks to understand the response of 
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physicians and their firms as payers shift to risk-based ACO contracts and corresponding effects 
on social welfare.   
Institutional Details on ACOs 
Accountable Care Organizations are one of many reforms initiated with the Affordable Care Act to 
help providers improve quality while maintaining or reducing cost levels. Such delivery system 
reforms seek to improve the health of local populations and slow inefficient and rising cost 
growth. Proposed regulations on Medicare ACOs were first issued on March 31, 2011 with the 
stated goal of better care coordination across providers. Multiple trends in population health and 
health services motivated the development of Accountable Care models (Cutler, 2012). 
Particularly, ACOs highlight the need for and benefits of coordinated care for patients with 
multiple comorbid and chronic conditions. More than half of all Medicare beneficiaries have 
greater than four chronic conditions such as diabetes, arthritis, hypertensions, and kidney 
disease, often receiving care for these conditions through treatment by multiple, unaffiliated 
physicians (Cutler, 2012). This can result in patients receiving duplicative or unnecessary 
treatments and a corresponding increase in the risk of suffering medical errors. One in seven 
Medicare patients admitted each year to the hospital is expected to endure a medical mistake 
during treatment. Furthermore, one in five Medicare beneficiaries discharged from a hospital will 
be readmitted within 30 days. Such incidents are presumed to be to some extent avoidable; if 
physicians and other providers were forced to internalize the cost of sub-optimal care then such 
errors and readmissions would be dramatically reduced. Thus, ACO proponents argue (Fisher, 
2007), improving care coordination and communication across providers through the use of an 
ACO will help improve beneficiaries’ care while also reducing costs. However, Chernew and 
McWilliams question this approach (2015). To what extent are quality and quantity of treatment 
substitutes or complements in practice?  
Saliently, ACOs create previously non-existent incentives (at least outside of fully integrated 
settings) for providers to coordinate care for such patients across primary care, inpatient, and 
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post-acute settings (Fisher, 2007). The Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) model 
specifically rewards ACOs that are able to provide health care to an attributed population at a 
lower rate than an expected cost benchmark while still meeting performance standards regarding 
quality of care. Both patient and provider participation in Medicare ACOs is voluntary. While most 
Medicare ACO contracts currently feature one-sided risk (e.g. no risk for cost overruns), the 
federal government has strongly communicated a coming shift to two-sided risk for participating 
provider groups. 
Accountable Care Organization Basics 
Under Medicare regulations, as well as in most commercial ACO settings, ACOs refer to a group 
of providers assigned an incentive contract by the payer to be held responsible for the health and 
resource use of an attributed population of patients. Such attribution may be done prospectively 
or retrospectively. With a stated goal of seamless, high quality care for their patient populations, 
ACOs are not dissimilar to the movement toward patient-centeredness in care delivery and trends 
toward the patient-centered medial home. Networks of ACO affiliated providers include provider 
types from across the health care continuum, including: physicians and hospitals in group 
practice arrangements, fully integrated health systems, small or independent practices 
incorporated  for the sole purpose of sharing risk under the ACO contract, and the full spectrum of 
other health care providers (including post-acute providers, social work organizations, and 
pharmacies) at the discretion of the reimbursing principal (either Medicare or another payer) who 
ultimately approves the ACO composition and contract. Under current CMS regulations and the 
Affordable Care Act, ACOs must have a minimum total attributed population of 5,000 patients 
(15,000 for the Pioneer program). Medicare compares the realized costs of care for such a 
population against a cost benchmark. This benchmark weighs both previous annual expenditures 
for the ACO’s attributed patient population as well as local market and/or national growth 
expenditure trends. In addition, Medicare has implemented minimum gain ratios (MGR) and 
minimum loss ratios (MSR) around the benchmark such that small fluctuations in expenditures 
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due to random annual variation are neither rewarded nor penalized (CMS, 2012, 2016). A 
representation of this ideal is shown in   
Figure 1 (Xcenda, 2017). Additionally important features of ACO contracts in the Medicare 
context are then described in added detail below.  
 
Figure 1: An Idealized Model of an ACO 
 
 
Quality Improvement 
While measure development is ongoing, ACOs in the larger Medicare Shared Savings Program 
(MSSP) are currently monitored across 33 quality measures regarding patient 
experience/satisfaction, management of at-risk populations, preventive care, and care 
coordination/patient safety. In early years of most contracts, many measures were satisfactorily 
met solely through reporting (similar to pay-for-reporting schemes used in pay-for-performance 
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contracts). A weighted scoring rule combining these measures is known by ACOs in advance and 
used to determine whether the ACO met quality goals. If quality goals are not met, ACOs are not 
eligible to receive their portion of shared savings should any realize (CMS, 2012, 2016). 
Commercial ACO contracts employ heterogeneous incentive schemes that often parallel 
Medicare quality measures but may include custom or tailored measures for commercial 
populations. The wide array of commercial quality measures are discussed in further detail with 
reference to analyses on commercial ACOs in Part 4 of this dissertation.   
Public Reporting 
A public reporting requirement requires Medicare-participating ACOs to publicly report salient 
features to the public on their own websites. Notably, this reporting includes characteristics of the 
ACO’s internal distribution of share savings to individual physicians and other providers. 
Specifically, ACOs must report the percentage of shared savings respectively invested in 
infrastructure, invested in redesigned care processes, and distributed to primary care physicians, 
specialists, and hospitals.   No regulation, with an exception for non-profit hospitals discussed 
below, dictates how ACOs distribute savings; substantial variation is expected in these internal 
incentives. While not centrally located, such information is very useful for subgroup analyses. 
(CMS, 2016)  
Antitrust Guidance for ACOs and Non-Profit Hospital Participants  
Providers in ACOs have been allowed wide breath to integrate under safe harbor notices 
provided the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). ACOs 
participants are encouraged to clinically and financially integrate, thus prompting substantial 
antitrust concerns. In the antitrust phrasing, regulatory bodies will apply a rule-of-reason to ACO 
behavior based primarily around consideration of ACO market shares. A description of the 
‘safety-zone’ allowed for ACOs to consolidate market share in their local markets, even for 
commercially populations, without running afoul of regulatory authorities has been communicated 
by regulators (Department of Justice, 2014).     
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Non-profit hospitals have received additional guidance from the Internal Revenue Service 
regarding participation in hybrid-organizations such as ACOs. Primarily, the IRS has directed 
non-profit participants in ACOs to not engage in anti-competitive behavior (e.g. through the use of 
“fair-market” rates to coordinating firms) and to require that shared savings/losses are distributed 
proportionally such that they don’t surpass the non-profit’s proportional entitlement (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2016).    
Growth of Commercial ACO Designs 
Attaining higher quality care at lower cost is clearly a hope of Medicare’s ACO contracts (Tu, 
Muhlestein, Kocot, and White, 2015). Though the efficacy of these public programs to meet these 
goals remains unknown, many commercial insurers have begun to mimic Medicare’s programs 
(Eggbeer and Morris, 2013) either in locations where a Medicare ACO already exists or as a 
stand-alone contract. In doing so, commercial insurers expect that they can significantly lower 
consumer premiums while using quality monitoring to at minimum maintain existing quality 
(Williams, 2015). If possible, attainment of lower prices from providers would give such insurers 
an advantage in the new health insurance exchanges and other redesigned insurance markets 
reformed under the Affordable Care Act (Eggbeer and Morris, 2013). Some have also argued that 
provider-led ACOs are forming to compete with payer-led HMOs (Scheffler, 2015, Whaley, Frech, 
and Scheffler, 2015). A study in California found a positive correlation with HMO density and ACO 
entry, which supports this claim despite multiple, competing explanations for such a phenomenon 
noted by the authors (Whaley, Frech, and Scheffler, 2015). For example, this correlation could be 
the result of provider experience with managed care and population health, such that the ACO 
transition requires less organizational change for such providers. (Whaley, Frech, and Scheffler, 
2015). Regardless, growing shares of both primary care and specialist physicians across the U.S. 
have continued to join some combination of public and commercial ACO contracts from 2012 to 
2016 as shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Estimated PCP and Specialist Participation in any ACO Contract: 2012 - 2016 
 
Source: Empirical analysis of 2012 – 2016 SK&A Office-Based Physician (OBP) files. 
 
Concerns regarding Medicare ACOs are amplified for commercial ACOs, especially those 
concerning potentially diminishing quality and abuse of market control by a dominant provider 
group. To deal with quality concerns, Medicare takes a variety of quality measures and sets 
standards for the ACOs to meet (Scheffler, 2015). When mimicking the Medicare ACOs, the 
commercial providers also instituted quality measures, but insurers have tended to develop their 
own measures and standards, making the quality management process difficult for providers to 
navigate when multiple insurers are involved (Williams, 2015). Because of the requirements, 
providers seem to be very focused on the quality measures, which, if the measures accurately 
convey quality, should cause them to maintain their quality of service. However, quality measures 
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are not reported in real time, providing uncertainty and added pressure to providers, whom may 
receive little feedback on whether their attempts to improve are successful during a specific 
reporting period (Williams, 2015). 
 
Expert concerns about market power from so-called integrated delivery networks (IDNs) stem 
from the vertical and horizontal integration that an ACO requires. Vertical integration may be 
necessary to obtain the efficiencies from economies of scope, for example by sharing medical 
information systems and reducing unnecessary testing and retesting, and allow for organizations 
to avoid antitrust laws when taking advantage of these economies of scope (Whaley, Frech, and 
Scheffler, 2015; Handel, 2015). Horizontal integration is also important to allow some flexibility 
and choice for consumers within the network. These efficiencies and options are beneficial for 
consumers, but the integration also gives the ACOs more of an ability to negotiate (Whaley, 
Frech, and Scheffler, 2015). If they use that power to negotiate for higher payments, then this 
could actually raise prices for consumers instead of lowering them (Feldman, 2015; Scheffler, 
2015). As shown in Figure 3, ACO contract penetration among vertically-integrated physician is 
much higher than those unaffiliated with a hospital or health system. However, participation by 
system-affiliated physicians has slightly decreased in recent years while participation among non-
system physicians continues to grow. 
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Figure 3. Physician Participation in any ACO Contract by System Status: 2012 - 2016 
 
Source: Empirical analysis of 2012 – 2016 SK&A Office-Based Physician (OBP) files. 
 
Narrow networks, typically with limited if any focus on quality compared to ACO networks, have 
also been increasing in popularity as a low-cost alternative, keeping costs low (in some cases, 
25% lower than PPO and HMO plans) by excluding expensive providers. Such organizations 
could serve to compete with ACOs to keep commercial ACO prices low (Eggbeer and Morris, 
2013). However, in other cases, such ‘accountable care partnerships’ will just be a rebranding of 
a narrow network (Eggbeer and Morris, 2013). Regardless, limited networks were found to be 
correlated with patients receiving more primary and preventative care with less use of emergency 
rooms (Optum Labs, 2015) However, in places where there are few providers and extensive 
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network restrictions, narrow networks have more trouble forming and providing competition with 
ACOs to challenge their market power (Handel, 2015). Some researchers are wary of the rise in 
narrow networks; a similar interest was shown in the 1990s for HMOs with narrow networks with 
limited success (Tu, Muhlestein, Kocot, and White, 2015). Similarly, others see the rise of 
commercial ACO networks as not dissimilar to the relatively unsuccessful spread of IDNs in 
decades past (Burns and Pauly, 2012). 
 
Literature Review 
Managed Care to Accountable Care 
Over the last two decades the prevalence of managed care plans and capitated reimbursement 
has continually grown, with the current promotion of accountable care designs a direct evolution 
of this approach. In general, two main differences separate ACOs from managed care: a lack of 
restrictions on patient choice of provider and an increased use of financial incentives for quality 
reporting and improvement both within and across organizations.  Under traditional managed 
care reimbursement, commercial insurers compete on the basis of price, administrative efficiency, 
and the attractiveness of their provider networks while hospitals and physician groups compete 
on the basis of price and quality attributes, both for inclusion into provider networks and for 
individual patients (Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000). Dranove, Shanley, and White refer to such 
mechanisms as ‘payer-driven competition’ which may lead to lower prices but also potentially 
lower quality than that provided under a fee-for-service, ‘patient-driven competition’ 
reimbursement system (1993). Despite a backlash from consumers in the late 1990s, 
overwhelming evidence exists that managed care succeeded in lowering prices paid by both 
patients and plans (Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000). Empirical work has found that managed 
care lowered premiums (Wholey, Feldman, and Christianson, 1995), decreased total health 
expenditures with no adverse effects on quality (Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse, 2000), and 
decreased the diffusion of technology (Baker and Phibbs, 2002).  
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Cutler, McClellan, Newhouse (2000) reviewed the overall effects of  HMOs in Massachusetts 
from 1993 to 1995 during which a large portion of the patient population shifted into managed 
care plans. They find treatments and health outcomes were not significantly affected by this 
change for HMO enrollees, although such patients had 30-40% lower expenditures compared to 
the control FFS plans. The authors determine this is due to lower unit prices, also noting potential 
increases in productivity for HMO plans. In a structural analysis of managed care markets in 
Medicare, Town and Liu documented overall welfare improvements due to increases in both 
producer and consumer surplus, although importantly consumers only benefited with surplus 
gains in competitive markets (2003). 
Throughout this period, it was even speculated that a total market evolution was occurring from 
lightly integrated, low-managed care penetration physician and hospital markets to markets 
where managed care and capitated payments prevailed and made provider integration 
necessary. However, such stages did not necessarily occur across markets and the relationship 
between managed care penetration and integration remained ambiguous (Burns et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, Burns and Pauly highlight the many promises of managed care through integrated 
systems that have not yet been realized. The authors note their skepticism that the “California 
model” of capitated health care will be widely adopted, that hospitals can partner with physicians 
and thus control their referring habits, or that vertical integration of providers is usually beneficial 
due to economies of scale and natural complementarities across different providers (2002). So, 
while managed care has been successfully implemented with many estimated benefits, the extent 
of its impact remains to be seen.  
Simultaneously with developments in managed care, the Triple Aim promoted by health reform 
advocates and motivating the Affordable Care Act has sought to improve the quality of care, 
increase access to health care for larger populations, and reduce per capita costs in care through 
efficiency gains (Berwick, 2008). Integrated health systems are one potential solution to each of 
these goals; federal and state promotion of ACOs, increased provider communication through 
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meaningful use of EHRs, and increased use of value-based reimbursement all encourage such 
integration. ACOs in particular have been lauded as a payment model of the future, with Emanuel 
and Liebman going so far as to predict the end of the American health insurance industry by 2020 
following widespread adoption of ACOs able to provide higher quality and more efficient care 
(Emanuel and Liebman, 2012).  The oft-credited creator of the ACO design, Elliot Fisher (Fisher 
et al., 2007), in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, noted important questions surrounding 
ACOs but noted his thinking that such models are “the best hope we have” (Avery, 2012).  
 
Quality Improvement Incentives 
Reimbursement of health care services is increasingly tied to “quality” measures like those used 
in ACO contracts. Efforts to improve quality have broadly used two approaches to incentivize 
quality improvement in health care markets: service-specific changes in reimbursement such as 
pay-for-performance schemes or readmission penalties and transition to capitated payments 
based around specific ACO type contracts (Doyle, Graves, and Gruber, 2015).  In addition to 
affecting reimbursement, quality measures for most Medicare health care facilities are now 
publicly reported as indicators to beneficiaries and as market pressures for providers.  Provider 
response to changes in reimbursement based on quality measures may be different than 
standard changes to the extent that providers maximize not only profits but quality, or intensity, 
itself. Hodgkin and McGuire (1994) note this tradeoff mathematically with the utility effect of the 
implicit derivative on demand inducement ௎಺௎ഏ. To the extent that hospitals do not solely maximize 
profits, changes in payment based on quality may also change the marginal benefit of quality.    
However, it is commonly recognized that efforts to report or reimburse on quality may cause 
problems for sicker patient populations comparable to those of unprofitable populations under 
traditional prospective payment (Newhouse, 1996) as will be further discussed later.  Pauly 
(2004) reviews the concept of quality of care in medical services, noting that hospital’s choice of 
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optimal quality reflects the balance between marginal benefits and minimized marginal costs. In 
practice, actual quality may be suboptimal due to inefficiencies in its production by providers or 
the inability of consumers to make utility maximizing choices. Competition and informed 
consumers helps to alleviate these problems. However, in a system of administered, regulated 
prices, changes in prices will lead directly to changes in quality. Citing Rosen (2002), Pauly also 
notes that in equilibrium it is completely feasible that different health care providers will provide 
different levels of quality depending on their specific production functions.        
Rosenthal and coauthors (2004) systematically reviewed all past pay for performance Medicare 
demonstrations, including nine aimed specifically at hospitals, concluding that such programs 
tended to reward not quality improvements as intended but rather historically high quality 
providers. A broader review of pay for performance systems utilized both in and outside of health 
care settings also failed to find significant empirical evidence for such systems’ efficacy 
(Rosenthal and Frank, 2005). However, the authors note in both cases that such demonstrations 
have been relatively small and may not compare with the larger and systemic policies then being 
considered for implementation. Mullen and coauthors use data from physician group performance 
reports published by a large network HMO to consider the effects of a pay-for-performance 
system, and also find little evidence of improvements in quality (2010).    Helmchen and Sasso 
(2010), motivated by a lack of empirical evidence potentially due to the use of negligible 
incentives in past demonstrations, consider a sample of primary care clinic physician who were 
transferred from salaried positions to those based substantially on provision of selected 
encounters and procedures. Physicians responded by increasing selected encounters from 11% 
to 61% and increased provision of selected procedures to profit-maximizing levels. Despite this 
finding, empirical evidence of provider response due to service-specific performance payments 
remains weak, highlighting a divergence in findings with the broader literature on general 
changes to reimbursement both in and outside of health care markets.   Kaarbøe and Siciliani 
(2008) propose a model of reimbursement on quality where some aspects of quality are verifiable 
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while others are not. Their model predicts that the degree to which a quality incentive payment 
scheme succeeds usually depends on the degree to observable and unobservable aspects of 
quality are complements or substitutes.  
Early Consensus on Medicare Accountable Care Organizations 
Under an ACO model, groups of providers are assigned groups of patients and allowed capitated 
payments to provide care, with accompanying quality benchmarks to be met. Although 
arrangements vary, ACOs are typically eligible for incentive payments if they are able to reduce 
expenditures while maintaining or improving quality. However, skepticism over the success of 
ACO models is increasing. Frandsen and Rebitzer calibrate a model of physician free-riding in 
ACOs using private insurer claims and quality measures. Their model predicts free-riding by 
physician members of the ACO will be a significant problem with optimal incentive payments 
likely to outweigh cost reductions (2014).   McWilliams and coauthors have also found evidence 
of weak incentives by estimating leakage of ACO-assigned beneficiaries to non-ACO physicians 
prior to program implementation (9% of primary care visits and 67% of specialty visits by 
assigned patients occurred outside their ACO). Likewise, the authors estimate that on average 
only 40% of total Medicare outpatient billing by a physician was for patients actually assigned to 
her ACO (McWilliams et al., 2014).  
While findings are still forthcoming with much active research, some early consensus is 
developing in the evaluation of ACO payment models with regards to quality improvement and 
cost reduction. Empirical evaluations of the earliest Medicare ACOs results highlight the potential 
for such contracts to modestly lower spending (Toussaint et al., 2013; Epstein et al., 2014). As 
more data has become available, growing evidence highlights the potential for ACOs to improve 
quality of care, patient satisfaction, and, in some cases, constrain costs (McWilliams et al., 2015; 
Song et al., 2014; Nyweide et al., 2015). McWilliams and his team have further evaluated effects 
of the MSSP ACO program and found participating organizations were able to reduce post-acute 
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spending by 9% without negative effects on health quality (2017). However, it poorly understood 
what specific changes in behavior by physicians, if any, are driving these early results.          
In their most recent work on the subject, Pauly and Burns question the promise of accountable 
care, drawing direct comparisons to the promotion and ultimate limits of managed care in past 
decades (2012). They argue that the success of ACOs will depend similarly to managed care on 
such organizations’ ability to target specific populations such as those with chronic disease for 
which care coordination will be cost-effective. Meanwhile, such organizations may also promote 
increased integration and decreased competition thus causing unintended consequences for 
health reform efforts.  
Horizontal Integration in Physician Markets 
A final concern regarding ACOs is the impression that participants are encouraged to clinically 
and financially integrate, thus prompting antitrust concerns and the formation of special safe 
harbors for ACOs by federal regulators. Integrated health care systems are not new, with ongoing 
trends of both horizontal and vertical integration across the physician, hospital, and insurance 
markets (Gaynor and Haas-Wilson, 1999; Welch et al., 2013). Baker and coauthors highlight a 
growing trend of physician-hospital integration, classifying nearly 60% of physician-hospital 
relationships as vertically integrated with 35% of all physicians working in fully integrated systems 
(2012) 1.  There are several hypothetical economic benefits to integration of health care 
providers. Firms may integrate to increase productivity by developing economies of scale, to 
improve their market power and negotiate higher prices, or to lower transaction costs stemming 
from business with multiple external suppliers (Laugesen and France, 2014). However, welfare 
                                                     
1	 Other	 forms	 of	 physician‐hospital	 integration	 categorized	 by	 Baker	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 include	
independent	physician	associations,	open‐physician	hospital	organizations,	closed‐physician	hospital	
organizations.		
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costs of integration and mergers are also increasingly evident. Evidence of price effects and 
increasing bargaining ability due to horizontal integration have been documented in hospital 
markets (Town and Vistnes, 2001; Capps, and Dranove, 2004; Ho, 2009), health insurance 
markets (Dafny, 2010; Dafny, Duggan, et al., 2012) and physician markets (Dunn and Shapiro, 
2012). In recent work, Baker and coauthors utilize tax IDs and Medicare claims to track physician 
consolidation and then match these estimates to Truven MarketScan data on county commercial 
insurance prices. Results indicate a change from one standard deviation below the mean 
concentration level to one standard deviation above increases prices for physician services by 
2.9% (2013). 
 
Vertical Integration in Health Care Markets 
Potentially negative effects of vertical integration between different types of providers are also 
increasingly well documented. Baker, Bundorf, and Royalty (2014) find that hospital-cardiologist 
integration is associated with higher spending, with some evidence of increased outpatient 
procedures and inpatient services. This effect is unlikely to be due simply to selection of high 
spending physicians into integrated arrangements (2014). Due to the prevalence of insurer-
provider bargaining, the interaction of up- and down-stream markets is also important to consider. 
Ho (2009) models a bilateral bargaining game between hospitals and managed care plans, 
finding five factors that affect hospitals’ ability to negotiate higher prices: consumer demand for a 
particular hospital; hospital costs of care; “star” status; expected capacity constraints; and the 
existence of hospital systems. Dafny et al. (2012) and Dunn and Shapiro (2014) also show that 
decreased insurer market power increases physician income and payments.   
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CHAPTER 2: A Moral Hazard Theory of Procurement Under Incomplete Contracts 
 
To date, the estimated performance of ACO contracts has been mixed. ACOs are highly reliant 
on the response of individual physicians within participating firms to receive contractual shared 
savings. However despite widespread and increasing adoption, the effects of ACO style contracts 
on physician and firm behavior are not well understood. Relying on neoclassical contract theory 
(McAfee and McMillan, 1986; Laffont and Tirole, 1987), I present a model of ACO incentive 
contracts reliant on optimal procurement and auction theory. Under a setting of ex ante adverse 
selection (due to uncertainty and risk aversion) and ex post moral hazard by health care 
providers, contract theory reveals a separation property whereby (latently) high-efficiency 
physician-firms necessarily select into the ACO incentive contract. If a single-crossing assumption 
(Mirrlees, 1971) on participation holds, ACO contracts are an efficiency gain and a social welfare 
benefit.  This is because the ACO contract internalizes the inefficiencies of supply-side moral 
hazard by making otherwise efficient firms responsible for cost-overruns; further social welfare 
benefits are implied if partially-altruistic physicians respond to contract adoption with least-harm, 
most-productive changes in treatment choice consistent with Chandra and Skinner’s model of 
medical productivity (2012).  
 
Moral Hazard in Demand and Supply: A Brief Overview   
“Moral hazard” has a long history in health economics and refers to a type of information 
asymmetry (“hidden action”) in which individuals are more likely to take actions or risks because 
they do not bear resulting costs (Pauly,1968) . Broadly, three types of moral hazard have been 
considered in the health economics literature from a demand perspective: ex ante moral hazard 
such as skimping on preventive care services (Zweifel and Breyer, 1997), static ex post like 
consuming more medical care when insured (Manning et al, 1987), and dynamic ex post such as 
opting for newest medical technology and thus prioritizing product innovation over process 
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innovation (Goddeeris, 1984; Baumgardner, 1991). However, it is often difficult to distinguish 
between the three types empirically (Zweifel and Manning, 2000). More notably for this 
dissertation, insurance also affects the behavior of physicians and other providers thought to act 
on patients' behalf, regardless of whether they are perfect agents or not. This is so called "supply 
side moral hazard" and the magnitude of such marginal effects is expected to be increasing in the 
degree of delegation to the physician in any given encounter. Health economists cite three main 
reasons patients may delegate medical-decision to physicians:  
 Informational Asymmetries: Costs of gathering relevant medical knowledge are excessive 
for patient. However, given a sufficiently high expected return patient may choose to 
bridge the information gap. 
 Shifting of Responsibility: Even a well-informed patient may wish to delegate most of 
decision-making authority, possibly to shift the source of their treatment's negative 
externalities (e.g. missing work, reduced income) from themselves to the physician 
 Insurance Coverage:  As insurance coverage insulates the patient from financial risk of 
treatment choices may increase their willingness to delegate treatment choices to 
physicians . Without insurance, patient's willingness to delegate treatment decisions 
would presumably be reduced.   
On both the demand and supply sides, moral hazard mechanisms work in similar ways to reduce 
efficiency while increasing economic rents of patients and/or providers. Such effects may be 
heterogeneous and are subject to behavioral biases; Baicker, Mullainathan, and Schwartzstein 
(2012) identify and estimate the magnitude of demand side “behavioral hazard" where the 
insured may under-use high value medical services due to various behavioral biases. Such 
effects may dominate any overutilization due to classical moral hazard and may imply zero or 
negative optimal cost sharing. In addressing this and related issues, Pauly and Blavin (2008) 
seek reconcile traditional views of optimal cost sharing under moral hazard with value-based 
insurance designs promoting decreased cost-sharing for high (marginal) value services. They 
show how introducing cost-sharing based on services' marginal benefit is a superior approach to 
providing information when patient demand falls short of full information. Value-based, capitated 
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payment models such as ACOs represent the contemporary analogue to this value-based 
insurance design just as supply-side cost sharing through prospective payment has been 
compared to optimal cost-sharing in insurance markets (Newhouse, 1996). 
 
Regulation of Multiproduct Monopoly Firms  
Consideration of classic procurement contract theory is a useful starting place for modeling the 
economics of ACOs, as problems of multidimensional (e.g. quality and costs) incentive 
contracting are far from new in this literature. However, the case of ACO contracts provides a 
prime example of the tension between incentives to cuts costs and raise product quality. Bolton 
and Dewatripont (2005) aptly describes the classical model of reimbursing a multiproduct, 
monopoly firm. All ACO provider groups exhibit some market power and may be consider local 
monopolies. Thus, such organizations face a complex, nonlinear pricing problem depending on 
the range of health services they deliver. Subsequently a risk-neutral, profit-maximizing firm will in 
theory respond to an offered incentive contract with some mix of both selection (into the program 
and in effort provision) and moral hazard type effects (i.e. on marginal treatment intensity, or the 
mix of treatment inputs allocated to a specific patients) margin to maximize profits (or conversely 
some multi-objective utility function) across service lines. In the absence of regulation, a 
monopolist firm has two incentives to provide quality: to encourage future sales from repeat 
customers and to increase market share via reputation effects.    
Regulation of Quality and Costs in Procurement 
ACOs are an attempt by Medicare and other payers to regulate quality and the marginal benefit of 
services while also introducing incentives for cost savings. Writing decades before the ACO 
model was conceived, Laffont and Tirole (1993) described a model of quality regulation that lends 
itself well to health care finance. Product quality may be considered either a search good or an 
experience good. In the former case, quality is thought to be identifiable ex ante while in the latter 
quality is only knowable ex post. While product quality is ultimately visible to the consumer, the 
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extent to which quality is merely observable rather than verifiable is of added importance for 
quality regulation. In cases where quality is verifiable, where its level may be described ex ante 
and determined ex post by a court, quality may be directly contracted on as an additional good for 
purchase. Pay-for-performance incentives and recently introduced readmissions penalties for 
hospitals are good examples of contracting on verifiable aspects of quality in health care settings. 
However, the efforts and effectiveness of groups of physicians to promote health across their 
patient populations and broader communities is not likely to ever be fully verifiable regardless of 
advances in quality monitoring and health IT.  
Closer to the less tangible quality of regulated television programming or the threat of core 
meltdown at a regulated nuclear power plant, examples cited by Laffont and Tirole (1993), 
population health services possess many aspects that may be difficult to measure and 
subsequently contract on. In the presence of such informational asymmetries, theorists propose a 
low-powered incentive schemes not dissimilar to a typical ACO contract in cases where quality 
and quantity are net substitutes in production. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) similarly document 
the theoretical implication that in the presence of moral hazard type effects but little or no ability 
for selection, a regulator’s best choice is to simply eliminate its financial stake and transfer 
financial risk to firms. By providing ACOs and their participating providers a financial interest in 
lowering health care spending and improving quality, Medicare thus seeks to reduce these 
inherent managerial incentive problems and promote “efficiency at the top”.               
In recent work, Feldman (2015) notes that because ACO contracts are so far voluntary, the 
expected utility of participation in the program must meet or exceed the ACO’s reservation utility. 
This is an important point, highlighting a separation property of ACO incentive contracts that only 
providers with a reasonable expectation of success in the program (relative to outside options) 
will join. Furthermore, conditional on incentive contract participation, managerial effort to reduce 
costs and improve quality will vary with the ACO’s expectation of shared savings (in addition to 
other payoffs, such as developing firm ability to manage risk). I will argue below that the ACO 
entry decision and effort to promote high value care will depend on providers’ expectations about 
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their payoffs and the ability of their physicians to affect marginal care delivery and quality 
provision through (costly) effort. I will analyze these relationships using a principal-agent model of 
a procurement auction.     
While perhaps not immediately intuitive, consideration of ACO contracts as a specific form of 
procurement auction (an incentive contract auction) by an issuer such as Medicare is both 
realistic and theoretically appealing. Contract theorists have long considered such contracts with 
respect to a wide variety of government procurement in goods and services across industries; 
such contracts are distinctly “not auctioned off like a painting or a treasury bill” but typically see 
the regulator able and eager to audit realized costs of the procurement (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
This observability of realized costs ex post allows the regulator to interpret participation as a 
choice of contract by providers across a menu composed of expected prices and the share ratio 
for cost overruns. Such models are conceptually appealing and noticeably similar to the payment 
structure and incentives for an ACO contract.2   
                                                     
2 Given that ACO contracts financially reward providers conditionally depending on cost and 
quality measures, an even more realistic model ties the award of the incentive contract to a 
scoring rule (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) dependent on both cost and quality measures. Such 
models are theoretically ambiguous if cost and quality are substitutes, generally resulting in no 
tractable predictions. Asker and Cantillon (2010) characterize the optimal procurement 
mechanism under private information about total costs and quality when both are valued; 
comparing this optimal mechanism to an efficient scoring auction highlights the ability of such 
mechanisms to reduce rents and improve welfare.  For these reasons, the theoretical model 
assumesACO contracts incentivize those aspects of quality that are complementary to cost-
reductions, reducing the theoretical framework to a singular dimension.  This may be a better 
assumption for ACO quality measures regarding management of at-risk populations, preventive 
care, and care coordination/patient safety than for those related to patient experience/satisfaction.            
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Although noted welfare benefits of incentive contracts for government procurement date to at 
least Scherer (1964) and Myerson (1981), McAfee and McMillan (1986) were among the first to 
introduce a theory of optimal procurement incorporating moral hazard, risk-sharing with firms, and 
the potential for risk aversion by firms unsure of their ability to generate shared savings under a 
given incentive contract. The principal-agent type model presented below explains physician 
response to ACO contracts using a similar framework for physician-firms bidding on the 
opportunity to share savings (or cost overruns).  Specifically, I structure a theoretic model of an 
ACO contract as an implicit auction3  by Medicare offering firms an incentive contract. This is 
achieved primarily through a transfer payment to higher efficiency firms to induce them to provide 
services more efficiently at lower marginal rents. 
Chandra and Skinner (2012) construct a principal-agent model containing elements of moral 
hazard in an endeavor to explain cost and technology growth in U.S. health care expenditures. 
They propose a model whereby providers seek to maximize the health of their patients, but may 
                                                     
3 In the economics literature “auctions” may refer and be used to model any general trading 
mechanism (Manelli and Vincent, 1995). In particular, this setting may be viewed as an all pay 
auction, where both winners and losers pay their bid and zero bids (non-participation) is possible. 
While Medicare allows any organization or set of organizations to form an ACO, substantial fixed 
costs as well as opportunity costs of lost revenue make participation (regardless of ex post effort) 
costly. Recall by the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (Vickrey, 1961; Myerson, 1981; Reily and 
Samuelson,1981) that such an auction is expected to be equal in payoffs for the 
principal/regulator relative to a broad class of other auctions, including first price and Vickrey 
auctions. It is also possible to frame the problem from the perspective of a tax and transfer 
scheme (Chetty, 2008). I may pursue this later with respect to a sufficient statistics approach to 
ACO contract design. This approach would apply the “exact identification” approaches of this 
literature to estimate marginal effects on treatment choice, allowing welfare considerations 
without the additional assumptions of structural estimation of model primitives.     
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deviate due to financial objectives, capacity constraints, ethical judgement, or patient demand. I 
adapt aspects of their model to make theoretical predictions about the types of health services 
most affected by an ACO incentive contract. This begins with a review of the classical result that 
menus of contracts should be offered to firms by a principal in cases where firms have private 
information.           
The Problem of Principal Procurement from a Natural Monopoly Agent 
Consider a principal such as Medicare or another issuer seeking to procure total costs of health 
care services for a population from a natural monopoly firm. This firm, referred to as the agent, 
has private information about its efficiency given by continuous parameter  ࢼ࢏ ∈ ሾ ࢼ  , ࢼഥ]. Due to 
this information asymmetry, the firm enjoys profitable rents. The principal wishes to increases the 
allocative and productive efficiency of the firm and does so through a direct revelation mechanism 
that induces “truth-telling” behavior. hich the agent, privately knowing its own type, chooses to 
maximize its own utility (or profit, given a profit-maximizing firm). As such, after assuring the 
incentive compatibility of its contracts and committing to transfer some social surplus to higher 
types upon revelation of type, social welfare gains are possible for the principal through 
productivity increases and an overall reduction in rent to the agent. This is a classical theoretical 
result relying only on a single-crossing condition (Mirlees, 1971, Laffont and Tirole, 1993).  
The presence of asymmetric information and uncertainty about future costs (due to general cost 
shocks) implies remaining monopoly rents from the procurement. Contract theorists and health 
economists alike have noted these remaining inefficiencies may to some extent be alleviated by 
yardstick competition (Holmstrom, 1982; Shleifer, 1985; Newhouse, 1996) comparable to that 
used in the DRG system for inpatient hospital reimbursement. Newhouse’s (1996) review of the 
literature to date noted that extensions have in general relaxed one or more of the Shleifer 
model’s assumptions regarding competition on a homogeneous product, of firms (hospitals) 
maximizing only profit (i.e. agency within the firm), and of perfect regulatory pricing (i.e. first best 
pricing). To the extent that natural monopoly firms are not comparable due to idiosyncratic 
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features, objectives, and costs, such mechanisms will provide limited if any efficiency gains 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993).  In an early reference to ACO-style contracts, Newhouse (1996) further 
conjectures that welfare gains are hypothetically possible if HMO-type organizations were able to 
bid a price schedule featuring fixed amounts per enrollee and variable amounts dependent on 
utilization. I present a formal auction model below that shows that ACOs represent a new 
procurement mechanism in health care (an incentive contract auction) reminiscent of this 
suggestion. 
Ellis and McGuire (1986, 1996) produced seminal work across several articles highlighting the 
agency of utility-maximizing physicians on the part of both hospitals and patients as a violation of 
yardstick competition. Building on earlier work, their 1996 article highlights the potential of 
prospective payment systems to encourage moral hazard effects in which hospitals provide more 
or less care to certain sets of patients, selection effects in with hospitals make a choice in the 
average severity of patients admitted, and practice style effects through which hospitals’ shares 
of total discharges change relative to other providers based on their specific utility functions.   
Newhouse (1991, 1996) further notes across several articles that yardstick competition under 
Medicare’s PPS assumes that the regulator is able perfectly set prices equal to costs. However, 
errors are likely to arise regardless of whether prices are set on aggregate or very fine levels due 
to measurement error or asymmetric information (1991). Even if average prices are perfectly 
known, errors will still occur equal to the variance across observably identical firms. Prospective 
payments are thus not optimal to the extent that they vary from first-best pricing equal to cost. 
McClellan (1997) develops a novel method for calculating relative prospective versus cost-based 
reimbursement as well as the profitability of payments for specific diagnoses. He argues from his 
results that the PPS is not as prospective as popularly thought and that profit incentives vary 
significantly across DRGs, demographic groups, and types of intensive treatment. Efforts to 
reimburse or publicly rate health care providers based on quality will encounter analogous 
selection and measurement error inefficiencies (Newhouse, 1996). A model such as that 
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proposed next seeks to confront such selection issues directly through the use of voluntary 
bidding to participate in an incentive contract rather than status quo mixed payment system.4            
A Linear Model of ACO Incentive Contract Auctions 
 
Suppose rather than a yardstick competition, where all firms are compared to some average cost, 
the principal wishes to introduce a cost saving, quality improvement program for health 
expenditures and assumes that there are now multiple agents (hereafter providers5) capable of 
promoting “value” in the Medicare system through a total cost of care (TCOC) incentive contract 
(Feldman, 2015). Assume for the moment that government is indifferent as to how “savings” are 
generated or value promotion is achieved so long as cost reductions are welfare improving. That 
is, the government is not concerned about distributional effects of the program so long as the 
program improves economic welfare for patients and taxpayers. To further simplify the theory, 
assume that promotion of quality is cost saving; that marginal quality and marginal quantity are 
net substitutes. Asymmetric information, the principal observes neither the agent’s type ࢼ࢏ ∈ ሾ ࢼ  
, ࢼഥ] nor its costly effort ࢎ࢏ሺࣈሻ to efficiently produce, allowing regulated providers to enjoy rents.  
 
                                                     
4 This may in practice be a supply-side analogue of “selection on moral hazard” effects 
demonstrated by Einav, Finkelstein and coauthors (2013). Similar to that work’s finding that 
consumers more likely to respond to reduced cost-sharing with increased utilization will select 
into such health plans, I conjecture that providers best able to respond to an ACO contract 
(through reduced supply-side moral hazard) will select into such payment models.  
5 This work is presently ambivalent with respect to the true boundaries of firms (Coase, 1937) 
across health care markets. However, boundaries of the firm are potentially important and will be 
addressed by considering different types of organizations. A number of managerial critiques 
follows this theoretical contribution. 
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The Provider’s Problem 
Given that a specific provider, i, participates in the incentive contract, the ex post cost ࢉ࢏ሺࢗሻ of the 
program will have three parts: 
ࢉ࢏ሺࢗሻ ൌ ࢼ࢏ ൅ ࢝ െ ࣈ࢏ 
where expected TCOC for a population as well as opportunity costs to the provider are given by 
the efficiency parameter βi (this is private information, potentially over a distribution, known to the 
provider but not to the regulator), w is a random cost shock distributed over F(w) with expected 
value equaling zero that is only known ex post (following the contract participation decision), and 
ࣈ represents the realized cost  savings due to effort by the provider. Let  ࢎሺࣈሻ  equal the cost of 
effort to participate in the incentive contract, which cannot be charged to the regulator as part of 
ࢉ࢏∗ and is assumed to have decreasing returns to scale (h’’ > 0). Note this is without loss of 
generality as any costs that may be charged to the regulator will be encompassed in type 
parameter ࢼ࢏.     
Note the regulator/principal observes neither the efficiency parameters nor the level of effort 
chosen by the provider, only an ex ante announcement of the firm’s type ࢼଙ෪ and the realized 
costs ࢉ࢏ሺࢗሻ of the winner (in reality, Medicare observes all realized costs).To select the 
provider(s) to undertake the ACO program, the regulator/principal organizes an “auction” to 
maximize social welfare and minimize monopoly rents.   Figure 4 presents a basic conceptual 
model of this game.  
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Potential providers optimize their expected utility in their decision to participate in the incentive 
contract as well as their choice of effort to attain a bonus. Expected utility maximization is given 
by the profit function6:  
࣊࢏ ൌ ࢻ൫ࢼ෡࢏൯ ൅ ሺ૚ െ 	ࢻሻࢌ࢏ሺࢗሻ െ ࢼ࢏ െ ࢎሺࣈ࢏ሻ , or 
࣊࢏ ൌ ሺ૚ െ હሻ൫ࢌ࢏ሺࢗሻ െ ࢉ࢏ ሺࢗሻ െ ࢝࢏൯ ൅ ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻࣈ࢏ െ ࢎሺࣈ࢏ሻ 
With a share rate α for cost overruns beyond the benchmark determined by the agent’s 
announced type,	ࢼ෡࢏ , and a fixed price per unit ࢌ࢏.   If the expected utility given ࣊࢏ from providing 
marginal efficiency under the contract is less than zero, the provider will not participate in an 
ACO. So, the principal’s choice of the share ratio determines the agent’s choice of effort to 
                                                     
6 Ultimately,	this	dissertation	seeks	to	present	a	dual	objective	function	in	which	agents	value	both	
profits	and	health.	
Principal	announces	contract	details	
(benchmarks)	to	agents
Agents	choose	"bids"	of	program	participation	and	
corresponding	cost‐reduction	activities	based	on	
expected	payoffs.	Non‐participating	firms	make	no	
effort	to	reduce	costs.
Expected	costs	are	realized	as	a	function	of	
produced	services,	cost	shocks,	and	cost‐reducing	
efforts
Firms	received	shared	savings	or	losses	
Figure 4. Conceptual Model of ACO Incentive Contract Auction 
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reduce cost-overruns relative to the initial bid. Maintaining an auction framework, let us for now 
note that the ex ante probability of “winning” shared savings under the ACO program is given by 
ࡱ࡭ࢁ ൌ ࡱࢁ൫ሺ૚ െ હሻሺࢌ௜ሺࢗሻ െ ࢉ࢏∗ሺࢗሻ െ ࢝࢏ሻ ൅ ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻࣈ࢏ െ ࢎሺࣈ࢏ሻ൯ ∗ ሺ૚ െ 	ࡲሺ࢈࢏ሻሻ 
For simplicity and to match actual program characteristics, presume a discrete choice of two bid 
options,	࢈࢏, offered to each provider by Medicare. If the EU(πi)<0 the physician firm does not bid 
(i.e. participate in the program or expend effort for cost-savings), while if EU(πi)>0 the provider 
accepts the ACO benchmark contract and sets effort costs7 h(ξ) to participate in the incentive 
contract. The benchmark8 may (hopefully) be roughly equivalent to the competitive bidding 
mechanism of a competitive auction, with a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) given by 
࢈࢏ ൌ ࡮ሺࢉ࢏∗ሺࢗሻሻ when all other agents bid  ࢈࢐ ൌ ࡮ሺࢉ࢐∗ሺࢗሻሻ. In other words, I assume that 
࢈࢏ ൌ 	࡮൫ࢉ࢏,࢚ି૚∗ ൯~࡮൫ࢉ࢏,࢚∗ ൯ 
For truth telling to form a BNE it must be that ࢼ෡࢏ ൌ ࢼ࢏ maximizes a provider’s expected utility with 
respect to its true efficiency parameter. If this equilibrium exists, then conditional on participation 
in the ACO contract, effort provision ࢎ࢏ሺࣈሻ  will be selected to satisfy utility maximization. As such 
                                                     
7 Including opportunity costs. Recall that these costs cannot (at least in total) be charged to the 
regulator as part of ܿ௜ ሺݍሻሻ  and is assumed to have decreasing returns to scale (h’’ >0).      
8 While an ACO contract/program does not involve formal solicitation of bids from organizations, 
the cost benchmark is analogous to the competitive effects of other bidders via a slightly altered 
form of yardstick competition (Shleifer, 1985). From a bargaining perspective, models dating from 
Samuelson (1984) show that in the presence of private information and bilateral monopoly one 
party (typically a buyer) maximizes their own utility through the use of a first-and-final offer to the 
other (a seller). This is done administratively in the case of ACOs in the form of the benchmark; 
consistent with Samuelson (1984) the existence of a mutually profitable contract is necessary and 
sufficient for the economic exchange (and gains from trade) to occur. 
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the share ratio and methodology for setting bids (i.e. benchmarks) will be of clear importance.  
How to determine benchmarks in ACOs is a topic of active research (Chernew and McWilliams, 
2015) with payment models heterogeneously mixing firm, market, and national cost estimates. 
Furthermore, newer ACO designs allow organizations to change their “bid” through changes to 
the minimum savings and loss ratios stipulated by the incentive contract.        
The Principal’s Problem 
The procuring principal’s goal given provider behavior is the creation of a direct revelation 
mechanism to induce high efficiency types to reveal themselves and produce health care more 
efficiently.9 Such a mechanism is a set of functions ti(β),Ci(β), xi(β) for all types β that induces 
truth-telling behavior for all types βi with a net monterary transfer rule ti(.), cost Ci(.) that the firm 
must realize if participating, and xi(.) a probability of receiving the transfer conditional on one’s 
type (as well as effort choice, itself a function of the type and the transfer rule.) A general 
structure of reimbursement in procurement of health care services balances ex post, total costs of 
care (dependent on volume as prices are fixed) and fixed fee payment f reimbursed at a fixed rate 
plus the potential for some profit γ.  
ࡼ࢏ ൌ 	ࢻࢉ࢏ሺࢗሻ ൅ ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻࢌ࢏ሺࢗሻ ൅ ࢽ 
Reimbursement in health care is often structured in this way. The Physician Fee Schedule (PFS) 
has traditionally reimbursed physicians for all services on a roughly cost-plus basis for each 
marginal service (where α = 1, ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻ=0). Meanwhile, inpatient care is reimbursed through a 
menu of fixed prices contracts through a prospective payment system (PPS) on the basis of 
admitting diagnoses (where α=0, ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻ=1). Without consideration of incentive contracts, it has 
                                                     
9 It is equivalent to frame these analyses as a general project (promotion of high value care in the 
U.S. health system). In that sense, welfare benefits exist regardless of the number of “winning” 
firms.  
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been shown that in the presence of physician agency a mixed payment system is optimal over 
either corner solution (Ellis and McGuire,1986, 1990; Newhouse, 1996). 
Next consider the ACO incentive contract where 0 < α < 1. McAfee and McMillan10 (1986) argue 
that under such a contract, only the share ratio α effects marginal behavior without regard for the 
other parameters (β and γ). Without loss of generality, reimbursement under the incentive 
contract will be announced by the regulator as:       
ࡼ࢏ ൌ 	ࢌ ൅ ࢻሺࢉ࢏ሺࢗሻ െ ࢌሻ 
With agents able to choose between the incentive contract and the status quo reimbursement 
and assuming truth-telling behavior, such a auction mechanism reveals a separation property. 
High efficiency types will choose the incentive contract (and more ex ante risk) while low-
efficiency types will select status quo reimbursement. It may be shown that such a direct 
revelation mechanism is optimal and pareto improving. Each agent is incentivized to formulate a 
bidding strategy that is optimal regardless of other agents’ bids, that is, such a mechanism is a 
direct strategy auction.  Total costs of care provided by winning agents will be theoretically 
identical to those in the absence of the competitive mechanism, which simply reduces the agents’ 
rents by reducing the principal’s uncertainty about agents’ true costs.  Such a model also 
highlights the importance of ACO contract design, such as the share ratio and benchmark 
generosity, in determining agents’ response.  
Predicted Variations in Physician Response by Treatment Type   
As individual physicians are often the ultimate agents of production within provider firms, the 
extent to which they value health promotion of their patient population (in addition to profit) is 
important to consider as it will be incorporated into their firm’s decision to participate in the 
incentive contract. Regarding the range of services that physicians may choose to offer patients, 
                                                     
10 A	more	 realistic	 version	of	 the	model	 includes	 estimates	of	 risk	 aversion.	 This	will	 be	 explored	
further	as	the	dissertation	is	developed. 
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including evaluation and management office visits, procedures, tests, and imaging, it is helpful to 
consider both the price and the productivity of a given treatment in predicting response due to the 
dual objectives of physicians. Chandra and Skinner (2012) model three types of medical 
technology productivity: highly cost-saving treatments with little chance of overuse, treatments 
which are highly effective for some but not for all, and treatments with uncertain clinical value. 
ACO contracts provide soft-powered incentives to increase cost-effective treatments (e.g. 
immunizations) while decreasing services with low or uncertain value. However, the extent to 
which ACOs are able to increase the appropriateness of providing treatments with mixed 
effectiveness to the marginal patient is a key question (Chandra, Skinner, Holmes, 2013). To be 
successful, ACOs need to limit investments in technology such as proton beam accelerators, 
steer patients away from cost-ineffective technologies, and slow the development of costly 
innovations (Finkelstein et al., 2007). 
Predicted Variations in Physician Response by Payer Type   
Theoretical and empirical analyses primarily assume that physicians are unable to significantly (or 
fully) distinguish between patients by payer type or ACO affiliation (Pauly and McGuire, 1991). 
However, conceptual questions exist related to the ability of providers to directly aim treatments 
and procedures at the patients of a single payer. Or, if as Pauly and McGuire (1991) model, the 
physician has a reasonable expectation of payer type over all patients. Empirical analyses in Part 
5 will test these assumptions by estimating the extent of spillover effects from ACO contracts. 
Conceptual understanding of possible spillover effects will be further discussed jointly with 
empirical analysis. 
Asset Control and Governance in ACOs: A Managerial Critique 
Of course, a critique of the proposed auction theory may be made on the basis of incomplete 
contracts and unclear boundaries of the firm (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1986, Williamson, 1985; 
Coase, 1937). Specifically, to what extent is the decision to participate in an ACO contract made 
by a rational decision maker with residual control of assets and profits? One important distinction 
from this literature notes differences across empirical settings in control over assets by in 
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managers/provider groups and human capital by agents/physicians (Holmstrom, 1999; 
Willamson, 2002). Williamson in particular has noted the importance of governance structure 
and/or residual ownership of assets (1986) when agents ultimately control production. Laffont and 
Tirole (1993) also note that such theoretical models (of incentive contract auctions) ignore 
transaction costs, capture costs, and dynamic costs of repeated games and renegotiation. 
Renegotiation may be of particular relevance in the Medicare program, where ACOs and their 
members have been able to exit or re-negotiate from two-sided to one-sided risk models 
retroactively. Theoretical predictions tempered by such critiques will be informed by empirical 
analysis.  
One strand in the organizational economics literature focuses on moral hazard problems faced by 
organizations when agents within the firm control production, a useful setting relevant to the 
behavior of individual physicians within ACOs. In such cases, management can influence agents 
and production only indirectly. The key problem focused on by these alternative models are that 
actions are to some degree ex post non-contractible and as such behavior of physician agents 
will differ substantially in integrated (firm) vs. non-integrated (market) settings. Non-integration 
provides higher incentives for cost reduction while reducing those for efficiency improvements; 
integrated firms likewise diminish entrepreneurial incentives of employee-agents to reduce 
resource use but allow for increase coordination and economies of scope. This is consistent with 
the premise from early transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937) that firms, with their ability to 
coordinate production through bureaucratic decisions, show an advantage to market-based 
decision making.  Within health care organizations, some physicians may deviate in the presence 
of weak internal incentives to respond or free rider problems in large groups (Gaynor and Gertler, 
1995; Frandsen and Rebitzer, 2014). Such considerations will be further considered in empirical 
estimation when a number of ACO features, such as composition, integration with a health 
system, and internal financial incentives (how shared savings are distributed), will be tested in 
subgroup analysis.     
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Finally, Laffont and Tirole (1993) further note that incentive contracts auctions may not be 
practical due to two industrial policy considerations that are pertinent to health care services: the 
regulator may seek to keep capacity utilization, learning by doing, and firm efficiency 
approximately similar in order to preserve competition / bargaining ability in future auctions or to 
satisfy distributional constraints related to some “fair distribution” rule (such as a distribution of 
contracts across U.S. states). Given the relatively small portion of reimbursement tied to ACOs in 
the present day despite anticipated expansion, such concerns are not immediately relevant. 
Regardless, the theoretical model of an incentive contract auction by a government purchaser 
matches fairly well to stylized facts surrounding ACOs. In reality, Medicare now offers a menu of 
contracts to providers ranging from the recently introduced Merit-Based Payment System (MIPS) 
system to advanced alternative payment models (APMs) such as Next Generation ACOs 
featuring substantial downside risk. In general response to such critiques, the preceding model 
emphasizes the information asymmetries faced in procurement rather than transaction cost 
issues.  As noted by Burns and Pauly (2012), ACO contracts often have distinguishing features 
that many payer-provider partnership and integrated health systems in the past have lacked. 
These include a greatly expanded use of care management practices, significant investments in 
health IT, broad governance, and the holding of performance, rather than actuarial, risk. To the 
extent that ACOs respond to financial incentives and are able to improve care management for 
efficiency gains, welfare improvements are expected. The fact that some providers are willing to 
participate in ACO contracts and successfully attain shared savings seemingly reveals this to be 
true. However, it will be important to review subgroup results across two categories in empirical 
analysis in Part III: ACO governance (system-led, jointly-led, and physician-led) and the degree of 
distribution of shared savings to individual physicians.          
34 
 
CHAPTER 3: Effects of Medicare ACO Adoption on Physician Behavior 
I test above theoretical predictions using a novel combination of physician, firm, and ACO data 
and an identification strategy that utilizes variation in ACO start dates. Consistent with ACO 
program goals and theoretical predictions, physicians participating in Medicare ACO programs 
are found to significantly decrease per patient utilization of services, particularly specialist 
services. Analyses on specific service categories find significant effects related to per patient 
reimbursements for imaging, testing and evaluation and management (E&M) services. Subgroup 
estimates highlight the important effects of ACO governance and profit-sharing with physician 
participants. Physicians in physician-led ACOs are found to respond significantly more to the 
contract change, as are those in system-led ACOs that distribute shared savings bonuses to 
physician members. 
Introduction 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are an evolving type of global capitation contract in 
health care which seek to reimburse health care providers conditionally on quality and total cost. 
ACOs are highly reliant on the response of individual physicians within participating firms to 
obtain contractual shared savings. However, despite widespread adoption by 26 percent of U.S. 
physicians, the effects of ACO style contracts on physician and firm behavior are not well 
understood.  
This analysis seeks to investigate theoretical predictions reviewed in Part II regarding the 
changes in treatment choice by physicians following adoption of an ACO contract. This work 
seeks to answer related questions and test theoretical predictions utilizing physician-level 
indicators of participation in Medicare ACOs, rich firm organizational characteristics, and public 
use Medicare Part B claims data to analyze treatment and practice patterns following Medicare 
ACO adoption.  Consistent with ACO program goals and previous theoretical predictions, 
physicians participating in Medicare ACO programs were found to significantly decrease marginal 
treatment intensity in terms of both total services and payments per Medicare beneficiary.   
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Presented analyses will first characterize the existing market for Medicare physician services with 
respect to health system and ACO participation. This research then seeks to answer several 
research questions of interest to both health policy makers and health economists. How does 
market structure and organizational features affect a firm’s decision to form an ACO and the 
financial and quality performance of those who select to participate? What characteristics of ACO 
and their members predict success in meeting program goals and recouping shared savings? 
What are the effects of such clinical and financial integration on local market quality and costs? 
I seek to answer these questions and test theoretical predictions utilizing physician-level 
indicators of participation in Medicare ACOs, rich firm organizational characteristics, and public 
use Medicare Part B claims data to analyze treatment and referral patterns following Medicare 
ACO adoption.  Consistent with ACO program goals and theoretical predictions, physicians 
participating in Medicare ACO programs were found to significantly decrease marginal treatment 
intensity in terms of both total services and payments per beneficiary. Analyses on specific 
service categories find significant effects related to per beneficiary reimbursements for imaging, 
testing and evaluation and management (E&M) services. Applying the Shortell et al. (2015) 
categorization of ACO types, subgroup results suggest that smaller, physician-led ACOs are 
more effective in limiting the marginal administration of services and reducing referrals to 
specialists compared to hospital and system-led organizations. I further explore the roles of non-
profit hospitals and for-profit population health services organizations (PHSOs), which are 
expected to offer different incentive schemes to providers due to regulation. Further analysis 
seeks to link estimated changes in marginal utilization across a number of service categories to a 
specific mechanism: changes in referrals by primary care physicians participating in ACOs to 
specialists, hospitals, and post-acute providers. This is completed utilizing Medicare referral data 
from 2010 – 2014 and the same generalized difference in differences approach to evaluate trends 
in referrals by primary care physicians out to other providers. Controlling for all static physician 
and geographic characteristics, primary care physicians participating in early Medicare ACOs 
significantly increased total referral rates to specialists. Furthermore, primary care physicians did 
significantly increase referrals to specialists within their own firms and health systems upon ACO 
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adoption (both in terms of share and total). Interestingly, only physician-led ACOs show 
significantly reduced total primary care referrals to specialists or an ability to reduce referrals to 
specialists in the same organization. In empirics, I also show significant increases in primary care 
physician referrals to hospitals and post-acute providers following ACO adoption by system-led 
and jointly-led organizations. Consistent with previous results, only physician-led ACOs 
significantly reduced referrals to inpatient and post-acute providers.   
Findings highlight the promise of the ACO approach to limit health care utilization while 
underlining potential unintended consequences and ongoing antitrust concerns. Results are 
relevant not only to policy makers, but also the patients, providers, and insurers increasingly 
participating in such arrangements and will inform the ongoing development of both public and 
commercial ACOs through identification of estimated physician responses to changed incentive 
schemes.  
Causal Identification of Physician Response 
Research Questions 
Empirical analysis seeks to investigate the above theoretical predictions regarding the changes in 
treatment choice by physicians following adoption of an ACO contract utilizing a unique dataset of 
physician and provider participation in ACOs as well as newly available data on Medicare ACO 
program results. Analyses first characterize the existing market for physician services with 
respect to ACO participation. This work then seeks to answer several research questions of 
interest to both health policy makers and health economists. How does the adoption of ACO 
incentive contracts in Medicare affect physician treatment choice? How do ACO organizational 
features such as governance and internal incentives affect the treatment choices of physicians 
who select to participate?  
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Empirical Specification 
Analyses employ a modified form of generalized difference in differences (Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan, 2004) type specifications across a range of dependent variables related to patient 
selection and marginal treatment intensity by physicians: 
			ݕ௜௖௧ ൌ 	 ̅ߚܣܥ ௖ܱ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ௜௖௧ ൅	ߚ௧ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅	ߚ௖ܣܥܱܥ݋݄݋ݎݐ௖ ൅ ߝ௜௖௧	 
In this specification, the mean causal effect of physician i in ACO cohort c adopting the ACO 
contract by year t  ሺܣܥ ௖ܱ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ௜௖௧ሻ are estimated through ̅ߚ while controlling for differences in 
ACO treatment and control groups (ܣܥܱܥ݋݄݋ݎݐ௖ሻ and time trends (ܻ݁ܽݎ௧).  
Utilizing physician-level ACO affiliations and controlling for static, unobserved physician 
characteristics (through the use of physician-level fixed effects at the NPI level), the above 
specification ultimately reduces to:  
			ݕ௜௖௧ ൌ 	 ̅ߚܣܥ ௖ܱ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ௜௖௧ ൅	ߚ௧ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅	ߚ௜݄ܲݕݏ݅ܿ݅ܽ݊௜ ൅ ߝ௜௖௧	 
The average treatment effect of Medicare ACO participation ̅ߚ, for a given outcome 	ݕ௜௖௧ is well 
identified with every untreated physician in a specific year (including those later joining an ACO) 
acting as controls for ACO adopting physicians in that year. So, physicians joining ACOs in 2014 
act as controls for early adopters until the physician-year observation itself is treated.     ̅ߚ will 
thus capture average treatment effect across the multiple start-dates and ACO cohorts. This 
second specification is identical to the first except for the addition of a physician fixed effect 
(݄ܲݕݏ݅ܿ݅ܽ݊௜ሻ to control for static differences across individual physicians. Multiple years of 
Medicare claims data across a large sample of physicians allow for such analyses while 
maintaining sufficient degrees of freedom; also note that neither the ACO cohort variables nor 
specific static physician characteristics (e.g. system integration) need be included in this 
regression due to perfect multicollinearity with the physician fixed effects (assigned at NPI level). 
Four sets of outcome measures, ݕ௜௖௧, are considered. The first are general measures of marginal 
reimbursement; these are constructed from the three aggregate outcomes to construct annual, 
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per beneficiary utilization estimates (results in Table 2). The second are aggregate measures on 
Part B utilization that test for effects of ACO adoption on total unique beneficiaries treated, total 
Part B reimbursement, and total services administered annually (in Appendix Table 23).  Finally, 
remaining specifications each estimate specific measures of marginal treatment intensity for 
specific services; these are constructed similarly to the general marginal treatment measures by 
dividing total annual reimbursement for a specific service category by the physicians’ total 
number of treated beneficiaries. So defined and estimated with physician fixed effects, such 
measures will estimate both the marginal propensity of a patient in the physician’s panel to 
receive a service (e.g. an immunization) as well as the intensity of specific services (e.g. the time 
length and corresponding reimbursement of an office visit).             
Two “triple difference” interaction specifications are included to highlight important differences in 
the effects of ACO adoption due to organizational differences. The first concerns differences in 
response between ACO governance types; the second how organizations choose to distribute 
shared savings to participants.  With accumulating evidence (Shortell et al., 2015; McWilliams et 
al., 2016) on the importance of ACO composition, the triple difference specification estimates the 
varying effects of ACO adoption by organizational type:     
ݕ௜௖௧ ൌ 	 ̅ߚ௃ܣܥ ௖ܱ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ௜௖௧ ∗ ܶݕ݌݁௃ ൅ ̅ߚ௉ܣܥ ௖ܱ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ௜௖௧ ∗ ܶݕ݌݁௣ ൅	 ̅ߚௌܣܥ ௖ܱ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ௜௖௧ ∗ ܶݕ݌݁ௌ 
൅		ߚ௧ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅	ߚ௜݄ܲݕݏ݅ܿ݅ܽ݊௜ ൅ ߝ௜௖௧	 
As such, the estimated effects of ACO adoption by physicians in ACOs operated primarily by 
physician groups (ܶݕ݌݁௣) will be estimated separately from effects for physicians in system-led 
ACOs (ܶݕ݌݁ௌ) and jointly-led ACOs (ܶݕ݌݁௃ሻ. For example, ̅ߚ௉ may be interpreted as the effect of 
physician-led ACOs while the sum of ̅ߚௌ estimates the effect of ACO contract adoption on hospital 
or system-led organizations. Further detail on the underlying typology and the analytic definition 
of these two subgroups are provided in the earlier data section. 
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Robustness 
Key findings are robust to multiple specifications and alternative modeling assumptions. 
Specifically, consistent results are estimated: 
‐ Using an exposure variable (fraction of year), for ACO contracts beginning at different 
months of a year (January, April, July); 
‐ Using a gap year to estimate effects in the second year of participation only; 
‐ Using organization/firm level fixed effects rather than physician (NPI) level fixed effects; 
and 
‐ Using a treatment group that excludes the Pioneer ACO participants.	
Additionally, no significant effects are found for placebo contracts randomly assigned to 
physicians as well as assigned based on a non-random, arbitrary assignment rule (placebo 
assignment by physician last name). Standard errors are clustered at the primary care service 
area (PCSA) level to control for unobserved market-level characteristics such as ACO entry; the 
over six thousand PCSAs are compiled from zip codes and were designed to identify where 
populations of Medicare beneficiaries typically seek primary care. While clustering errors at this 
level is conceptually preferred, statistical significance holds using state-level clustering. Due to 
the volume of checks, robustness results are excluded but are available upon request.    
Data 
SK&A Physician and Organization Data 
SK&A has collected a unique dataset of physicians’ Medicare and commercial ACO affiliations 
typically unavailable to researchers. Until recently, complete national data on system ownership 
and provider integration was also not available across hospital, physician, and insurer markets. 
The SK&A data files are a increasingly used and continually updated commercial database of 
practicing office-based physicians organized at the physician-office level initially developed for 
marketing purposes. SK&A data is able to be used for research purposes and has been shown to 
include more than 90 percent of physician offices without selection in terms of safety-net 
providers (Rhodes et al., 2014).  This data is maintained through a continuously updated phone 
survey of all U.S. office-based physicians. Data from 2014 show over 25 percent of all physicians 
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are participating in either a Medicare or commercial ACO contract. SK&A data files incorporated 
into final analysis file includes: 
‐ Office-Based Physicians (OBP) files (2005 – 2014) 
‐ ACO Contacts file (2014) 
‐ Integrated Health System (HIS) Contacts file (2014) 
‐ Hospital file (1816 Hospitals with links to physician file, ACO file, and IHS file, 2014) 
Gresenz, Auerbach, and Duarte (HSR, 2013) compared SK&A with the AMA Masterfile and the 
American Community Survey, finding similar totals of office-based physicians and selection 
across broad specialties. The ACS listed 673,000 physicians (including non-office based and 
non-clinical), with AMA listing 553,000 and SK&A listing 552,000.  
SK&A has since increased its total physician count, as of the 2013 OBP file uniquely counting 
568,748 unique physicians across 737,183 sites. Exercises completed by the author comparing 
state-level counts of physicians from SK&A and data from the Kaiser Family Foundation 
produced similar distributions. Furthermore, SK&A data does appear upon review to 
underestimate certain hospital-based subspecialties.    
Several categories of variables are available for use in analysis. “ACO contract design” metrics 
include total assigned beneficiaries, financial alignment of physicians across the ACO (within 
groups, health systems, or jointly operated ACOs), and ACO governance. Additional 
characteristics at the ACO level for Medicare ACOs, including ACO start date, were merged in 
from public use Medicare files to define ACO treatment cohorts. Ultimately, analyses include 
observations from 23 Pioneer ACOs (all completing second year, exiting Pioneers were excluded) 
and 335 Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) ACOs with one of four start dates from April 
2012 to January 2014.      
Defining the Firm  
Shortell and coauthors, in their book on American health systems, define an organized delivery 
networks as a group of “organizations that provides or arranges to provide a coordinated 
continuum of services to a defined population and is willing to be held clinically and fiscally 
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accountable for the outcomes and health status of the population served” (2000). However, 
defining a modern, integrated firm from multiple, partially overlapping organizational categories is 
a non-trivial empirical challenge. Recently, Baker and coauthors have utilized tax ids to classify 
firms at the smallest ownership level (2014); the same authors also previously classified nearly 
60% of physician-hospital relationships into some vertically integrated form (2012). While such 
approaches in many cases will identify a residual claimant (i.e., the taxed physician group or the 
hospital-owner), this approach may underestimate the impact of system ownership if physicians 
integrated into systems work across non-system hospitals or in different markets. Instead, this 
project seeks to assign physicians to the broadest organizational form listed by SK&A under the 
assumption that physicians participating in larger groups or health systems will utilize their 
broader organizations’ full market power.   
A hierarchy of organizational forms exists in the SK&A data around physician offices: 
‐ Integrated Health Systems (689 unique IHS) 
‐ Health Systems  (5,055 unique systems)  
‐ Hospital Ownership (528 unique hospitals) 
‐ Group  Medical Practice  (18,388 unique GMPs) 
‐ Independent Physician Association  (5,055 unique IPAs) 
‐ Company (222,653 unique companies) 
‐ Offices ( 294,989 unique offices) 
To overcome this variety of overlapping forms, a unique firm identifier was assigned to each 
physician based on the largest organization they were a part of. While the variable does not 
completely overlap physicians participating in other organizations, it uses all identifiable 
connections to summarize physicians expected to have related financial interests. This approach 
is similar to that used by Dunn and Shapiro (2014) in their research utilizing the SK&A, although 
their data has fewer identified organizational categories. Table 1 indicates what percentage of 
physicians in the same organization will be defined as being in the same firm by the unique firm 
identifier.   
Table 1. Overlap of Unique Firm Identifier with other Organizational Categories 
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Organization Overlap 
Office 91% 
Company 95% 
Group Medical Practice 95% 
Health System 91% 
Hospital Owner 96% 
Independent Physician Association 66% 
ACO 68% 
Integrated Health System 100% 
  
Consideration of the other organizational categories provided in the data is interesting despite the 
need to create a single, universal firm identifier.  The company variable appears to be the nearest 
identifier of a unique, traditional firm in the SK&A. Members of the same company are more than 
95% likely to be in the same health system, owned by the same hospital, be in the same IPA,  be 
in the same ACO, and/or be in the same IHS.  Conversely, not all offices reporting the same 
group practice report being in the same company (52%); though members of such organizations 
do choose to be in the same IHS and ACOs approximately 98% of the time. Accountable Care 
Organizations (578 unique ACOs) may also be considered as a type of organizational form, but 
are better thought of as payment arrangements entered into by multiple firms.  86% of physician 
offices in the same ACO are in the same IHS; likewise members of an IHS are 89% likely to be in 
the same ACO.   
Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data 
The Physician and Other Supplier public use file (PUF) available from CMS provides information 
on utilization and Medicare reimbursement and is organized by National Provider Identifier (NPI) 
and Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) code. While some data is 
censored in cases where a physician provides fewer than 10 of a specific procedure a year, these 
annual summaries benefit from being drawn from 100% of all final claims for the population 
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enrolled in traditional Medicare. Files were additionally aggregated in several ways. First, HCPCS 
codes were aggregated to service category levels using the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service 
(BETOS) classification. Additionally, specific procedure codes were organized into categories of 
interest such as physician provision of evaluation and management (E&M) office visits and 
preventive services. Meaningful preventive services categories were primarily defined using 
Medicare’s own list of preventive services, for which out of pocket payments are typically waived. 
Only specific procedure codes are eligible for reimbursement under these benefits, allowing for 
direct identification in the PUF data. A full list and definition of those services is provided in 
Appendix Table 17. In addition, a list of costly, high volume procedures recently developed by 
Austin and Baker (2015) are flagged to evaluate how physicians in ACOs are approaching 
administration of particularly salient procedures.             
Medicare Physician Referrals Data  
Additional public use data is available from CMS on physician referral patterns from 2010 – 
201411. The data is structured as a data dump from 100% traditional Medicare claims across all 
provider types, with a referral being defined as any pair of claims (i.e. patient encounters) from 
two different NPIs occurring within 30 days of each other. I aggregate this to the physician-year 
level so that it is possible to consider both referrals-out and referrals-in (i.e. referral capture). 
Empirical analysis presents trends in referrals related to one specific relationship: referrals from 
primary care physicians (i.e. generalists) to specialists. I identify a consistent panel of  92,247 
primary care physicians (PCPs) found to refer Medicare beneficiaries to specialists from 2010 – 
2014 in public use referral data as well matched to the SK&A physician file (for firm and ACO 
organizational affiliations). The combined analytic sample allows for creation of firm self-referral 
                                                     
11 Data years released by CMS actually ranged from 2009 – 2015, however both years at the 
ends of the data are incomplete annual summaries (half-years). While results are consistent with 
these years included, they were excluded over concerns of heterogeneous differences in the 
completeness of the summary data for ACO- and non-ACO providers.   
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measures in cases where primary care physicians refer to specialists in the same group or 
system.    
Sample Selection and Summary Statistics 
From the raw SK&A file, I exclude physicians identified as specializing in oral surgery/dentistry, 
holistic medicine, or acupuncture, as well as medical trainees, allied health professionals, and 
physician executives. This cleaned file of 530,126 unique physicians was then merged with the 
Medicare data also at the physician level by National Provider Identifier (NPI). A substantial 
amount of SK&A physicians, 22.2 percent, were not present in Medicare data. Such providers do 
not treat Medicare patients (e.g. most pediatricians) or treat less than ten unique beneficiaries a 
year (a requirement for inclusion in the public use Medicare data).  Almost all physician 
observations in the 2014 Medicare file were matched to SK&A, only 23,941 observations (or 5.4 
percent) were not found in SK&A; these physicians are likely hospitalists or other facility-based 
physicians not identified in SK&A’s office-based data collection. This sample selection process is 
shown in Figure 5 below.  
Figure 5. Sample Selection Flow Chart 
 
556,882  Unique Physicians (NPIs) 
in Raw SK&A File
530,126 Unique Physicians (NPIs) 
in Cleaned SK&A File 
412,705 Merged by NPI to latest 
Medicare Utilization File
392,400 Merged by NPI to all years 
(2012 ‐ 2014) of Utilization File
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Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the final analysis sample of 392,400 unique U.S. 
physicians, including 118,982 primary care physicians, participating consistently in Medicare from 
2012 – 2014. Physicians specializing in primary care, in larger offices (in terms of other 
physicians), in larger physician groups, and vertically integrated with health systems are all more 
likely to form and participate in ACO agreements by 2014. As of 2014, ACO physicians had lower 
billed utilization levels across a range of measures both in total and on the margin per beneficiary. 
The next section provides additional detail on how data on ACO governance and internal 
incentives were collected and defined.      
Table 2. Physician Summary Statistics, 2014   
 All Physicians 
Non-ACO 
Physicians ACO Physicians  
Sig. 
Diff.
? 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD   
Total MDs in Office 11.3 28.6 10.9 27.0 14.0 36.1  *** 
Total MDs in 
Group/System 326.6 743.2 288.4 758.1 539.9 610.5  *** 
Primary Care 30% 46% 28% 45% 42% 49%  *** 
Surgeon 27% 45% 28% 45% 26% 44%  *** 
Internal Medicine Sub. 18% 39% 19% 39% 14% 35%  *** 
Hospital Specialties 24% 43% 25% 43% 19% 39%  *** 
System Integration 38% 49% 33% 47% 68% 47%  *** 
Total Services 3,960 18,008 4,151 19,009 2,890 10,759  *** 
Total Unique Bene. 449.6 678.6 459.5 697.4 394.1 558.8  *** 
Total Part B Payments 
(Thousands) $140.9 $266.5 $146.3 $278.2 $110.9 $185.2  *** 
Service Per Bene. 8.3 34.4 8.6 36.2 6.8 21.7  *** 
Payment Per Bene. $329.45 
$534.8
7 
$336.7
0 
$559.9
1 
$288.9
4 
$361.6
3  *** 
Unique Physicians 392,400 
392,40
0 
332,89
7 
332,89
7 59,503 59,503   
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2014 Medicare Physician and other Supplier PUF. 
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Construction of ACO Characteristic Variables 
This section describes two typologies of ACO contracts to be used as separate treatment groups 
in analysis. First, I describe the creation of ACO governance variables based on the noted 
importance of such features in the literature (Shortell et al., 2015). Next I detail new data 
collection on the internal incentives provided to physicians participating across 193 ACO 
agreements, which is publicly reported and scraped from ACO websites.  
Characterizing ACOs by Shortell et al. (2015) Typology  
Shortell and coauthors distinguish between smaller, physician-led ACOs versus those jointly-
operated with hospitals or overseen by an integrated health system. This categorization has been 
validated in the literature (McWilliams et al., 2015, 2016) as well as in self-reported composition 
MSSP program ACOs (CMS, 2015). A recent CMS brief on MSSPs notes that 56% of such ACOs 
include networks of individual practices, 37% include group practices, 34% include 
hospital/professional partnerships, and 25% include hospital-employed physicians (2015).  
Figure 6 below shows two clusters of system participation in ACOs using this analysis’ primary 
analytic sample of all physicians. I define two mutually exclusive categories based around the 
thresholds of 20% and 80% system affiliation (defined from SK&A) among physicians in the ACO. 
Some ACOs (and 42% of ACO participating physicians) have little to no system or hospital 
involvement. Others are nearly or exclusively operated by hospitals and health systems (26%). 
The remainder fall somewhere between, with joint participation in the ACO across multiple types 
of providers (32%). I find that physician-led ACOs tend to be smaller in term of beneficiary 
enrollment compared to the other forms, consistent with findings from Shortell (2015). Looking at 
a subset of data where enrollment information is available, early physician-led ACOs participating 
in the MSSP program had a median organizational enrollment of 9,814 beneficiaries compared 
with median enrollment of 13,314 for jointly led MSSP ACOs and 20,982 for system-led MSSP 
ACOs.         
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Figure 6. Distribution of ACOs and ACO-Affiliated Physicians by Health System Share 
 
Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file and 2014 CMS Physician and Other Supplier Aggregate file.  
Characterizing Shared Savings Distributions (Internal Incentives) by ACOs 
New data collection was completed by the author to scrape public websites for a sample of ACOs 
(primarily the first three cohorts of MSSP ACOs) to identify how each ACO distributes shared 
savings to provider participants. While non-profit hospitals participating in ACOs are required to 
receive proportional ratios of shared savings (discussed below), other ACOs are given full 
flexibility on how, and if, shared savings bonuses are distributed to ACO participants. While 
significant variation exists across actual compliance with reporting, ACOs are required to make a 
public disclosure available on their websites listing distribution of savings, typically across five 
categories:   
‐ Proportion invested in infrastructure 
‐ Proportion invested in  redesigned care processes/resources 
‐ Distribution to ACO primary care physicians 
‐ Distribution to ACO specialists 
‐ Distribution to ACO hospitals 
Completed web scraping has identified the distribution of shared savings across 138 
organizations participating in the MSSP program. An additional 55 ACOs were identified as not 
publicly reporting the distribution of shared savings, explicitly stating either that such decisions 
were to be decided or were not available. Of the sample 209 MSSPs for which such data was 
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sought, shared savings policies could not be found for 16 ACO contracts (representing a 7.6% 
error rate); an additional 13 cases were completed using a web archive from 2014 due to the 
ACOs listed website being no longer active. Ultimately, 7 of the identified ACOs were excluded 
from the final analysis, 2 of which were in fact identified to disclose shared savings distributions.      
Figure 7. Distribution of ACO-Affiliated Physicians by Internal Incentives  
Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2014 CMS Physician and Other Supplier Aggregate file, author’s 
self-collected data on ACO distributions.  
 
Substantial variation exists across ACO composition with respect to the level of shared savings 
internally distributed to physicians, although this is generally positively correlated with ACO status 
as physician-led. Physician-led ACOs on average distributed 29.5 percent of shared savings to 
primary care physicians, while system-led ACOs on average distributed 26.1 percent. System-led 
ACOs were more likely on average to distribute a greater share of shared savings bonuses to 
participants, with physician-led ACOs more likely to reinvest or allocate the bonuses to 
reinvestment for infrastructure or payments for management.   
Although results are robust to several categorical definitions, review of summary statistics led to 
creation of four categories of treatment: ACOs with low internal incentives (0 – 19% of distributed 
bonus payments) for physicians, those with moderate internal incentives (20 – 80%), those with 
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high internal incentives (81 – 100%), and those for which the information was not publicly 
reported. Approximately 25% of physicians participating in ACO contracts with scraped internal 
incentive data fell into the unreported category. A review of the ACOs in this category highlight 
that many are associated with for-profit management companies known as population health 
services organizations (PHSOs). Additional institutional detail on these organizations is reviewed 
in a later section of this chapter.   
 
Results 
This section presents results of empirical analyses on Medicare ACOs. First, I show how ACO 
contracts reduce per capita utilization and payment for physician services. This effect is 
heterogeneous, with ACO contracts increasing primary care while reducing specialty care. This 
difference is related to the next set of results, which detail how ACO contracts have 
heterogeneous effects on per capita aggregate utilization due to varying organizational designs. 
Furthermore, ACOs will heterogeneously affect types of services based on the value of the 
service with respect to total costs of care and the ACO’s quality goals. Specifically, I show that 
ACO contracts reduce the provision and intensity of evaluation and management services while 
increasing per capita administration of specific cardiac tests and imaging. Finally, I present results 
showing the relevance of shared savings distributions for system-led ACOs; physician-led ACOs 
do not appear to require these specific incentives to generate significant cost savings. 
Changes in Treatment Intensity and Patient Mix Following Medicare ACO Adoption 
Analyses begin with a series of generalized difference in differences regressions on outcomes 
defined from data at the physician – year level related to changes in per capita treatment intensity 
and patient panel selection (e.g. patient mix). No significant changes were detected in physicians’ 
Medicare panel size of unique beneficiaries. However, consistent with ACO program goals, 
negative and statistically significant average treatment effects on Part B Medicare payments and 
services are estimated in total (columns 2 and 3) and on a per beneficiary level (columns 4 and 5) 
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for participating doctors. While marginal decreases of approximately $7 on a per beneficiary level 
may seem small, estimated total annual reductions of -$1990 (stat. sig. at a 10% level) indicate 
meaningful changes by ACO-participating doctors.      
Table 3. DID Results Across Aggregate Utilization and Marginal Treatment Measures 
 Aggregate Utilization Measures Marginal Treatment Measures 
  
Total 
Unique 
Bene. 
Total Part B 
Payments ($) 
Total 
Services 
Part B 
Payments 
Per Bene. 
Total 
Services 
Per Bene. 
  
ACO Treatment * Post -0.03 -1990.07 -451.39** -7.83*** -0.74*** 
2013 2.98*** -929.92*** 21.09 -1.70** 0.11** 
2014 -4.04*** -2,236.52*** 273.04*** -0.44 0.62*** 
Constant 512.60*** 143,469.14*** 3,755.76*** 331.09*** 7.78*** 
Fixed Effects NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI 
R2 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.88 0.92 
Unique Physicians 392,400 392,400 392,400 392,400 392,400 
N 1,177,200 1,177,200 1,177,200 1,177,200 1,177,200 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2012-2014 Medicare Physician and other Supplier PUF. Standard 
errors clustered at the primary care service area (PCSA) level.  
 
Changes in Treatment Intensity by Specialty Type 
Consistent with ACO program goals, negative and statistically significant average treatment 
effects on Part B Medicare payments and counts of services are estimated on a per beneficiary 
level (columns 1 and 4 in Table 4) for participating doctors. Consistent with predictions that ACO 
contracts will increase provision of higher-value services, per capita primary care payments and 
services increase following ACO adoption while specialty care per capita is reduced, where over-
use of services due to grey-area medicine (Chandra and Skinner, 2012) is more common.    
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Table 4. DID Results Across Aggregate Per Capita Utilization Measures 
Dep. Variable Part B Payments Per Bene. Total Services Per Bene. 
 
All 
Physician
s 
Primary 
Care 
Physician
s 
Specialist
s 
All 
Physician
s 
Primary 
Care 
Physician
s 
Specialist
s 
ACO Treatment * 
Post -7.83*** 2.48* -14.56*** -0.74*** 0.03 -1.12*** 
 (1.95) (1.08) (3.06) (.13) (.05) (.20) 
2013 -1.70** -1 -1.99** 0.11** 0.01 0.15** 
 (.53) (.56) (.72) (.03) (.02) (.05) 
2014 -0.44 -1.57* 0.04 0.62*** -0.08** 0.92*** 
(.76) (.74) (1.03) (.06) (.03) (.08) 
Constant 331.09*** 263.39*** 360.47*** 7.78*** 6.53*** 8.30*** 
 (.40) (.37) (.55) (.03) (.01) (.04) 
Fixed Effects NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI 
R2 0.92 0.87 0.92 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Unique Physicians 392,400 118,977 273,423 392,400 118,977 273,423 
N 1,177,200 356,931 820,269 1,177,200 356,931 820,269 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2012-2014 Medicare Physician and other Supplier PUF. Standard 
errors clustered at the primary care service area (PCSA) level.  
 
Physician Response Varies by Organizational Characteristics 
Table 5 replicates the regressions from the previous table, now separately specifying treatment 
effects by ACO organizational governance or internal incentives (distribution of shared savings 
bonuses), respectively. Specialists in physician-led ACOs are found to respond significantly more 
to the contract change, while primary care physicians in system-led organizations show the 
largest (and only statistically significant) increases in per capita payments.  
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Table 5. Triple Difference Results Across Aggregate Per Capita Utilization Measures by ACO 
Type 
Dep. Variable Part B Payments Per Bene. Part B Payments Per Bene. 
Physician Type 
All 
Physici
ans 
Primary 
Care 
Physici
ans 
Speciali
sts 
All 
Physici
ans 
Primary 
Care 
Physici
ans 
Speciali
sts 
ACO * Post * System-Led 
-6.38*** 3.07** 
-
11.02**
*  
  
(2.33) (1.32) (3.29)   
ACO * Post * Jointly-Led  -8.38** 0.55 -15.31**    
 (3.83) (1.96) (6.54)    
ACO * Post * MD-Led -12.27** 2.83 -33.60**    
 (5.62) (2.22) (13.25)    
ACO * Post * Low Internal 
Incentives    2.27 5.79** 0.21 
    (2.90) (2.78) (4.00) 
ACO * Post * Medium Internal 
Incentives    -4.57* 2.19 -9.09** 
    (2.55) (2.20) (3.56) 
ACO * Post * High Internal 
Incentives    -0.72 5.79** -4.61 
    (3.15) (2.42) (4.55) 
ACO * Post * Unreported Internal 
Incentives    
-
26.06**
* 
-4.3 
-
40.98**
* 
    (6.69) (3.22) (11.33) 
2013 -1.71*** -1.00* -2.02*** -1.71*** -0.93* -2.06*** 
 (.54) (.56) (.72) (.53) (.56) (.72) 
2014 -0.44 -1.57** 0.04 -0.68 -1.41* -0.37 
 (.76) (.74) (1.03) (.75) (.72) (1.01) 
Constant 
331.11*
** 
263.42*
** 
360.53*
** 
330.89*
** 
263.51*
** 
360.19*
** 
(.41) (.37) (.56) (.39) (.38) (.54) 
Fixed Effects NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI 
R2 0.92 0.87 0.92 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Unique Physicians 392,400 118,977 273,423 392,400 118,977 273,423 
N 
1,177,2
00 356,931 820,269 
1,177,2
00 356,931 820,269 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2012-2014 Medicare Physician and other Supplier PUF. Standard 
errors clustered at the primary care service area (PCSA) level.  
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Physicians in ACO contracts with medium level of performance incentives outperformed both 
those in both high and low incentive categories. Interestingly, ACO contracts which did not 
publicly report (and/or have not yet determined) internal incentives were the most effective in 
reducing per capita payments, particularly for specialists. 
Physician Response Varies by Treatment Type 
The next series of regressions use BETOS services categorization to aggregate data on annual 
reimbursement for specific service codes into clinically relevant measures. For narrative 
convenience, this may be presented chronologically to a patient encounter with a physician. First, 
physicians typically bill an evaluation and management code (E&M) once per beneficiary per day 
of treatment. Table 6 highlights that on this extensive margin, specialist physicians in ACOs are 
reducing office visits for established patients (column 2) while not limiting access for new patients 
(column 1). The next five columns present effects on per capita spending related to the visit 
intensity (typically based on the number of minutes spent with the patient) across established 
patient visits. Specialists reduce per capita provision of mid-level visits lasting app. 15 or 25 
minutes rather than short (app. 5 or 10 min.) or long (app. 40 min.) patient encounters.  
Appendix Table 19 presents similar findings for primary care physicians. Consistent with 
predictions that ACO contracts will incentivize higher-value care, primary care physicians reduce 
established patient visits and in particular longer visits (25 min.) while also increasing shorter 
office visits (10 minutes or less) as well as preventive care appointments known as annual 
wellness visits.     
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 Table 6. DID Results Across E&M Service Categories for Specialists 
 E&M Office Visits By Patient Type 
E&M Office Visits By Visit Intensity (Visit Time) 
(for Est. Patients) 
 New 
Establishe
d 5 Min. 10 Min. 15 Min. 25 Min. 40 Min. 
BETOS/CPT Code M1A M1B 99211 99212 99213 99214 99215 
-0.17 -1.90*** 0 0.15 -1.01*** -1.42*** 0.25 
ACO Treatment * 
Post (.20) (.36) (.12) (.15) (.22) (.35) (.66) 
2013 -0.55*** 1.26*** 
-
0.14**
* 
-0.48*** 0.05 0.98*** -0.89*** 
 (.04) (.10) (.04) (.04) (.07) (.11) (.25) 
2014 -1.02*** 4.46*** 
-
0.50**
* 
-0.61*** 1.40*** 3.99*** 0.24 
(.05) (.15) (.06) (.06) (.10) (.15) (.31) 
Constant 
23.78**
* 69.44*** 
2.93**
* 8.40*** 
30.99**
* 
42.52**
* 
27.79**
* 
 (.03) (.08) (.03) (.03) (.05) (.08) (.17) 
Fixed Effects NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI 
R2 0.91 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.93 
Unique Physicians 
138,62
3 
159,677 14,75
1 
58,420 135,51
1 
120,89
0 
43,495 
N 
415,87
0 
479,031 44,25
4 
175,25
9 
406,53
2 
362,67
0 
130,48
5 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2012-2014 Medicare Physician and other Supplier PUF. Standard 
errors clustered at the primary care service area (PCSA) level.  
 
In addition to billing Medicare for the E&M visit, physicians will further be reimbursed for all 
procedures and services completed during the appointment. Physicians participating in early 
ACO programs were found to significantly increase per beneficiary provision of treatments across 
advanced imaging, cardiac testing, and other advanced tests. Not presented are results, 
consistent with expectations, showing no significant effect on payment per beneficiary across the 
nine procedural categories defined in the BETOS typology. Appendix Table 20 highlights key 
55 
 
effects of ACO adoption on reimbursement across these affected services for specialists. 
Significant increases in cardiac testing are driven primarily by increases in “Cardiac Stress Tests” 
(T2B) and “Other Cardio. Tests” (T2D). Significant increases in advanced imaging are related to 
increased non-brain imaging scans of the body (I2B, I2D) for both CT and MRI. 
While a second objective of Medicare ACO contracts is to monitor and improve quality, it is 
unclear to what extent ACO adoption affects quality promotion behavior among physicians. As a 
final use of the procedure code data, measures of marginal reimbursement per beneficiary for 
multiple preventive services were considered as possible ACO outcomes. These analyses find 
limited effects of ACO adoption on the marginal administration of most preventive treatments; 
notable exceptions include increased reimbursement to ACO-participating physicians for annual 
wellness visits, seasonal flu vaccines, and diagnostic colonoscopies (data not presented). 
Additional analyses not presented found no significant effect differences by type of ACO in 
changes related to marginal preventive care across the various other services defined in 
Appendix Table 17. This is accompanied by an increase in some, and no estimated decrease, 
across several high cost, high volume procedures developed following Austin and Baker (2015). 
Significant results may be related to the specific quality measures of ACO contracts. However, 
results suggest physicians do not respond to ACO contracts by significantly changing their 
practice styles toward preventive care as way to improve overall care quality. 
Organizational characteristics affect physician responses in treatment choice as well. Appendix  
Table 21 presents results employing the triple difference interaction variables to separately 
estimate the effects of adopting either a physician group led or health system led ACO contract. 
Total annual payments for several categories of evaluation and management (E&M) visits 
occurring in office, inpatient, and post-acute settings are presented. While a general effect across 
ACO types is significantly estimated for decreased marginal office visits for established patients, 
distinct patterns between the organizational types emerge in other cases. Only system-led ACOs 
significantly decreased reimbursement per beneficiary for new office visits; conversely physicians 
in such organizations all received higher marginal reimbursement for initial hospital visits. Only 
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physician-led ACOs, those with little or no financial stake in hospital profitability, were effective in 
reducing inpatient E&M spending per beneficiary for subsequent and critical care visits.     
For System-Led ACOs, Internal Incentive Payments to Physicians Appear Necessary 
Finally, results highlighting that while the distribution of shared savings bonuses was only weakly 
significant in general, clear effects are more evident when stratifying by ACO governance. These 
results are shown in Appendix Table 22.  Such payment schemes are a priori expected to be 
more impactful in systems and jointly-led ACOs; under a physician-led ACOs physicians are often 
owners of the organization and residual claimants regardless of performance due to ownership. 
For integrated health systems, distributing some but not all shared savings to physician 
participants appears optimal; while the point estimate for the high incentive category is also 
negative the effect is not statistically significant. Interestingly, estimated effects for those ACO 
contracts where internal incentives are not publicly disclosed continue to be high and strong 
across governance types; physician-led ACOs with unreported incentive schemes reduced 
spending by approximately $101 upon joining the ACO.    
Changes in Referral Patterns Following Medicare ACO Adoption 
To further explore mechanisms for unintended increases in volume and per capita reimbursement 
within ACOs following adoption of such payment models, I identify a consistent panel of 92,247 
primary care physicians (PCPs) found to refer Medicare beneficiaries to specialists from 2010 – 
2014 using both public use referral data and the SK&A physician file (for firm and ACO 
organizational affiliations). Approximately 20.5% of primary care physicians were found to enter 
an ACO that started during this period. Results from two referral-related outcome variables are 
presented in Table 7: total annual referrals to specialists and the share of self-referrals to all 
referrals. The latter variable was defined by dividing the number of specialist referrals to members 
of one’s own group or health system (as defined by SK&A) by the total referrals to all providers. 
Two specifications analogous to those used previously are employed. The first estimates the 
average treatment effect (columns 1 and 2) and the second presenting results with triple 
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difference interactions (columns 3 and 4) included to separately estimate adoption effects on 
physicians in physician-led versus system-led ACOs.  
Difference in differences regressions fail to find a robust, significant effect of general Medicare 
ACO participation on total specialist referrals by PCPs as shown in the first column of Table 7. 
However, as shown in the second column, physicians are significantly more likely to refer patients 
to specialists within their own organization upon ACO adoption. With the average ACO PCP 
referring 26.6% of specialist visits to members of their own organization, the estimated effect of a 
1.1% annual increase is both plausible and nontrivial.      
Repeatedly highlighting the importance of ACO financial alignment and governance, the last two 
columns of Table 7 show significantly different effects on referral behavior following adoption of a 
physician or system-led ACO contract. While participation in the former appears to prompt PCPs 
to reduce referrals both generally and within their firm, results indicate that hospital or health 
system-led ACOs significantly increase both total specialist referrals as well firm self-referral 
rates. With the opposing effects for physician-led ACOs separately estimated in the interaction 
term, the general effect of ACO adoption increases and becomes statistically significant. With an 
average of 3029.5 referrals by ACO PCPs to specialists in 2014, estimates of the change in 
marginal referrals for each of the ACO organizational types are all economically significant. 
Appendix Table 24 presents the triple difference specifications from Table 7 across a range of 
specialist types that primary care physicians to which may refer patients. While such subgroup 
analyses are individually interesting, the repetition of similar results is a useful robustness check 
for the analyses generally.      
Table 7. DID Results for PCP to Specialist Referrals for Physician vs. System Led ACOs, 2010 - 
2014 
Specification DID Estimates Triple Difference Estimates 
Dependent Variable Total Annual Referrals 
Self-Referral 
Share 
Total Annual 
Referrals 
Self-Referral 
Share 
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ACO Treatment*Post 47.3 0.011*** 84.5* 0.004 
ACO * Post * 
System-Led 
128.0* 0.024*** 
ACO* Post * 
Physician-Led  
-311.8*** -0.009** 
2011 -3.2 0.008*** -2.9 0.008*** 
2012 -143.0*** 0.017*** -142.1*** 0.017*** 
2013 -385.9*** 0.026*** -386.3*** 0.026*** 
2014 -699.6*** 0.030*** -699.2*** 0.030*** 
Constant 4087.2*** 0.153*** 4087.2*** 0.153*** 
Fixed Effects NPI NPI NPI NPI 
R2 0.894 0.928 0.894 0.929 
Unique Physicians 92,247 92,247 92,247 92,247 
N 461,235 461,235 461,235 461,235 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2010-2014 Medicare Physician Referral Data PUF. Standard 
errors clustered at the primary care service area (PCSA) level. 
 
Referrals to Inpatient and Post-Acute Providers 
In below results, I next show significant increases in primary care physician referrals out to 
hospitals and post-acute providers following ACO adoption by system-led and jointly-led 
organizations. This is consistent with recent findings from McWilliams, Grabowski, and coauthors 
(2017) on the effects of ACOs on post-acute care. Consistent with previous results, Table 8 
shows only physicians in physician-led ACOs significantly reduced referrals to inpatient and post-
acute providers following contract adoption. Estimated an average treatment effect across all 
ACO contracts, statistically significant results shown in Appendix Table 25 show that ACO-
adopting physicians also increased referrals to outside lab providers upon adoption.    
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Table 8. Triple Difference Results for PCP to Organizational Provider Referrals for Physician vs. 
System Led ACOs, 2010 - 2014 
Dependent Variable: PCP “Referrals Out” to Provider Type   
Provider Type 
Acute Care 
Hospital 
Home 
Health 
Skilled Nursing 
Facility Labs 
ACO * Post * System-
Led 
130.767*** -3.162 20.892 6.287 
ACO* Post * Physician-
Led  
-90.697*** -13.917** -13.335 34.135 
ACO* Post * Joint-Led 32.502 10.321** 15.359 23.332 
2011 21.695*** -6.518*** -2.687 -28.543*** 
2012 23.857* -11.715*** -22.997*** -67.268*** 
2013 -8.715 -19.986*** -56.191*** -93.184*** 
2014 -65.751*** -30.882*** -75.984*** -
134.581**
*Constant 1583.403*** 220.021*** 608.253*** 987.642**
* 
Fixed Effects NPI NPI NPI NPI 
R2 0.803 0.836 0.914 0.873 
Unique Physicians 116,493 58,222 41,662 101,231 
N 582,465 291,110 208,310 506,155 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2010-2014 Medicare Physician Referral Data PUF. Standard errors 
clustered at the primary care service area (PCSA) level. 
 
Policy Implications and Counterfactuals 
Policy Implications  
Criticisms of current ACO designs include an over-reliance on hospitals for generating savings, 
likely conflicts preventing hospital-physician collaboration, generally weak incentives, lack of 
patient involvement, and the possibility of cost-shifting to commercial payers  due to increased 
integration. Due to these problems with the current ACO program designs, Goldsmith proposes a 
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payment model with separate payments and incentives provided for long-term, low-intensity 
primary care, and urgent/emergency care (2011). The latest Medicare alternative payment 
models, including the Next Generation ACO, Advance Payment ACO, and the Comprehensive 
Primary Care Plus (CPC+) models appear to address many of these concerns.  Future work will 
be able to provide insights into the importance of ACOs’ specific designs on physician and firm 
behavior, holding market and organizational characteristics fixed. 
With respect to treatment choice and organizational subgroup findings, results provide added 
insight. Regarding the former, no evidence was found of physicians reducing high-value services 
such as major procedures or new evaluation and management visits. Rather reductions in per 
capita utilization were found for less beneficial services such as mid-intensity repeat office visits. 
Whether this is due to ACO quality objectives, physician altruistic tendencies, or other factors 
such as reputation or liability concerns, it is reassuring from a program evaluation perspective 
that physicians were found to reduce services in ways less potentially harmful to beneficiaries’ 
health. Further research is necessary to monitor for unintended consequences, for example due 
to free-riding behavior, in future ACOs.    
Regarding organizational subgroup findings, results highlight the importance of physician 
governance, preferably by physician groups if not a physician group-hospital joint venture, in 
managing physicians’ behavior within an ACO contract. Integrated health systems, where 
decision-making is unlikely to be well-centralized, appear less likely to succeed. For systems 
primarily, the transfer of some performance risk from the organization to individual physicians 
through the use of internal distribution of shared savings bonus payments appears beneficial to 
encourage desired cost savings.  
These findings also point toward an additional typology of ACOs worth further consideration in 
future work. Two new organizational categories for evaluating the internal design (or strength) of 
ACO contracts are shown by my results: non-profit affiliated ACOs and for-profit management 
companies known as population health services organizations (PHSOs). The former is bound by 
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IRS regulation to only obtain a “fair share” of shared savings and more likely to be jointly-led; the 
latter is assumed to maximize profits, is more likely to be physician-led, and comprise over half of 
participating ACOs which do not publicly disclose internal shared savings distributions. These 
evolving forms are briefly described below.  
Anecdotal reports indicate that many ACO providers, particularly those in physician-led ACOs, 
are turning to for-profit management companies known as population health services 
organizations (PHSOs).  A review of public use Medicare data notes that one Universal American 
Corp. VP, Richard Kory, was the listed public contact and ACO executive for no less than 34 
MSSP ACOs nationally. Such activities appear highly profitable for the PHSO; as a publicly 
traded firm Universal American reported two thirds of total income ($8.2 million) in the first half of 
2016 stemmed from ACO management (Universal American Corp., 2016). Furthermore, the 
company claims to require an ownership stake (51%) in the assets of any ACO it operates (Fierce 
Healthcare, 2012). 48 total PHSOs identified in the data include MSSP contracts operated by 
Imperium Health (5), American Health Network (3), ApolloMed (2), Akira (2), and Walgreens (2) 
and started across four start dates from April 2012 to January 2014. Strategies employed by such 
firms vary, Imperium Health appears to partner mainly with system-led groups of providers while 
Walgreens, which recently exited the ACO market, focused on pharmaceutical management. 
While a more comprehensive review of shared savings distributions to members and strategies 
employed by PHSOs is necessary, initial review indicates that such organizations are much less 
likely to distribute shared savings to provider participants while also taking a greater role in 
practice management.  
Conversely, profit and loss sharing by non-profit hospitals operating ACOs appears much more 
highly regulated in the distribution of shared savings bonuses internally to participants. Non-profit 
hospitals have received additional guidance from the Internal Revenue Service regarding 
participation in hybrid-organizations such as ACOs. Primarily, the IRS has directed non-profit 
participants in ACOs to not engage in anti-competitive behavior (e.g. through the use of “fair-
market” rates to coordinating firms) and to require that shared savings/losses are distributed 
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proportionally such that they don’t surpass the non-profit’s proportional entitlement (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2016).  Colla and coauthors (2016) show that most (~80%) of hospitals 
participating in ACOs are in fact non-profit, although as previously noted approximately 42% of 
ACOs are unaffiliated with any hospital or health system. Consideration of ACO physicians 
affiliated (as well as those fully integrated) with non-profit hospitals will thus be important 
subpopulations to consider moving forward, with different predictions for salaried physicians and 
those physicians only affiliated but not financially integrated with a non-profit.    
Estimation of Total Savings and Counterfactuals 
Ultimately, this research is interested not in current but optimal design of value-based, incentive 
contract reimbursement. To this end, I utilize the reduced form estimates from Table 3 and a 
sufficient statistic (Chetty, 2008, Chetty, 2009) from presented theory to consider counterfactuals. 
Historically, reduced form estimates have been critiqued as local average treatment effects 
endogenous to a policy regime (Lucas, 1976; Heckman and Vytlacil 2005) with counterfactual 
analysis typically requiring structural estimation of underlying market and firm primitives, often by 
fairly strict assumptions. Work over the past decade in the public economics and labor literatures 
have introduced broadly applicable methods for welfare analysis that, unlike structural work, may 
utilize reduced form estimates with limited assumptions (Chetty, 2008, 2009). Specifically, the 
principal-agent model presented in the theory section highlights a basic sufficient statistics ࣔ࡯࢕࢙࢚࢙ࣔ࡭࡯ࡻ  
that I may use to make statements about welfare.  
In terms of estimated total savings, topline results indicate an estimated reduction of $7.83 per 
year, across 59,503 physicians in ACO contracts, who have an average annual per capita 
spending of $361.63. Across mean patient panels of 394 beneficiaries, this represents total 
estimated aggregate savings of approximately $183.57 million dollars. This is a plausible result; 
Medicare itself estimated 2014 savings across all ACOs at $411 million (with $422 million in 
bonus transfers to just 97 ACOs) across all services, including Part A inpatient care on which this 
analysis lacks data. That figure is also estimated through benchmarks; so, $183 million in savings 
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from reductions in physician services is convincing given $411 million as a reasonable upper 
bound.    
With physician services captured by my data representing 16.2 percent of the traditional Medicare 
payments of $441.78 billion (such that $71.56 billion is made toward physician services) (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2015), estimated savings represent only 0.26 percent of total annual 
expenditures in 2014 on physician services. To the extent that providers reveal an ability to 
generate savings through continued participation in ACO contracts, economic theory implies that 
cost savings and social welfare gains will accrue. As participation in Medicare ACOs continues to 
grow in adoption, additional savings are expected because participation is voluntary relative to a 
lower risk, fee-for-service baseline. Policy changes to strengthen the design and incentives of 
ACO contracts will also encourage larger responses. For example, currently only 42% of 
physicians in participating ACOs are in the more successful physician-led organizations. With 
estimated savings for this ACO governance type at a higher per capita effect of $12.27 in reduced 
spending per participating physician, this implies physician-led ACOs alone are responsible for 
$120.8 million in estimated reductions (app. two thirds of the total effect on physician services).12 
While more rigorous consideration of counterfactuals will be helpful, it is interesting to note that a 
population of only 25 thousand physicians in physician-led ACO contracts generated such 
significant savings. Medicare, should it choose, would have little problem doubling physician 
enrollment in such payment models. This is notably already being done through specific 
physician-focused ACO models, namely the previously noted CPC+ alternative payment model 
which seeks to enroll up to 5,000 practices into primary-care centered ACO-type contract 
featuring a combination of fee-for-service and capitation-based payments.                   
                                                     
12 Note that neither of these aggregate estimates reflect the economic value of any quality 
improvements brought on by organizations’ pursuit of quality measures under an ACO contract.           
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Discussion 
Presented analyses in Part III seek to demonstrate the role of physician decisions and 
organizational form in the success and failure of ACO contracts. I show heterogeneous, 
economically significant responses to ACO adoption by physicians in terms of marginal treatment 
intensity and, to a lesser extent, patient panel selection. Given the free choice of providers by 
beneficiaries under Medicare and documented increases in specialist referrals by ACO PCPs, the 
weaker evidence of selection is not surprising. Furthermore, data restrictions limit the work from 
identifying differences in treatment between ACO-affiliated patients and those unaffiliated. While 
anecdotal evidence suggests that early ACOs were unable to cleanly determine such a difference 
due to retrospective attribution, presented results may be lower-bound estimates of effects on 
attributed patients if this is not the case. Results reflect the importance of large physician groups 
and integrated health systems in development of ACOs, as well as the importance of market 
structure in terms of primary care physician integration with health systems and specialists. In the 
case of ACOs, discussion of clinical integration is often synonymous with financial integration. 
Whether the benefits of the former outweigh the negative effects of decreased competition in 
ACO markets is yet to be shown. However, ACO contracts that appear to do both are able to 
reduce both per capita spending and service utilization. 
Future research is well positioned to evaluate the effects of value-based designs in physician 
markets. Further characterizing the various vertical relationships between primary care 
physicians, specialists, and inpatient providers will be an important aspect of this work. Within 
ACOs, Mostashari and coauthors have noted that physicians, and in particular primary care 
physicians, have stronger financial incentives than hospitals or health systems to reduce health 
care costs outside of their physician group (Mostashari, Sanghavi, and McClellan, 2014). Indeed, 
criticisms of current ACO designs include an over-reliance on hospitals for generating savings, 
likely conflicts preventing hospital-physician collaboration, generally weak incentives, lack of 
patient involvement, and the possibility of cost-shifting to commercial payers  due to increased 
integration. Due to these problems with the current ACO program designs, Goldsmith proposes a 
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payment model with separate payments and incentives provided for long-term, low-intensity 
primary care, and urgent/emergency care (2011). The latest Medicare ACO models, including the 
Next Generation ACO, Advance Payment ACO, and the Comprehensive Primary Care Plus 
(CPC+) models appear to reflect many of these concerns. Presented research provides further 
insights into the importance of ACOs’ specific designs on physician and firm behavior, holding 
market and organizational characteristics fixed. Understanding how health systems and ACOs 
manage the array of incentives and disincentives presented to them, sometimes referred to as 
polarity management (Burns, 1999), will likely be an important factor in explaining ACO program 
outcomes. Medicare spending per beneficiary for physician services increased by 67 percent 
from 2000 to 2013, far surpassing growth in Medicare spending due to increases in 
reimbursement prices or inflationary adjustments. Findings highlight the promise of the ACO 
approach to limit health care utilization while underlining potential unintended consequences for 
treatment choice and ongoing antitrust concerns. Results are relevant not only to policy makers, 
but also the patients, providers, and insurers increasingly participating in such arrangements and 
will inform the ongoing development of both public and commercial alternative payment models. 
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CHAPTER 4: Commercial ACO Designs: Evidence from Three National Payers 
 
Does adoption of Accountable Care Organization (ACO) type contracts by commercial insurers, 
which reimburse providers conditionally on quality and cost benchmarks, affect physician 
treatment behavior and subsequent patient outcomes? By what mechanisms may physician 
behavior change and care quality improve? Presented research is positioned to answer such 
questions using a unique analysis file combining physician-level commercial ACO identifiers by 
zip code with commercial claims data from a consortium of three top U.S. insurers. Commercial 
claims data were accessed through the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI), a non-profit 
organization partnering with Aetna, Humana, and United Healthcare to share claims data with 
researchers.  
Introduction 
Over the past fifteen years, industrial organization and health economists have made major 
contributions in understanding the role of health care provider competition and provider-insurer 
bargaining on price determination in health care. (Town and Vistnes, 2001; Capps, Dranove, and 
Satterwaite, 2003; Ho, 2009). Less clearly understood is how providers determine the quality of 
care provided to patients. Policy reforms have in general taken two approaches to further 
incentivize quality in health care markets: service-specific changes in reimbursement such as 
pay-for-performance schemes or readmission penalties and transition to capitated payments 
based around specific ACO type contracts (Doyle, Graves, and Gruber, 2015). Initial evidence 
highlights the potential for ACOs and other total cost of care (TCOC) contracts to improve quality 
of care, patient satisfaction, and, in some cases, constrain costs (McWilliams et al., 2015; Song et 
al., 2014; Nyweide et al., 2015). However, it is not known what specific changes in behavior by 
physicians, if any, are driving these early results. This work contributes to this literature by 
showing that while commercial ACOs are estimated to increase overall payments, payments per 
patient, and units of service per patient provided by specialists, such contracts are able to 
significantly shift important aspects of patient care away from elective and discretionary services 
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including specific specialist procedures, imaging, and testing. After broadly reviewing effects 
across various specialist services following commercial ACO entry, I focus on the estimated 
effects of ACO contracts in two categories: discretionary services and radiation oncology 
treatment.              
While it is increasingly understood how providers and insurers negotiate prices, how provider 
organizations set the level of quality (i.e., the mix of services) provided is significantly less 
understood (Gaynor and Town, 2012). Such “quality” selection is likely endogenous to the 
competitive environment and thus to underlying prices and payment models. However, I propose 
that physician’s recent exposure to newly implemented Medicare and commercial ACO 
arrangements are significant shocks to identify how physicians make marginal treatment 
decisions in response to changes in reimbursement incentives. Underlying the validity of such 
policy instruments are assumptions that providers do not cost-shift in response to financial 
shocks, that quality levels are endogenously set on average across payer types, and that 
reimbursement based on quality by one payer affects the aggregate returns to quality (i.e. that 
quality is at least partially set on average across patients). Results from this work estimate that 
while specialists participating in commercial ACO contracts increase both total reimbursement 
and units of service provided, no significant changes are evident in terms of per patient spending 
or service provision. Instead, commercial ACO contracts reduced utilization of discretionary, 
elective medical services such as hip and knee replacements, ambulatory and minor procedures, 
basic and advanced imaging, and radiation therapy for prostate cancer.           
Background 
Commercial ACO designs in their early development have introduced various, often idiosyncratic 
designs (Health Affairs Blog, 2014). A push is underway for payers to streamline quality 
measures and incentive contracts. However, to the extent that commercial ACO contracts are the 
result of provider group-insurer bargaining, contract designs will likely continue to maintain some 
distinctiveness across markets.           
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Aetna, Humana, and United Healthcare (the three HCCI data contributors) are each known to 
operate ACOs associated with specific quality measures that physicians must meet to be eligible 
for shared savings bonus payments. Often, contacts are linked to National Quality Forum (NQF) 
or National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) Healthcare Effectiveness Data and 
Information Set (HEDIS) measures. An insurance industry movement toward measure 
standardization is under way, with HCCI data contributor Humana recently reporting a drop to 
“202 key quality measures instead of 1,100”. So, meaningfully aggregating and summarizing 
quality measures across specialty types and ACO goals (e.g. increased quality, increased 
access, reduced utilization) is difficult and prone to measurement bias. Qualitatively, reviewed 
quality measures typically employed across the three insurer’s 96 commercial contracts 
considered in claims analysis appear to parallel estimated significant responses from physicians. 
For example, most if not all ACO contracts across the three HCCI payers have quality measures 
related to reduced emergency room utilization; such a reduction is significantly shown in results.     
Among these HCCI data contributors, examples of commonly reported quality measures of 
associated ACOs include (Health Affairs Blog, 2014, Bates White, 2015): 
‐ Increased access to primary care physicians 
‐ Better management of patients with chronic conditions like diabetes and heart failure 
‐ Routine diabetes screenings and control of blood sugar 
‐ Multiple metrics around care of patients with chronic asthma 
‐ Decreased hospital readmission rates 
‐ Reductions in “avoidable” hospital readmission rates 
‐ Decreased emergency room visits 
‐ Reductions in “avoidable” emergency room visits via expanded primary care access 
‐ Increased patient satisfaction 
‐ Percentage of beneficiaries receiving recommended screenings 
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Data 
SK&A ACO Affiliations Data 
SK&A has collected a unique and valuable dataset of physician commercial ACO affiliations 
previously unavailable to researchers. 25 percent of all physicians are identified by SK&A as 
participating in either a Medicare or commercial ACO contract, with 9% of physicians affiliated 
with a commercial contract specifically. Approximately 25 thousand physicians are participating in 
one or more of the 96 ACO contracts affiliated with a HCCI data contributor (Aetna, Humana, 
UnitedHealthcare) present in the SK&A data. Figure 8 below provides detail on the geographic 
distribution of commercial ACO physician penetration rates at the HRR level for the primary 
treatment group of HCCI-contributor ACOs (left) as well as for all commercial ACOs (right).              
Figure 8. HRR Penetration of HCCI-Contributor ACOs (left) and All Commercial ACOs (right)  
 
This data set is supplemented by an additional custom data source collected for this research: 
start dates for each of the commercial ACOs featured in the empirical analyses of Part IV and 
Part V. These start dates are necessary for determining when commercial ACOs changed 
physician incentives and thus for identification of underlying causal effects; this is directly 
comparable to the identification strategy used with Medicare ACO start dates in Part III. While 
introduction of commercial ACOs has occurred fairly smoothly time, this distribution presented in 
Figure 9 shows that many commercial ACOs were started in 2012, simultaneously with the 
launch of the first Medicare ACO agreements in the Pioneer and MSSP programs.    
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Figure 9. Distribution of Sample Commercial ACO Contract Starting Years   
 
HCCI Physician Services Claims Data 
In primary analysis, HCCI claims were processed into physician-year level claims summaries for 
focus of the analysis and consistency with previous Medicare results. The raw claims file prior to 
aggregation to the physician-year level contains over 96 million observations representing 19.2 
million physician-patient relationships (across any given year).  From physician billing claims, 
treatment choice summary variables were constructed from HCPCS codes analogous to work 
presented previously in this dissertation using Medicare data. Outcome variables across multiple 
treatment categories were defined to generate measures of per treated enrollee (hereafter, per 
patient) per year spending on treatment categories such as specific procedures (using the 
BETOS and CPT categorizations), testing, and preventive services. All outcome variables are in 
the form of per patient per physician annual payment for the specific service. Paralleling previous 
analyses in Medicare populations, these variables are generate by dividing annual specialist 
reimbursement for services as specific as the procedure level by the total number of patients 
seen by the physician in that year. In this way and combined with physician fixed effects in 
regression, dependent variables measure physicians changing propensity to administer specific 
treatments on the margin.      
A consistent data panel of physicians treating and being reimbursed for at least one adult 
member insured by an HCCI insurer in each available year (2010 – 2014) was assembled totaling 
903,914 unique providers. Presented analyses focus on changes in behavior by specialists, with 
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restricting the sample to 601,050. Of this population, a consistent panel of 357,535 specialists 
billing to an HCCI insurer in each year from 2010 – 2014 was utilized in final analyses to reduce 
any biases from physicians churning in and out of commercial insurance networks. This large 
convenience sample of specialist physicians present in each year of HCCI claims were then 
mapped at the provider zip code level to ACO penetration rates to estimate treatment with an 
HCCI commercial ACO as described next.     
Mapping SK&A ACO Affiliations to HCCI Physicians by Zip Code 
To map 2014 ACO affiliations to the HCCI claims, a summary file at the zip code level was 
created. Commercial ACO contracts with physicians were identified using the nationally 
representative SK&A office-based physician file (fully described in Part 3). A zip code summary 
file was created from a final analysis file of 700,380 unique physician-zip pairs across 562,747 
physicians.  
Penetration rates for public, HCCI, and non-HCCI ACOs were each estimated by zip code using 
the shares of physicians (head counts) in the zip code participating in such a contract. In 61.2% 
of physician-zip pairs and for 78.9% of unique physicians in SK&A, the physician location was 
unique to a single zip code. Physicians practicing in multiple zip codes were counted toward the 
ACO penetration rate in each respective zip code; no full-time equivalent adjustments were 
made. Physician location-based (rather than merely physician-based) ACO affiliations were 
considered in the ACO penetration rates. In less than one percent of observations where 
physicians were listed at multiple locations in the same zip code, physicians were uniquely 
assigned to a single location within a zip code via a sorting rule based on location commercial 
ACO participation and larger office size. Partly to preserve claim anonymity and meet HCCI use 
requirements, this file listing commercial ACO penetration rates and respective entry dates for 
any Medicare and commercial ACOs (separating HCCI and non-HCCI affiliated) by zip code was 
then transferred to the HCCI server.  Physicians present in the HCCI data were merged to ACO 
contract data by zip code; 97.7 percent of unique zip codes from SK&A matched to the HCCI 
data.  
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Defining Commercial ACO Treatment 
Physician ACO assignment by zip code occurred when a given zip code had more than 50% of 
providers participating in such a contract. Due to anonymity of the three larger insurers in HCCI 
data, all patients of physicians participating in an HCCI-contributor ACO were assumed to be (or 
assumed to be treated by physicians) in that ACO. The inability to attribute patients to the ACO in 
this way may be a source of measurement error bias. However, such error generally biases 
against finding significant treatment effects of ACO participation. Significant results may thus be 
overly conservative. However, given that specific insurer’s ACO entry within a zip code was 
mapped to physician services known to be reimbursed by the insurer in the same area, any such 
measurement error is expected to be relatively small. For example, if SK&A identify a United 
Healthcare ACO operating in a given zip code and this is confirmed in the merge to HCCI claims, 
the percentage of claims that are truly treated by the United Healthcare ACO is bounded at more 
than zero and up to one hundred percent.  
The pre-aggregated SK&A analysis file use to make the zip code file was also used to consider 
the validity of defining ACO treatment for HCCI commercial ACOs and other types through zip 
code penetration rates based on SK&A physician counts. This check estimated that a zip-level 
assignment of ACO identification correctly assigned the true physician ACO affiliation for 87% of 
physicians in Medicare ACOs and 86% of those in all commercial ACOs. The smaller penetration 
of either HCCI-insurer affiliated ACOs and those associated with non-HCCI payers, respectively, 
led to higher accuracy rates of 96.5% and 92.7%.   
For HCCI-insurer affiliated ACOs specifically, using a 50% share threshold resulted in 2.9% of 
physician-zip pairs being incorrectly not assigned to an HCCI zip (false negatives), while 0.6% of 
physicians-zip pairs were incorrectly assigned to an HCCI ACO (false positives). Empirical results 
in Part IV and Part IV are robust to alternative ACO treatment measures employing 10% and 25% 
thresholds.  Utilizing “any ACO” penetration resulted in an overly high false positive rate; 
Medicare ACOs with any adoption by zip code in particular were found to have “treated” over 
70% of observations using such a definition.    
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Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics presented in Table 9 show appropriate analytic file construction and cleaning. 
I restrict presented analyses to specialist physicians only, excluding primary care physicians and 
general internists as defined by a specialty of family medicine or internal medicine.  I define a 
consistent panel of specialists billing at least one service and receiving reimbursement from an 
HCCI insurer in each of the five years of the panel data. This results in a final analytic sample of 
357,535 specialist physicians with 1.78 million physician-year observations. 
While the majority of my results are robust to measures utilizing payments per patient for specific 
services, I mainly present results relating to service units rather than payments as an exogenous 
measure of marginal resource use not (or less) affected by endogenous market structure like 
negotiated commercial prices.  To adjust for long distributional tails in unit counts and payments 
per patient, dependent variables in regression are the transformed natural log of claimed units per 
patient treated in a given year, in aggregate and for specific service categories. Specialists in my 
final sample were paid a mean total $71k annually by HCCI insurers, receiving an average 
payment per unique treated patient of $418 for 7.6 claimed service units. While such general 
measures of service utilization (total claimed units per patient) are often unhelpful, the use of NPI 
fixed effects in regression analysis allows for physician-adjusted unit counts allowing for unbiased 
comparisons.  
Table 9. HCCI Commercial Payment and Claimed Units Summary Statistics 
 Obs. Mean SD 
Commercial Payments 
Total Commercial Payment 1,787,675 $71,006.5 $461,054.7 
Natural Log of Total Payment 1,787,675 9.8 2.1 
Total Payment Per Patient Treated 1,787,675 $418.0 $1,157.3 
Natural Log of Per Patient Payment 1,787,675 5.4 1.3 
Units 
Total Units Claimed 1,787,675 1519.8 34359.9 
Natual Log of Total Units 1,787,675 5.7 1.7 
Total Units Claimed Per Patient Treated 1,787,675 7.61 32.5 
Natural Log of Per Patient Units 1,787,675 1.37 0.92 
Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2010-2014 HCCI Commercial Claims for physician services. 
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Methods 
Methods employed in analysis of commercial ACOs are very similar to those used in the 
Medicare analyses (Part III) to ensure comparability of results. Utilizing physician-level 
commercial ACO assignment and controlling for observable physician characteristics (primarily 
through the use physician-level fixed effects), regression models employ the following 
generalized difference-in-differences (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004)   specifications:  
			ݕ௜௧ ൌ 	 ̅ߚܣܥܱ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ ൅	ߚ௧ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅	ߚ௜݄ܲݕݏ݅ܿ݅ܽ݊௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧	 
Where the average treatment effect of commercial ACO participation ̅ߚ, for a given outcome 	ݕ௜௖௧ 
is well identified with every untreated physician in a specific year (including those later joining a 
commercial ACO) acting as controls for ACO adopting physicians participating in that year. So, 
physicians joining ACOs in 2014 act as controls for early adopters until the physician-year 
observation itself is treated.     ̅ߚ will thus capture average annual treatment effect across the 
multiple start-dates and ACO cohorts. Such a specification is identical to a classical difference in 
differences approach except for the inclusion of a physician fixed effect (݄ܲݕݏ݅ܿ݅ܽ݊௜ሻ to control for 
static differences across individual physicians and related nonrandom selection into the ACO 
contract. Five years of commercial claims data across a national sample of physicians allow for 
such analyses while maintaining sufficient degrees of freedom; also note that neither the ACO 
cohort variables nor specific static physician characteristics (e.g. system integration) need be 
included in this regression due to perfect multicollinearity with the physician fixed effects 
(assigned at NPI level). Key outcome measures, ݕ௜௧, similar to those used in Medicare analyses, 
include multiple metrics of treatment behavior and procedure utilization. 
Recognizing that the potentially time-varying assignment of commercial ACO affiliation may 
introduce measurement error bias into results that is likely to vary across geographic markets, I 
cluster standard errors at the zip code level (with the number of zip code clusters utilized 
reported) in each regression sample presented in regression tables. Use of robust standard 
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errors without clustering does not change results but does improve the statistical confidence of 
many results.     
Results 
Results utilizing commercial HCCI claims are presented below after export from the HCCI server 
environment. Broadly, commercial ACOs appear to be successfully shifting specialist provision of 
services away from costly procedures and tests and toward increased evaluation and 
management both in outpatient and acute care settings.  
Unlike work presented in chapter 3 on Medicare ACO contracts, physicians participating in the 
sampled commercial ACO contracts (representing entry of 96 different ACOs) did not significantly 
reduce per patient annual spending (measured by payments). These results are presented below 
in Table 10. Finding no significant effect on payments per members is not inconsistent with a 
conceptual framework where in a market with negotiated prices payers are not able to 
substantially alter equilibrium prices with the introduction of a new quality contract (unlike 
Medicare where prices are administratively set). Anecdotally, commercial ACOs often de-
prioritize reductions in per capita payments to providers (or increase reimbursement rates) in 
order to promote physician participation in the contracts initially.  
 
Table 10. Commercial ACO Effects Across Payments and Service Units 
Dep. Variable 
Natural Log of 
Total Commercial Payments  
Natural Log of 
Claimed Units 
Transformation Total Per Patient Total Per Patient 
ACO Treatment * Post 0.080*** 0.006 0.068*** -0.005 
 (0.02) (0.011) (0.019) (0.007) 
2011 0.121*** 0.036*** 0.087*** 0.003*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
2012 0.189*** 0.043*** 0.152*** 0.002* 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) 
2013 0.220*** 0.043*** 0.181*** 0.004*** 
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 (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) 
2014 0.139*** 0.017*** 0.113*** -0.009*** 
(0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) 
Constant 9.64*** 5.380*** 5.636*** 1.373*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Fixed Effects HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI 
R2 0.89 0.89 0.87 0.88 
Zip SE Clusters 12,940 12,940 12,940 12,940 
Unique Physicians 357,535 357,535 357,535 357,535 
N 1,787,675 1,787,675 1,787,675 1,787,675 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2010-2014 HCCI Commercial Claims for physician services. 
Standard errors clustered at the zip code level.  
 
 
ACO Contract Effects on Discretionary and Non-Discretionary Procedures 
Despite a null effect with respect to total per patient provision of services, specialists in zip codes 
treated by commercial ACO contracts are estimated to broadly affect per patient treatment 
intensity in various care settings. This is most evident by a robust finding not presented that 
specialists are reimbursed less per patient for all procedures following entry of a commercial ACO 
contract. Table 11 and Table 12 seek to highlight a specific mechanism by which commercial 
ACOs reduce per patient provision of services. By reducing the provision of elective and/or 
discretionary services while increasing the provision of high-value services, commercial ACO 
contracts, specialists respond to commercial ACO contract adoption with least-harm, most-
productive changes in treatment choice consistent with Chandra and Skinner’s model of medical 
productivity (2012).      
Table 11 confirms this hypothesis with respect to both orthopedic and ophthalmologic procedure 
sub-categories. Similar to an approach taken by Clemens and Gottlieb (2014), I focus on 
estimated effects of three elective procedures: hip replacements (3B), knee replacements (3C), 
and cataract removal/lens insertions (cataract surgery) (4B). These are contrasted with three 
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higher acuity, higher risk procedures by the same specialty categories that neither specialists nor 
patients are assumed to have as much discretion over: hip fracture repairs (3A), corneal 
transplants (4A), and retinal detachment surgery (4C).  
Hip and knee replacements are well-studied examples of physician services where total volume 
of service provided is closely linked to the number of local-market specialists (Weinstein et al., 
2004) and other supply factors rather than solely clinical need. Each is shown in Table 11 to 
significantly decrease (by 6.7% and 2.8%, resp.) in each year following commercial ACO 
adoption while no significant changes are estimated for the hip fracture repair control outcome. 
Conversely, cataract surgery (P4B) has been shown in the medical literature to provide potential 
survival benefits (Fong et al., 2013), reduce risks of falls and hip fractures, and improve patient-
reported quality of life (as well as quality-adjusted life years) (Brown et. al, 2013). Following 
Chandra and Skinner’s typology (2012), this service category may be considered a highly cost-
effective innovation with little chance of overuse that theory predicts would increase under an 
ACO contract. For each of the ophthalmologic procedures, estimated treatment effects are 
consistent with theoretic predictions with commercial ACO contracts increasing cataract surgery 
by approximately 17%.      Further, higher acuity ophthalmologic procedures related to corneal 
transplants (P4A) and retinal detachment (P4C) are not found to be significantly affected by 
commercial ACO entry; a similarly consistent null response is estimated for hip fracture repairs.    
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Table 11. Effects for Orthopedic and Ophthalmologic Procedures  
Dep. Variables: Natural Log of Claimed Units Per Patient for: 
BETOS Category 
Major 
Procedur
e, 
Orthoped
ic - Hip 
Fracture 
Repair 
Major 
Procedure, 
Orthopedic 
- Hip 
Replacem
ent 
Major 
Procedure, 
Orthopedic 
- Knee 
Replacem
ent 
Eye 
Procedu
re - 
Corneal 
Transpla
nt 
Eye 
Procedure - 
Cataract 
Removal/Le
ns Insertion 
Eye 
Procedur
e - Retinal 
Detachme
nt 
BETOS Code 
3A 3B 3C 4A 4B 4C 
ACO Treatment * 
Post 0.03 -0.067* -0.028* -0.177 0.172*** 0.024 
 (0.056) (0.040) (0.031) (0.15) (0.061) (0.066) 
2011 -0.056*** 0.002 -0.032*** -0.75** -0.034*** -0.024 
 (0.011) (0.01) (0.01) (0.034) (0.011) (0.015) 
2012 -0.099*** 0.004 -0.015 -0.083** -0.011** -0.081*** 
 (.012) (0.02) (0.01) (.036) (.012) (.017) 
2013 -0.121*** 0.05*** 0.02** -0.173*** 0.020 -0.109*** 
 (.013) (0.01) (0.01) (.04) (.013) (.017) 
2014 -0.102*** 0.08*** 0.019* -0.153*** -0.007 -0.177*** 
(.01) (0.01) (0.01) (.04) (.02) (.02) 
Constant -4.18*** -3.71*** -3.33*** -4.40*** -2.70*** -3.55*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.025) (0.008) (0.012) 
Fixed Effects HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI 
R2 0.796 0.98 0.82 0.86 0.77 0.92 
Zip SE Clusters 4,200 4,119 4,365 1,260 6,760 2,366 
Unique Physicians 14,937 12,987 14,249 1,698 22,331 4,621 
N 45,770 42,635 52,513 4,816 79,801 14,601 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2010-2014 HCCI Commercial Claims for physician services. 
Standard errors clustered at the zip code level.  
 
Estimated Changes in Other Discretionary Service 
Estimated effects of commercial ACO adoption related to specialist testing, imaging services, 
minor procedures, and ambulatory procedures where physicians again have greater discretion in 
utilization and choice of services are presented in Table 12. While the magnitude of effect sizes is 
not large, changes in the provision of services by specialists for several discretionary service 
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categories highlight how commercial ACO participants seek to reduce per patient resource 
utilization. 
Table 12 considers multiple other service categories predicted as more likely to be affected by an 
ACO contract due to their discretionary or elective characteristics (Chandra and Skinner, 2012). 
Statistically significant annual percentage reductions are estimated each for standard imaging, 
advanced imaging, ambulatory procedures, and minor procedures in the range of 3.4% - 4.6% for 
patients treated by the specialists. However, no significant impact is estimated for provision of lab 
or other tests (primarily cardiac tests). Analyses not presented estimated no significant impacts of 
commercial ACO adoption on several subcategories of major procedures (BETOS category P1) 
that are in general more likely to be non-elective.   
The last column of Table 12 presents large estimated reductions of approximately 16.6% per 
physician per year for service units related to radiation therapy services in oncology care (P7A). 
This economically significant result was robustly estimated in various alternative specifications, 
including specifications considering total payment and payments per patient treated for such 
services by radiologists. Additional results focused specifically on radiation therapy services are 
reviewed in focus next. 
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Table 12. Effects Across Imaging, Testing, and Select Other Service Categories 
Dep. Variable Natural Log of Claimed Units Per Patient for:  
BETOS Category Standard Imaging 
Advanced 
Imaging 
Lab 
Tests 
Other 
Tests 
Ambulatory 
Procedures 
Minor 
Procedures 
Oncology - 
Radiation Therapy 
BETOS Code I1 I2 T1 T2 P5 P6 P7A 
ACO Treatment * Post -0.034* -0.045* -0.009 0.003 -0.036*** -0.046*** -0.166** 
 (0.02) (0.03) 0.028 (0.025) (0.013) (0.013) (0.078) 
2011 -0.077*** -0.372*** -0.056*** -0.035*** -0.021*** -0.027*** -0.024 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) 
2012 -0.134*** -0.403*** -0.085*** -0.091*** -0.085*** -0.079*** -0.08*** 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.016) 
2013 -0.162*** -0.415*** -0.119*** -0.254*** -0.111*** -0.117*** -0.116*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.018) 
2014 -0.186*** -0.422*** -0.155*** -0.245*** -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.14*** 
(0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.02) 
Constant -1.47*** -1.91*** -1.25*** -1.72*** -2.34*** -1.49*** -0.69*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.012)
Fixed Effects HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI 
R2 0.909 0.886 0.899 0.912 0.912 0.934 0.961 
Zip SE Clusters 10,758 6,099 9,847 9,865 10,725 12,470 2,607 
Unique Physicians 161,580 46,728 131,587 148,348 207,162 309,753 6,892 
N 623,868 169,315 485,937 503,714 792,121 1,313,398 23,898 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2010-2014 HCCI Commercial Claims for physician services. Standard errors clustered at the zip code level.  
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Estimated Effects on Radiation Oncology and IMRT Provision 
Significant reductions in radiation oncology treatments merited a focused analysis at the per 
member, per procedure annual reimbursement to see how oncology teams in commercial ACOs 
reduced per capita costs of care. One primary finding emerges from a review of effects by 
CPT/HCPCS procedure (rather than BETOS) codes related to oncology care: significant 
reductions in per capita spending are estimated for treatments related to intensity-modulated 
radiation therapy (IMRT). This oncology treatment is more complex than conventional 
radiotherapy methods and is most commonly used to treat cancers of the prostate, head and 
neck, and central nervous system, although such modalities are also used in treating other 
cancers in more complex cases. It has often been cited as an overused treatment modality in the 
health services research literature (Jacobs et al., 2012), with “watchful waiting” or “active 
surveillance” approaches typically providing higher value (depending on the patient) with lower 
resource use. Efforts of commercial ACO participants to reduce per capita utilization around this 
modality were evident in considering logged-transformed, per patient, annual units claimed 
across various procedure codes (CPT/HCPCS) related to IMRT. These included significant 
estimated decreases in per patient utilization of: 
‐ Use of clinical treatment planning in IMRT (CPT/HCPCS 77263) 
‐ Teletherapy, isodose plan, complex (77315) 
‐ Radiation treatment delivery (77413) 
‐ IMRT delivery-single or multiple fields/arcs (77418) 
In addition, each of the average treatment effects shown in Table 13  is statistically significant in 
regressions utilizing non-logged (raw counts) of units per patient measures that are not 
presented. The changes in per patient provision of IMRT services that significantly decreased but 
were not robust to the log transformation include: 
‐ IMRT Plan, including dose-volume histrograms (billed once during course of therapy) 
(77301) 
‐ Use of clinical treatment planning in IMRT (simple) (CPT 77261) 
‐ Multi-Lead Collimator (MLC) Devices for IMRT, design and construction (77338) 
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Table 13. Effects Across Select Radiation Oncology Services 
Dependent Variable Natural Log of Claimed Units Per Patient for:  
Service Description  
Oncology 
- 
Radiation 
Therapy 
IMRT 
Plan 
Clinical Treatment 
Planning in IMRT 
Teletherapy, 
Isodose 
Plan 
(complex) 
MLC 
Devices 
for 
IMRT 
IMRT 
delivery 
Service Category / 
Code P7A 77301 77261 77263 77315 77338 77413 
ACO Treatment * Post -0.166** -0.094 -0.184 -0 110** -0.155*** -0.05 -0.543* 
 (0.078) (0.071) (0.184) (0.056) (0.061) (0.069) (0.306) 
2011 -0.024 0.058*** -0.01 -0.005 -0.054*** 0.087*** -0.064 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.042) (0.012) (0.019) (0.017) (0.040) 
2012 -0.08*** 0.015 -0.118*** -0.023* -0.121*** 0.047***
-
0 119***
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.047) (0.012) (0.020) (0.019) (0.044) 
2013 -0.116*** 0.078*** -0.141*** -0.025* -0.211*** 0.107***
-
0 101***
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.051) (0.014) (0.022) (0.020) (0.044) 
2014 -0.14*** 0.062*** -0.095* 
-
0 031** -0.250* 0.111*** -0.131* 
(0.02) (0.021) (0.527) (0.015) (0.025) (0.022) (0.045) 
Constant -0.69*** -2.57*** -3.84*** -1 59*** -2.47*** -2.46*** -0.54*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.032) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.029) 
Fixed Effects HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI 
R2 0.961 0.8436 0.875 0.925 0.813 0.829 0.862 
Zip SE Clusters 2,607 2025 1,233 2,195 1,890 1,989       1 281
Unique Physicians 6,892 4,126 2182 4661 3,804 4,089 2,303 
N 23,898 16,154 4,671 18,896 14,311 15,869 7,548 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2010-2014 HCCI Commercial Claims for physician services. 
Standard errors clustered at the zip code level.  
 
Discussion 
Following review of empirical results, commercial ACO contracts appear to lower marginal 
provision of per-patient services utilization primarily in the service categories where they (in 
coordination with patients) have greater discretion in clinical decision-making. While I identify 
several service-category specific effects that are plausible, I do not estimate any changes in 
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major procedures or other high-acuity service categories where I should not expect them. This 
validates my theoretical approach while also suggesting potential welfare benefits from ACOs and 
reassurances against any concerns for patient safety like those historically made toward 
managed care. 
To the extent that classifying Medicare ACOs was difficult in Part III, the mix of commercial ACO 
contracts and relationships are even more heterogeneous. However, subgroup effects estimated 
in the Medicare analysis note a few salient characteristics (organizational governance and 
physicians’ internal financial incentives) that are likely to impact commercial ACO success or 
failure as well. The optimal design of health care organizations like those entering ACO contracts 
will continue to be an important avenue of research in the transition to value-based payment 
models. 
Furthermore, the role of spillovers and the overlap between Medicare and various commercial 
payers’ ACO contracts is a natural next analysis that will be the last empirical analysis of my 
dissertation. Scale economies and incentive alignment across payers in markets with multiple 
ACOs may generate larger responses; however such overlap could just as easily make the 
commercial ACO’s design less salient and corresponding provider response smaller.  Analyses 
presented next indicate that market entry of commercial ACOs from non-HCCI insurers may also 
result in negative spillovers in the form of cost and/or utilization shifting for the treatment of 
patients insured through an HCCI affiliated insurer. Such considerations are explored in Part V 
next.    
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CHAPTER 5: Spillover Effects of ACO Contracts on Payments and Utilization 
Introduction 
For the final empirical analysis of this dissertation, I approach the topic of overlapping ACO 
contracts and spillovers using four distinct categories of ACO contracts and again utilizing the 
Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI) commercial claims data considered in Part IV. Specifically, I will 
estimate the effects of ACO contracts by one or more payers (i.e.  Medicare, HCCI Commercial, 
and non-HCCI Commercial ACOs) on the patients of three major commercial payers (the HCCI 
data partners). Analyses estimate potential spillover effects of physician participation in Medicare 
and non-HCCI insurer on HCCI commercial claims. In addition, I separately estimate effects of 
HCCI-commercial ACO contracts on physician behavior with and without the entry of a Medicare 
ACO.     
Empirics seek to consider conceptual questions related to the ability of providers to directly aim 
treatments and procedures at the patients of a single payer. The Medicare ACO program expects 
50% of total expenditures to be tied to risk-based contracts by 2018. Such large changes in the 
flows of expenditures will almost certainly affect commercial care and insurance markets to some 
extent. However, the directionality of spillover effects is theoretically ambiguous and may vary 
significantly to the extent that physicians are able to distinguish patients by their insurance 
contract. While beneficial positive spillovers due to redesigned care processes may arise, 
negative spillover effects due cost-shifting, utilization shifting, or selection are also possible based 
on my results.    
I present evidence of unintended and economically costly spillovers to HCCI payer’s insured 
patients in terms of increased total payment, spending per patient, and total utilization in markets 
with both public and non-affiliated commercial ACOs as well as Medicare ACOs alone. This is 
accompanied by increases in unique patients treated annually for all physicians adopting ACOs. 
Completing similar analysis of specific service categories to those completed in Part IV, I show 
how stand-alone commercial ACOs as well as those holding contracts with both public and 
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commercial payers may effectively reduce per patient provision of discretionary services. These 
potentially beneficial effects do not in general spillover to non-ACO affiliated commercially insured 
patients.  
A Conceptual Framework for Spillover Effects 
Empirics below seek to address conceptual questions regarding the ability of providers to directly 
aim treatments and procedures at the patients of a single payer. Or, if as Pauly and McGuire 
(1991) model, the physician has a reasonable expectation of payer type over each treated 
patient. I will take a particular focus on effects of Medicare ACOs on commercial insurance 
populations. Spillover effects may be heterogeneous and are theoretically ambiguous to the 
extent that physicians and organizations are able to target different patient populations. For 
example, if physicians have decreased capacity constraints due to decreased low-value utilization 
for Medicare beneficiaries, commercial populations may experience increased marginal (and 
potentially low-value) treatment by physicians participating in Medicare ACOs. On the other hand, 
physicians who are incentivized to invest in improved care processes (e.g. EMR upgrades, 
disease registries, standards for imaging, etc.) through Medicare ACO programs may extend 
these efficiency gains to their whole patient panel regardless.  
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Figure 10. Conceptual Model of Spillovers 
          
Review of Literature on Spillovers in Health Care 
Motivating work on spillover effects of ACO contracts is recent reduced form work has highlighted 
the importance of public payers’ impact on negotiated commercial prices (Clemens and Gottlieb, 
2013; Ketcham, Nicholson, et. al, 2013). Presented analyses seek to highlight the role of public 
health care financing on provider group-insurer bargaining and the corresponding effects of such 
relationships on physician provision of services. Specifically, physician participation in Medicare 
ACO contracts may cause spillover effects on patient treatment and outcomes in the commercial 
insurance market as shown previously with other changes in Medicare reimbursement. Baker has 
shown previously how penetration of Medicare HMOs reduced fee-for-service expenditures in 
traditional Medicare (1997) as well as how commercial managed care impacted conventional 
insurance premiums (Baker and Corts, 1995). The direction of such spillovers is theoretically 
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ambiguous (Baicker, Chernew, and Robbins, 2013; Romley et al., 2015) and heterogeneous 
across populations of providers.   
With regard to spillovers from ACO contracts specifically, much less evidence currently exists. 
The commercial BCBS Alternative Quality Contract was found to lower medical spending while 
improving quality of care (Song et al., 2012); this was accompanied by some potential but mixed 
spillovers to the Medicare population.  Based on theoretical predictions and previous empirical 
results from Part IV, spillover effects may be expected to vary by treatment type.  
Such spillover effects on quality and treatment choice may be partly related to the large literature 
around potential “cost-shifting” by health care providers from one payer to another following a 
reimbursement cut and/or general inflation of charges due to some financial shock. There is 
increasing evidence that though cost-shifting has occurred in some circumstances, it is rare and 
when occurring is of relatively small magnitude (Dranove, Garthwaite, and Ody, 2013; Frakt, 
2011). To the degree that providers are profit-maximizing, any ability to increase charged prices 
following some shock would imply sub-optimally set prices previously. Why may ACO contracts 
be an exception to this literature? As noted by Gaynor and Town (2012), providers like physicians 
and hospitals may not directly choose quality but at minimum choose an aggregate level of effort 
based on the incentives they face. As patient and insurer demand (for network inclusion) is 
increasing in the quality of care provided, efforts to promote efficiency and quality competition 
through ACO contracts in one market (such as Medicare) are likely to affect both quality and price 
competition in commercial care markets. 
Characterizing Public and Commercial ACO Penetration 
Physicians were mapped at the provider zip code level to ACO penetration rates to estimate 
treatment with either an HCCI commercial ACO (treatment), Medicare ACO (spillover), and non-
HCCI commercial ACO (spillover). As more fully reviewed in Part IV, respective ACO participation 
was defined at the zip code level in HCCI claims when more than 50% of physicians in that zip 
code participate in an affiliated ACO (either an HCCI insurer ACO, a Medicare ACO, or a non-
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HCCI insurer commercial ACO). From physician billing claims, treatment choice summary 
variables were constructed from HCPCS codes analogous to previous work in Parts III and IV.   
Overall, I estimate average treatment effects of the various ACO contract types on a substantial 
portion of the physician sample. First, I separate treatment effects for HCCI-affiliated ACOs into 
markets with and without Medicare ACO entry: 
‐ Zip codes with a local HCCI-affiliated ACO but neither a Medicare nor non-HCCI affiliated 
commercial ACOs 
‐ Zip codes with a local HCCI-affiliated ACO and a Medicare ACO, but no non-HCCI 
affiliated commercial ACOs13 
Next, I also estimate average spillover effects on HCCI claims from unaffiliated local ACO 
contracts for two groups:   
‐ Zip codes with no commercial ACO, but a Medicare ACO 
‐ Zip codes with a local non-HCCI affiliated commercial ACO and a Medicare ACO, but no 
HCCI-affiliated ACOs     
This provides four mutually exclusive cohorts that I may include in my final series of regressions. 
Table 14 shows the estimated coverage by 2014 of ACO contracts in each cohort across unique 
physicians, zip codes, and Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs), a proxy for larger urban 
markets, present in the HCCI claims data. 
                                                     
13 The category also includes a small number of physician observations in which the provider’s 
zip code was found to include two types of commercial ACOs (67 unique physicians) or those in 
zip codes with all three ACO types (34 unique physicians). While these treatment cohorts were to 
small to be estimated separately, they are consistent with the empirical approach that considers 
the effects of other ACO adoption in addition to an HCCI-affiliated ACO.    
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Table 14. Distribution of Treatment Cohorts Across Specialists, Zip Codes, and CBSAs 
 
Unique 
Specialists 
Percent 
Specialists 
Unique Zip 
Codes 
Unique 
Core-
Based 
Statistical 
Areas 
(CBSAs) 
Medicare and HCCI Commercial 
ACOs 4,145 1.2% 238 70 
HCCI ACO Only 7,082 2.0% 148 41 
Medicare and Non-HCCI Commercial 
ACOs 4,130 1.2% 246 67 
Public ACO Only 30,669 8.6% 1,054 165 
No ACO (Control) 311,509 87.1% 11,254 381 
All Physicians 357,535 100.0% 12,940 396 
Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2014 HCCI Commercial Claims for physician services. 
 
Empirical Approach to Estimating Spillovers 
Familiar generalized difference-in-differences regressions will again be employed with treatment 
effects now being estimated separately for the four cohorts just described. Treatment effects for 
HCCI-affiliated ACOs are estimated in markets with and without parallel Medicare ACO entry. In 
addition, I estimate average spillover effects on HCCI claims from unaffiliated local ACO contracts 
for two groups: standalone Medicare ACO contracts and ACOs holding both Medicare contracts 
as well as a commercial ACO contract with an insurer unaffiliated with HCCI.   
The datasets described in previous analyses will continue to be utilized. Analyses seek to 
estimate potential spillover effects of physician-level participation in Medicare and non-HCCI 
insurer on commercial claims.  It is plausible that ACO contracts may result in externalities on 
non-attributed patients not specifically affected by the policy. Such spillovers could change the 
characteristics of physician treatment and referrals for commercial patients in the HCCI claims. 
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Review of trends in the dependent variables by treatment and control cohorts across the time 
series are important to consider for such reasons.  
Methods employ regression specifications similar to those completed in other empirical sections 
of this dissertation to ensure comparability of results. Utilizing zip-code level commercial ACO 
assignment and controlling for observable physician characteristics (through the use physician-
level fixed effects), regression models employ the following generalized difference-in-differences 
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004)   specifications:  
			ݕ௜௖௧ ൌ 	ߚ௖തതതܣܥ ௖ܱ ∗ ܲ݋ݏݐ௜௖௧ ൅	ߚ௧ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅	ߚ௜݄ܲݕݏ݅ܿ݅ܽ݊௜ ൅ ߝ௜௖௧	 
Where the average treatment effect of ACO participation is now separately estimated( ߚ௖ሻതതതത for 
each respective ACO cohort c for a given outcome 	ݕ௜௖௧. This regression model is well identified 
with every untreated physician in a specific year (including those later joining an ACO cohort) 
acting as controls for ACO adopting physicians participating in that year. So, physicians joining 
ACOs in 2014 act as controls for early adopters until the physician-year observation itself is 
treated. Note that in cohorts with both public and commercial ACO entry, I set the treatment year 
as the first year of ACO adoption regardless of whether that was via the commercial or public 
contract.  ߚ௖തതത so captures an average annual treatment effect across the multiple start-dates 
separately for each of the ACO cohorts. Such a specification is identical to a classical difference 
in differences approach except for the inclusion of a physician fixed effect (݄ܲݕݏ݅ܿ݅ܽ݊௜ሻ to control 
for static differences across individual physicians and related nonrandom selection into the ACO 
contract. Five years of commercial claims data across a national sample of physicians allow for 
such analyses while maintaining sufficient degrees of freedom; also note that neither the ACO 
cohort variables nor specific static physician characteristics (e.g. system integration) need be 
included in this regression due to perfect multicollinearity with the physician fixed effects 
(assigned at NPI level). Key outcome measures, ݕ௜௝, similar to those used in Medicare analyses, 
will include multiple metrics of treatment behavior, procedure utilization, and observed quality 
measures over time.     
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Recognizing that the (potentially time-varying) assignment of ACO affiliation may introduce 
measurement error bias into results and is likely to vary across geographic markets, I cluster 
reported standard errors at the zip code level with the number of zip code clusters utilized in each 
specification presented by column in regression tables. Use of robust standard errors without 
clustering does not change coefficients or estimated effects but does improve the statistical 
confidence of many results.     
Results 
Table 15 presents regressions a broad set of dependent variables similar to that shown in the 
introductory Table 10 in Part IV. I estimate the effects of ACO adoption within specialists’ local zip 
codes separately across the four mutually exclusive ACO cohorts.  
Statistically significant, positive spillover effects are estimated on HCCI payer’s insured patients in 
terms of increased total payment, spending per patient, and total utilization of services (units) in 
markets with both public and non-affiliated commercial ACOs (in row four)  as well as Medicare 
ACOs alone (row three). This is accompanied by increases in unique patients treated annually for 
all physicians treated any of the ACO cohorts. 
Only standalone, HCCI-affiliated commercial ACOs are found to significantly reduce per patient 
utilization of services (row one, column six), a primary measure of marginal resource use. While 
reductions in per patient payment are not found for any cohort, zip codes with HCCI-affiliated 
commercial ACOs were not estimated to significantly increased payments per patient (which 
occurs in areas where non-HCCI ACOs are adopted).  
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 Table 15. Spillover Effects across Aggregate and Per Patient Payments and Services 
Dep. Variable 
Natural 
Log of 
Unique 
Patients 
Natural Log of 
Total Commercial 
Payments  
Natural Log of 
Claimed Units 
 Total Total 
Per 
Patient Total 
Per 
Patient 
HCCI ACO Only * Post 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.006 0.057** -0.01** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.024) (0.032) (0.014) 
HCCI and Medicare ACOs* Post 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.021 0.121*** 0.019 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.010) (0.022) (0.007) 
Medicare ACO Only * Post 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.011* 0.033*** 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.09) (0.002) 
Non-HCCI and Medicare ACOs * 
Post 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.046*** 0.108*** 0.006 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) 
Fixed Effects HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI 
R2 0.88 0.79 0.89 0.88 0.90 
Zip SE Clusters 12,940 12,940 12,940 12,940 12,940 
Unique Physicians 357,535 357,535 357,535 357,535 357,535 
N 1,787,675
1,787,67
5
1,787,67
5
1,787,67
5
1,787,67
5* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
Note: All specifications include year dummy variables and a constant not shown. 
Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2010-2014 HCCI Commercial Claims for physician services. 
Standard errors clustered at the zip code level.  
 
Next, Table 16 below presents specifications modeling average treatment effects of the different 
ACO contract types on per patient discretionary service utilization similar to those shown 
previously in Table 11 and Table 12 in the preceding Part IV. Results show how stand-alone 
commercial ACOs as well as those holding contracts with both public and commercial payers 
may effectively reduce per patient provision of certain discretionary services (rows one and two). 
These potentially beneficial effects do not in general spillover to non-ACO affiliated commercially 
insured patients (rows three and four).  
Per patient reimbursement for standard imaging services (Table 16, column 1) such as x-rays are 
estimated to decrease with ACO adoption in general; entry only by a Medicare ACO significantly 
93 
 
reduced commercial per patient spending on such imaging by around one percent annually. 
Despite this finding, overall estimated spillover effects were null in most cases, while also 
significantly increasing per patient spending on ambulatory procedures (column 3) and oncology 
services (column 5).  
In the last three columns of Table 16, I review the three orthopedic and ophthalmologic services 
with estimated direction and effects matching theoretic predictions from Table 11. Consistent with 
the rest of the table, both stand-alone commercial ACO contracts and those supplemented with a 
Medicare ACO appear able to have some impact per patient spending for elective procedures like 
hip replacement, knee replacement, and cataract surgery. No beneficial spillovers were 
significantly estimated for non-HCCI ACO adoption, with the exception of orthopedist provision of 
hip and knee replacements in zip codes with a standalone Medicare ACO.   
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Table 16. Spillover Effects Across Imaging, Testing, and Select Other Service Categories 
Dep. Variable Natural Log of Claimed Units Per Patient for: 
BETOS Category Standard Imaging 
Advanced 
Imaging 
Ambulator
y 
Procedure
s 
Minor 
Procedure
s 
Oncology - 
Radiation 
Therapy 
Major 
Procedure
, 
Orthopedi
c - Hip 
Replace. 
Major 
Procedure
, 
Orthopedi
c - Knee 
Replace. 
Eye 
Procedure 
- Cataract 
Removal/ 
Lens 
Insertion 
BETOS Code I1 I2 P5 P6 P7A P3B P3C P4B 
HCCI ACO Only * Post -0.045** -0.075*** -0.027** -0.051*** -0.15* -0.05 -0.016 0.223*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.014) (0.017) (0.14) (0.064) (0.038) (0.088) 
HCCI and Medicare ACOs* 
Post 
-0.001 0.075** -0.034* -0.026* -0.118* -0.159* -0.034 0.132* 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.019) (0.014) (0.045) (0.09) (0.056) (0.078) 
Medicare ACO Only * Post -0.004 0.013 0.007 -0.005 -0.001 -0.039* -0.022 0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.01) (0.007) (0.003) (0.021) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016) 
Non-HCCI and Medicare ACOs 
* Post 
-0.029 0.004 0.014 0.001 -0.034 0.038 0.025 0.011 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.012) (0.013) (0.078) (0.057) (0.054) (0.05) 
Fixed Effects HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI HNPI 
R2 0.909 0.886 0.919 0.934 0.961 0.835 0.820 0.767 
Zip SE Clusters 10,758 6,099 10,725 12,470 2,607 4,119 4,365 6,760 
Unique Physicians 161,580 46,728 207,162 309,753 6,892 12,987 14,249 22,331 
N 623,868 169,315 792,121 1,313,398 23,898 42,635 52,513 79,801 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
Note: All specifications include year dummy variables and a constant not shown. 
Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2010-2014 HCCI Commercial Claims for physician services. Standard errors clustered at the zip code level.        
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Discussion 
In this final empirical analysis of my dissertation, I consider potential spillovers and volume-
shifting in commercial care markets due to commercial and Medicare ACO contracts. This 
empirical section sought to answer two questions: Are there economies of scope from pursuing 
ACO contracts with both commercial and public payers? Are there spillover effects on the 
treatment of patients by ACO physicians even if they participate in a contract unaffiliated with that 
patients insurer? 
First, it does not appear there is any substantial benefit, in terms of estimated effects on 
commercial claims, for providers to adopt multiple ACO contracts instead of solely a commercial 
contract. Both cohorts significantly affected per patient utilization of discretionary services; it may 
be argued that providers participating only in a commercial ACO contract had a greater response 
than those adopting both Medicare and commercial ACO designs as this cohort was the only type 
to significantly reduce aggregate per patient utilization of physician services.  
Second, while it is clear from Table 15 that ACO contracts by all payers are affecting payments 
and service provision in commercial markets to some extent regardless of the affiliated-payer, 
non-affiliated (Medicare and non-HCCI commercial) ACOs are not found to have spillover effects 
on the provision of discretionary services shown in Table 16. Specialists participating in 
commercial insurance markets may in practice have a strong understanding of the 
reimbursement incentives they face on a patient-specific basis and make marginal treatment 
decisions accordingly. Results noting the impact of competitor commercial ACO entry, particularly 
significantly increased total and per patient spending, in areas with competing, non-HCCI ACOs 
suggest that it may be in the self-interest of commercial insurers to seek their own contracts with 
established ACO organizations. The specific mechanism by which this occurs (e.g. selection of 
specific physician or patient populations into non-ACO arrangements), is an important avenue of 
future research. Based on all empirical results, it is also plausible to conjecture that there are 
likely spillovers from commercial ACOs to Medicare spending and treatment behavior even in 
areas where no public ACO exists.   
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CHAPTER 6: LIMITATIONS 
Presented analyses estimating the effects of ACO contracts in Medicare and commercial markets 
demonstrate the potential for such contracts to reduce per capita utilization of services and, to a 
lesser degree, corresponding per capita spending. However, several limitations to work presented 
in this thesis worth consideration . I review three primary concerns below, then briefly discuss 
some revised empirical results seeking to address market and patient selection.  
Importantly, most presented results do not account for dynamic selection of markets, individual 
organizations and physicians, and patient populations into (or out of) ACO contracts. For 
example, ACOs may be more likely to form in markets experiencing slower Medicare spending 
growth. Physicians or health systems selecting into ACOs may also know before participating that 
they can advantageously select their patient population, skimping on services for or dumping high 
severity patients (Ellis, 1998).  This endogenous selection effect may change from one time 
period to the next, potentially biasing my causal estimates of changes in physician treatment 
behavior. Such dynamic selection may violate the parallel trends assumption in my specification 
such that physician fixed effects will not sufficiently restore randomness to the quasi-experimental 
design. This differs from any static covariates remaining constant over time, where physician-
level fixed effects control for such selection into ACO contracts. Similarly, the timing of ACO entry 
is also potentially non-random. This may weaken my central identification strategy if provider 
groups are able to time ACO contracts to achieve the best financial results in terms of shared 
savings. Anecdotally, adoption of an ACO contract is generally a slow process of indeterminate 
length; adopting physicians, groups, and larger organizations appear to have limited ability to 
affect the specific start date of the ACO. However, to the extent that this is the case, estimates 
will measure not only changes in marginal treatment intensity but also ACO participants’ 
(physicians’ and provider organizations’) ability for strategic behavior through cherry-picking of 
patients, strategic provision of services before and after the ACO contract start, or other 
mechanisms.  
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Any additional static selection of markets, organizations, and physicians into ACO contracts, 
which are fully controlled for through the use of physician fixed effects, may limit broader 
interpretation of my results in terms of their generalizability. Most ACO contracts to date have 
been voluntary. The theoretical model presented in Part II and classical economic theory 
demonstrate why this may be the case: such mechanisms promote a second-best solution of 
“efficiency at the top” for those voluntary provider participants whom are willing to increase total 
social welfare in exchange for financial reward. Feldman (2015) notes that because ACO 
contracts are so far voluntary, the expected utility of participation in the program must meet or 
exceed the participants’ reservation utility. He instead recommends policy-makers simply lower 
prices to directly reduce incentives for over-utilization. While likely more efficient health policy, 
physician fee cuts are historically difficult to achieve. The ACO contracts I evaluate have been 
widely adopted by nearly a quarter of all U.S. physicians. However, the national generalizability of 
my empirical results may be questioned. While the efficacy of ACO contracts may be continually 
expanded and designs refined to encourage greater physician adoption, estimated empirical 
results are local average treatment effects that may not be generalizable to all U.S. physicians. 
Further, I estimate the effects of Medicare ACO contracts against a status quo of fee-for-service 
reimbursement in Medicare Part B. Physicians may maximize their own utility differently as we 
transition into a two-track Medicare reimbursement system under new MACRA legislation.     
Third, it is worth noting the respective data limitations of the SK&A data used for assigning 
Medicare and commercial ACO affiliations, the public-use Medicare claims used in Part III, and 
the commercial HCCI claims used in Part IV and Part V. SK&A data is a commonly used dataset 
in health services research, with Baker and coauthors finding SK&A well-suited to characterize 
physician market and organizational structure (2014).   However, the public and commercial ACO 
contract fields used in this work have not been well validated externally outside of checks made 
by the author. Conversely to previously stated selection concerns, presented results may also 
suffer from attenuation bias, biasing empirical estimates toward estimation of no significant effect. 
This may occur due to measurement error in how SK&A assigns physician (and/or office) level 
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ACO affiliation. Additionally, ACO contract affiliations occur over time, with physician entry and 
exit occurring somewhat fluidly. Any changes during a given year not captured by the point-in-
time affiliations collected by SK&A would be another source of measurement error. Medicare 
public-use claims data, while an excellent new resource, lacks the ability of research-identifiable 
claims files to finely control for patient characteristics for specific services as they are published at 
the physician-year-service type level. HCCI commercial claims are utilized at a similar unit of 
observation, introducing limits to the interpretation of those results. I pointedly took a physician- 
rather than patient-focus to my analytic approach. I do not consider patient populations 
specifically attributed to ACOs like most research on this topic. This was done purposefully; I 
seek to consider all-patient effects of ACO contracts and not specific behavior change for 
attributed patients. Additionally, anecdotal evidence suggests that physicians and to a lesser 
degree organizations may not fully know which patients are attributed under an ACO contract and 
which patient are not. However, this again limits the interpretation of my results; my estimated 
effects do not necessarily apply specifically to attributed patient populations under ACO contracts. 
These data sets are each more fully reviewed, including discussion of their strengths and 
limitations, in the Data Appendix included at the end of this dissertation.  
To briefly explore robustness to selection concerns, Appendix Table 26 and Appendix Table 27 
present refined specifications for the first tables of Part IV (Table 3 and Table 4, resp.) that control 
for changes in patient case mix and local market conditions from one year to the next. Such time-
varying characteristics of physicians should help to control for the dynamic selection concerns 
cited above. Time-varying market conditions were included from the 2015- 2016 Area Health 
Resources File and include the county unemployment rate, the county median household income, 
county Medicare Part C penetration rate, county Medicare Part D penetration rate, and county 
percent of Medicare beneficiaries who are dual-eligible. Time-varying physician-level 
characteristics of patient panels were incorporated from a different Medicare public use file and 
include the percent of beneficiaries who are dual-eligible, the percent of beneficiaries who are 
non-white, the mean HCC risk score of beneficiaries (a measure of health severity), and 16 
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variables measuring the percent of beneficiaries with one of sixteen chronic, comorbid conditions 
reported by Medicare publicly. Inclusion of such covariates has no statistically significant impact 
on my results, alleviating some but not all concerns over the extent of selection bias on my 
results.       
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation advances the theoretical mechanisms on which total cost of care contracts may 
be expected to affect physician behavior and presents empirical evidence in both Medicare and 
commercial physician services markets validating proposed mechanisms. Foremost, I find that 
physician participation in ACO contracts may work to reduce inefficiencies caused by supply-side 
moral hazard that lead to sub-optimal provision and mix of physician services.     
Despite stated limits regarding results’ robustness to selection effects and broader generalizability 
cited above, this thesis makes a substantial contribution to the policy evaluation literature in 
several ways. My foundation for understanding provider behavior under ACO contracts is based 
in an economic model of incentive contract auctions that is broadly applicable in vertically 
integrated health care markets. Physicians and other providers are increasingly given a choice to 
hold performance risk through ACO contracts. This separation of high efficiency types into 
incentive contracts (with more ex ante risk) while low-efficiency types remain in the strictly fee-for-
service contract is Pareto-improving to status-quo physician reimbursement. Empirical results 
highlight ACOs’ potential to lower per capita utilization of physician services, particularly for 
services in which physicians have more discretion and when organizations forming ACO 
contracts do so in ways that align financial incentives of individual physicians to those of the 
larger organization. My work considers this mechanism in several ways, notably first in public 
Medicare markets where both prices and ACO contract terms are fixed then in commercial 
markets where both prices and ACO contracts may be negotiated with insurers.  
In their extensive review of the industrial organization of health care markets, Dranove and 
Satterwaite (2000) analyze the three historically dominant regimes in U.S. health care: 
independent physicians and cost-based hospital reimbursement; regulation and prospective 
payment; and finally managed care and contracted physicians. The U.S. health care system is 
evolving toward a new regime, one that will certainly be informed by the testing and evaluation of 
early Medicare and commercial ACO contracts like those I consider in this research. Managed 
care is transitioning to accountable care in a majority of local health care markets. This is broadly 
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evident in increasing use of strategic network formation, total cost of care contracting through 
ACO-style contracts, and increased quality monitoring and reporting. ACO success by systems 
owning physician groups also increasingly requires physician profit sharing and financial 
incentives for physician staff to actively promote higher value care delivery and meet ACO goals, 
as results from Part 3 highlight.  In this transition to a new dominant health policy regime, 
physicians and other qualified clinical professionals should be identified as the ultimate medical 
decision-makers in many treatment settings.  
As shown in previous regimes (Dranove and Satterwaite, 2000), this thesis presents evidence 
that health care providers are found to respond to ACO incentive contract arrangements in ways 
generally consistent with economic theory. This work contributes to the broader understanding in 
the health economics literature that has developed over the past decade showing both demand- 
and supply-side interventions which public and commercial payers may introduce to promote 
efficient health care delivery.    
On the demand side, value-based insurance design (VBID) (Pauly and Blavin, 2008) may nudge 
patients toward higher value providers, services, and prescription drug choices.  However, 
increasing evidence shows that many patients are not rational consumers of health care, for 
instance in their response to high-deductible health insurance designs (Brot-Goldberg et al., 
2015), and often rely on physician input in treatment and referral choices. Physicians’ treatment 
choice is driven by a heterogeneous interplay of financial incentives and behavioral biases not 
dissimilar to those faced by patients themselves (Baicker and Mullainathan, 2013). However, 
value-based purchasing by payers through contracts like ACOs internalize the inefficiencies of 
supply-side moral hazard by making rent-seeking, but otherwise efficient, firms responsible for 
cost-overruns and quality-shortfalls. Like VBID, value-based purchasing hold promises to correct 
for mis-utilization of services within local health care markets and across diverse patient 
populations, including both Medicare beneficiaries and the commercially insured. Health policy 
makers are only starting to center on such payment contracts’ potential to promote efficiency and 
value in the health system, as suggested by this dissertation and numerous other researchers.    
102 
 
New MACRA legislation specifically introduces a wide range of alternative payment models 
(APMs) such as ACOs in Medicare.  The voluntary nature of such APM programs are a key 
feature of ACOs to date and not necessarily a flaw as some policy makers argue. My theoretical 
model presented in Part II and classical economic theory demonstrate why this the case: such 
systems promote a second-best solution of “efficiency at the top” for those voluntary provider 
participants whom are willing to increase total social welfare in exchange for financial reward. 
Non-participants are either unable (e.g. due to cost structures) or unwilling (e.g. due to 
reservation utility, opportunity costs) to increase social welfare through more efficient care 
delivery. With incentive-compatible payment schemes designed to promote value and reduce 
incentives for gaming, a wide-variety of APMs is expected to effectively decrease per capita 
service utilization and spending while increasing the marginal productivity and innovation of 
health care organizations. Within local markets, such models may further encourage quality 
competition as providers compete for inclusion in commercial networks or against regionally-set 
Medicare payment benchmarks. However, estimated increases in spending and utilization per 
patient in commercial markets with unaffiliated ACOs presented in Part V raise important 
questions surrounding selection of physicians and the underlying patient panels they treat 
through APMs. Advantageous selection of more productive physicians or healthier patients by 
ACOs will likely be a legitimate concern moving forward to be balanced against any gains in 
economic welfare caused by ACO contracts. Despite selection effects, this dissertation provides a 
theoretical foundation and new empirical evidence that ACO contracts can effectively promote 
efficiency in the U.S. health care system via a second-best mechanism that reduces supply-side 
moral hazard.  
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Data Appendix 
This data appendix describes the three primary data sources used in this dissertation: the SK&A 
physician marketing database; public use Medicare claims, payment, and referral summary files; 
and commercial health insurance claims data from the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI). 
 
SK&A 
The SK&A’s continually updated marketing database of office based physicians and other 
providers is currently licensed from IMS Health (IMS) as a premier database for most relevant 
information regarding health care providers such as physicians, nurses, physician groups, health 
systems, and accountable care organizations. Researchers and analysts find it useful both as 
primary data to study health care providers as well as a supplement to enhance the information 
known about such providers in other data sources.  
This overview of the SK&A reviews the structure of data sets provided to the author through his 
affiliation with the Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics, focusing on coverage, data 
collection methods, and linking the respective SK&A datasets to each other and/or external data 
sources. This physician database is unique in that data is collected through an ongoing, 
continually updated phone survey of recognized medical offices. SK&A provides a rich panel of 
office, organization, and individual characteristics useful in a tackling a variety of analytic 
questions in health economics and outcomes research.    
Coverage 
The SK&A database is compiled from an ongoing survey now being operated by IMS to all office-
based physicians in the United States. These files are an increasingly used and continually 
updated commercial database of practicing office-based physicians organized at the physician-
office level initially developed for marketing purposes. This data is maintained through a 
continuously operated phone survey of all U.S. office-based physicians. In addition to the primary 
data set with key physician characteristics commonly used by researchers such as location and 
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specialty, this dissertation leverages premium access to over 140 variables ranging from 
physician practice use of EMR and practice management software, ACO and system affiliations, 
new patient acceptance, drug market rep access, hours of operation, and other practice 
characteristic variables.  
SK&A data has good coverage geographically across the U.S. and is able to be used for various 
research purposes. It has been shown to include more than 90% of physician offices, including 
capture of safety-net providers such as rural and federally qualified health clinics (Rhodes et al., 
2014). Gresenz, Auerbach, and Duarte (2013) compared the SK&A with the AMA Masterfile and 
the American Community Survey, finding similar totals of office-based physicians and selection 
across broad specialties. The ACS listed 673,000 physicians (including non-office based and 
non-clinical), with AMA listing 553,000 and SK&A listing 552,000. More recently Baker, Bundorf, 
and Royalty find SK&A well-suited to characterize physician market structure and competition 
potentially preferable to Medicare claims data (2014).   
SK&A has since increased its total physician count, as of the 2016 OBP file uniquely counting 
606,495 unique physicians across 294,666 sites. In total, over 1.1 million unique clinicians 
(including both physicians and non-physicians) are present in the dataset.      
 
Data Collection Process 
IMS seeks to contact each physician office in their database every six months (twice annually) to 
confirm the validity of each individual record. Some internal validation is also undertaken by the 
data collection team. Variables exist noting both when an observation was first contacted as well 
as when it was last updated (origdate and change, resp.). “Current” a and “historic” data are 
structured identically; for example the 2015 file is simply a historic snapshot not including any 
updated data collected in 2016 or later. 
The SK&A database is maintained through a now nearly universal phone census of active United 
States medical offices. This survey has been improved and expanded upon by the SK&A team for 
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over thirty years since it was first introduced in 1984.  More recently fields have been added to 
collect additional information regarding health information technology (IT) infrastructure and 
physician integration with larger health care organizations. 
 
Variable Set 
The primary SK&A database of nearly 1.1 million clinicians includes over 140 fields of information 
across a wide range of individual, location, and organizational characteristics. This rich data 
allows for policy evaluation, market analysis, integrated health system valuation, health services 
research, and broad potential for various other types of analysis. Regarding individual 
characteristics, the data set allows review of clinicians: 
 Medical specialties 
 Education 
 Departmental title (e.g. Medical Director)  
 Date of birth 
 State and federal licensing 
 Medicare/Medicaid identifiers (e.g. NPI, UPIN)  
Mainly geographic information is consistent across observations for clinicians in the same office 
(or other setting such as a hospital). This geographic identification is denoted by the identifier 
variable id. This allows for easy aggregation to the office level if individual clinician variables listed 
above may be dropped or summarized. Such fields include each location’s: 
 Street Address 
 Geographic categories (state, county, MSA, zip, etc.)  
 Latitude/Longitude 
 Specialty (incl. multi-specialty) 
 Usage and name of EMR vendor  
 Usage and name of practice management software vendor 
 Drug market rep access 
 Hours of operation 
 Foreign languages spoken 
 Medicare, Medicaid, and new patient acceptance 
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 Daily patient volume estimate 
 Number of exam rooms 
Different clinical office locations can be connected by organizational fields in the database in 
multiple, overlapping ways, paralleling the various ways health care delivery organizations can  
be structured in reality. Clinicians may participate in a wide variety of organizations, which may be 
for-profit, non-profit, or public; independent practices only affiliated with local hospitals, 
horizontally integrated physician groups, or vertically integrated combinations of physician groups 
and hospitals referred to as hospital systems and integrated health systems.   A hierarchy of 
organizational forms exists in the SK&A data centered around individual clinicians within 
(potentially multiple different) offices: 
 Integrated Health Systems (801 unique IHS) 
 Accountable Care Organization Affiliations (656 unique ACO contracts) 
 Health Systems  (5,818 unique systems)  
 Hospital Ownership (892 unique hospitals) 
 Group  Medical Practice  (17,951 unique GMPs) 
 Independent Physician Association  (123 unique IPAs) 
 Affiliated hospitals (6149 unique hospitals) 
 Company (240,207 unique companies) 
 Offices (294,666 unique offices) 
In addition to this vast set of physician and nursing staff characteristics, additional data files are 
available from IMS that relate this database to others providing characteristics at the level of the 
organizational fields above (e.g. an IHS characteristics file, an ACO characteristics file).  
Data Population Contents (Physician and Non-Physician Observations) 
Each year of the SK&A file contains observations across a wide range of active clinicians, from 
physicians who are medical residents or hospital CEOs, to nursing staff who are nurse 
practitioners, office administrators, or social workers. Analysts often prefer to separate these two 
cohorts (physicians and non-physicians) in separate files depending on their focus.    
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Physicians may be identified in the data using the md variable or also by noting a title of “Dr.”. 
Research in this dissertation restricts analyses to active, non-trainee physicians by dropping 
those physician observations with the departmental titles (variable dept_expl) of Allied Health 
Professionals, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Information Officer, Chief 
Operation Officer, Fellow, President, Research, or Resident. 
SK&A is unique among health data sources in capturing a detailed depiction of nursing and other 
clinical staff labor within health care organizations. With over 500k unique individuals in the 2016 
file, this workforce is a large contributor to the U.S. health care system despite often providing 
services in comparable anonymity under a physician, hospital, or other employer. As noted by the 
same dept_expl field for non-clinicians, the most common types of non-physician clinicians with 
records maintained by SK&A include those in the role of  Office Manager (20.8% of non-clinician 
observations), Nurse Practitioner (17.4%), Physician Assistant (11.2%), Receptionist/Secretary 
(11.1%), Medical Assistant (9.8%), Registered Nurse (7.1%), Administrator (3.8%), Licensed 
Practical Nurse (2.2%), Director of Nursing (2.2%), Insurance/Billing Supervisor (2.2%), Social 
Worker (2.%), Registered Dietitian (.9%), Physical Therapist (.9%), and Nurse Midwife (.8%). 
Over 45 non-physician departmental roles are listed in total for the non-clinician population alone.  
Dataset Organization 
This data source is presented at clinician-location level. SK&A seeks to have a record for each 
practicing clinician (part. in the case of physicians) at a location and to have multiple records per 
physician if they practice at multiple locations. Researchers often reshape the file to create a 
unique record per office (by variable id) or per physician (by uid or npi). These and other key 
identifier variables are described below. 
 
Identifiers Used 
The primary, unique individual  identifier in the SK&A data is aptly called “uid”. Alternatively, the 
federal National Provider Identifier (npi) may be used as a unique identifier for all physicians and 
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other providers participating in public health insurance programs. Other identifiers exist 
depending. These include:  
 Uid – Unique SK&A Person ID Number for all locations  
 Personid – Unique SK&A Person ID Number across all locations (unique 
observation  identifier in data) 
 Id – Unique SK&A Site ID Number  
 Npi –National Provider Identifier – Used by Medicare and other insurers to 
universally track individual providers (and in some case organizations).   
Merging SK&A Datasets Together 
All of IMS’s data files are easily joined together as needed to attain the necessary subset of 
variables for analysis over two (or more) years of data. Files are simply appended together to 
create a panel with consistent variable names across files; flat files at the (raw) physician-location 
level may be created by merging at the unique identifier (uid) level (generally after renaming 
remaining variables in one file). If linking to other SK&A files, files are in general easily linked at 
the respective organizational level (e.g. at the integrated health system id or ACO id levels)     
Linking to Other Data Sources 
SK&A physician practice characteristics are an excellent secondary source of data for analyses 
primarily utilizing insurance claims, health records data, or other health or economic outcomes 
data. Among other uses the SK&A physician data serves as a useful denominator of practicing 
physicians or provider groups within local markets. It is frequently matched to other data sources 
at a variety of different organizational and market levels. 
Several public use datasets from Medicare and a commercial claims database were merge to the 
SK&A files in various ways over the course of preparing this thesis. These include aggregated 
claims, payment, utilization, and outcomes data from the entire population of Medicare 
beneficiaries. Combining SK&A physician characteristics with details on their respective patient 
populations allows for research on a range of topics, from comparative effectiveness research to 
policy evaluations of the Affordable Care Act. More broadly, SK&A contains a wealth of data and 
string fields capable of being matched by a data scientist to an innumerable set of data sources.  
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Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data 
Newly available data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released by 
the Obama administration publicly discloses payment and utilization data on nearly all U.S. 
physicians participating in the Medicare program for senior citizens and the disabled. This data 
was merged with the SK&A file in Part III of this thesis to estimate a range of aggregate and 
subgroup effects of Medicare ACOs.  The Physician and Other Supplier public use file (PUF) 
available from CMS provides information on utilization and Medicare reimbursement and is 
organized by National Provider Identifier (NPI) and Healthcare Common Procedure Coding 
System (HCPCS) code. A summary file at the NPI level lists physician aggregate Medicare 
payment information and information on the disease case mix and socioeconomic characteristics 
(on average) of treated Medicare patients. Linking the SK&A file to either of these datasets is 
straightforward based on the NPI field present in each of the files. In the former case it may be 
necessary to aggregate SK&A to a unique NPI level to avoid a many-to-many merge. Raw 
observations in the SK&A file may be merged to the provider summary file by NPI using a many-
to-one merge, combining SK&A’s variable set with a file presenting a range of average patient 
characteristics and disease complexity measures.    
Medicare Physician Referrals Data  
Another public use data series newly available from CMS and used in Part III contains a variety of 
data on physician referral patterns to other Medicare providers from 2009 – 2015. This data file is 
structured as a data dump from 100% traditional Medicare claims across all provider types, with a 
referral being defined as any pair of claims (i.e. patient encounters) from two different NPIs 
occurring within 30 days of each other. Because these files are structured as pairs of NPIs with 
no associated physician or organizational characteristics, pairing the referral data with SK&A is of 
great benefit. Such a combination allows consideration of various and nuanced questions about 
patient flows and referrals as a treatment choice such as:    
 Are patient referrals made differently in health systems, multi-specialty 
groups, accountable care organizations? 
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 How are primary care referrals to specialists based on peer effects 
between clinicians?  
 How does use of varying EMR software vendors affect health care firms’ 
ability to retain patients within the health system?  
Two particular samples of the referral data are of particular interest for combination with SK&A: 
referrals out by primary care physicians to specialists and referrals captured by specialists from 
PCPs. By merging to both the referring and referred physician variables, researchers may create 
unique lists by NPI with SK&A fields identifying characteristics like specialty. Also considered in 
Part 3 were primary care physician referrals to non-physician provider organizations such acute 
care hospitals and post-acute care providers. 
HCCI Commercial Claims Data 
Commercial claims data were accessed through the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI), a non-
profit organization partnering with Aetna, Humana, and United Healthcare to share claims data 
with academic researchers. Commercial ACO contracts with physicians were identified using the 
nationally representative SK&A office-based physician file reviewed previously. Empirical 
analyses in Part 4 and Part 5 consider the effects on HCCI-insurer affiliated ACOs and the 
broader range of ACOs contracted by both Medicare as well as both HCCI- and non-HCCI 
affiliated insurers. Physician claims billing and aggregate member files were utilized to extract 
and create physician-year summary observations describing payment and unit billing counts, 
aggregating up from the HCPCS/CPT level. Presented analyses primarily utilize dependent 
variables aggregating these codes up to the BETOS typology of service definitions shown in  
Appendix Table 18.  Cooper and coauthors were among the first to utilize commercial claims from 
HCCI insurers; their appendix argues HCCI data is the most comprehensive data source of 
commercial claims data.  HCCI is also a superior source of commercial claims data for its 
coverage across both fully- and self-insured insurance products in the national, large, small 
group, and exchange markets. In total, HCCI data is estimated to include over 40 million covered 
lives per year; providing coverage on average for 27.6 percent of all Americans with employer-
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sponsored insurance. Coverage does vary substantially from one state to the next, as Figure 11 
below reproduced from Cooper, Craig, Gaynor, and Van Reenen (2015). 
 
 
Figure 11. Estimates of HCCI Commercial Insurance Coverage Rates by State, 2011 
 
 
Source: Reproduced from Cooper, Craig, Gaynor, and Van Reenen (2015).  
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Example Calculations 
Measuring System Integration 
Identifying the firm and corresponding market share can be difficult in health care provider 
markets due to varying levels of ownership, partnership agreements and joint ventures, and 
vertical integration across individuals, sites of care like hospitals, and larger health systems. One 
method used by researchers (e.g. Dunn and Shapiro, 2014) uses the SK&A file to assign 
observations to a distinct organization involving a step by step assignment rule. By starting at 
presumably larger organization levels (health systems) and moving to smaller categories 
(companies), an individual will be assigned by the Integrated Health Systems field when one is 
present, followed by the fields for Health Systems, Hospital Owner, Group Medical Practice, and 
Company in descending order. Of the organizational variables listed previously, note that 
Independent Physician Association, Accountable Care Organization, and Affiliated Hospital fields 
refer to much more limited affiliations than company ownership. While the company field (present 
for all observations)  may be used to assign observations to unique firms, note this may 
underestimate corporate boundaries when systems hold full or partial stakes across multiple legal 
businesses. 
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Appendix Tables 
Appendix Table 17. Preventive Service Category Definitions 
Preventive Service Category 
HCPCS Codes Used in Category 
Definition 
Annual Wellness Visit (AWV)  G0438 G0439 
Intensive behavioral therapy for obesity  G0447 G0473 
Intensive behavioral therapy for CVD  G0446 
Medical nutrition therapy  97802 97803 97804 G0270 G0271 
Prostate Cancer Screening  G0102 G0103  
Colorectal Cancer Screening  00810 82270 G0104 G0105 G0121 
G0106 G0120 G0121 G0328 G0464 
Diagnostic Colonoscopy  45378 45379 45380 45381 45382 
45383 45384 45385 45386 45387 
45391 45392 
Hemoglobin screen (office and home)  83036 83037  
Nepropathy Screening  82042 82043 82044 84156 
Cardiovascular Disease Screening Tests / 
Lipid Panels  
80061 82465 83718 84478 
Pneumococcal Vaccine Administration  90669  90670 90732 G0009 
Seasonal Influenza Virus Vaccine  90630 90653 90654 90655 90656 
90657 90660 90661 90662 90672 
90673 90685 90686 90687 90688 
Q2035 Q2036 Q2037 Q2038 Q2039 
G0008 
Hepatitis B Vaccine Administration  90739 90740 90743 90744 90746 
90747 G0010 
Hepatitis C Screening  G0472 
HIV Screening  G0432 G0433 G0435 
Tobacco Cessation  G0436 G0437 
Depression Screening  G0444 
Diabetes Screening  82947 82950 82951 
Diabetes Self-Management G0108 G0109 
Glaucoma Screening  G0117 G0118 
Screening Mammography  77052 77057 77063 G0202 
Diagnostic Mammography  77051 77055 77056 G0204 G0206 
Screening Pap Test  G0123 G0124 G0141 G0143 G0144 
G0145 G0147 G0148 P3000 P3001 
Q0091  
Screening Pelvic Examinations  G0101 
Ultrasound Screening for Abdominal Aortic 
Aneurysm (AAA)  
G0389 
Alcohol Misuse Screening and Counseling  G0442 G0443 
Bone Mass Measurements  76977 77078 77080 77081 G0130 
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Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015. “Preventive Services Chart -ICN  
006559”. Medicare Learning Network Brief.  
 
Appendix Table 18. BETOS Typology of Service Categories  
Evaluation And Management 
 M1A Office Visits - New 
 M1B Office Visits - Established 
 M2A Hospital Visit - Initial 
 M2B Hospital Visit - Subsequent 
 M2C Hospital Visit - Critical Care 
 M3 Emergency Room Visit 
 M4A Home Visit 
 M4B Nursing Home Visit 
 M5A Specialist - Pathology 
M5B Specialist - Psychiatry 
M5C Specialist - Ophthalmology 
M5D Specialist - Other 
M6 Consultations 
 Procedures 
 P0 Anesthesia 
 P1A Major Procedure - Breast 
 P1B Major Procedure - Colectomy 
 P1C Major Procedure - Cholecystectomy 
 P1D Major Procedure - Turp 
 P1E Major Procedure - Hysterectomy 
 P1F Major Procedure - Explor/Decompr/Excisdisc 
 P1G Major Procedure - Other 
 P2A Major Procedure, Cardiovascular - Cabg 
 P2B Major Procedure, Cardiovascular - Aneurysm Repair 
 P2C Major Procedure, Cardiovascular - Thromboendarterectomy 
 P2D Major Procedure, Cardiovascular - Coronary Angioplasty(Ptca) 
 P2E Major Procedure, Cardiovascular - Pacemaker Insertion 
 P2F Major Procedure, Cardiovascular - Other 
 P3A Major Procedure, Orthopedic - Hip Fracture Repair 
 P3B Major Procedure, Orthopedic - Hip Replacement 
 P3C Major Procedure, Orthopedic - Knee Replacement 
 P3D Major Procedure, Orthopedic - Other 
 P4A Eye Procedure - Corneal Transplant 
 P4B Eye Procedure - Cataract Removal/Lens Insertion 
 P4C Eye Procedure - Retinal Detachment 
 P4D Eye Procedure - Treatment Of Retinal Lesions 
 P4E Eye Procedure - Other 
 P5A Ambulatory Procedures - Skin 
 P5B Ambulatory Procedures - Musculoskeletal 
 P5C Ambulatory Procedures - Inguinal Hernia Repair 
 P5D Ambulatory Procedures - Lithotripsy 
 P5E Ambulatory Procedures - Other 
 P6A Minor Procedures - Skin 
 P6B Minor Procedures - Musculoskeletal 
 P6C Minor Procedures - Other (Medicare Fee Schedule) 
 P6D Minor Procedures - Other (Non-Medicare Fee Schedule) 
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 P7A Oncology - Radiation Therapy 
 P7B Oncology - Other 
 P8A Endoscopy - Arthroscopy 
 P8B Endoscopy - Upper Gastrointestinal 
 P8C Endoscopy - Sigmoidoscopy 
 P8D Endoscopy - Colonoscopy 
 P8E Endoscopy - Cystoscopy 
 P8F Endoscopy - Bronchoscopy 
 P8G Endoscopy - Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy 
 P8H Endoscopy - Laryngoscopy 
 P8I Endoscopy - Other 
 P9A Dialysis Services (Medicare Fee Schedule) 
 P9B Dialysis Services (Non-Medicare Fee Schedule) 
 Imaging 
 I1A Standard Imaging - Chest 
 I1B Standard Imaging - Musculoskeletal 
 I1C Standard Imaging - Breast 
 I1D Standard Imaging - Contrast Gastrointestinal 
 I1E Standard Imaging - Nuclear Medicine 
 I1F Standard Imaging - Other 
 I2A Advanced Imaging - Cat: Head 
 I2B Advanced Imaging - Cat: Other 
 I2C Advanced Imaging - Mri: Brain 
 I2D Advanced Imaging - Mri: Other 
 I3A Echography - Eye 
 I3B Echography - Abdomen/Pelvis 
 I3C Echography - Heart 
 I3D Echography - Carotid Arteries 
 I3E Echography - Prostate, Transrectal 
 I3F Echography - Other 
 I4A Imaging/Procedure - Heart,Including Cardiac Catheterization 
 I4B Imaging/Procedure - Other  Tests 
Testing 
 T1A Lab Tests - Routine Venipuncture (Non Medicare Fee Schedule) 
 T1B Lab Tests - Automated General Profiles 
 T1C Lab Tests - Urinalysis 
 T1D Lab Tests - Blood Counts 
 T1E Lab Tests - Glucose 
 T1F Lab Tests - Bacterial Cultures 
 T1G Lab Tests - Other (Medicare Fee Schedule) 
 T1H Lab Tests - Other (Non-Medicare Fee Schedule) 
 T2A Other Tests - Electrocardiograms 
 T2B Other Tests - Cardiovascular Stress Tests 
 T2C Other Tests - EKG Monitoring 
 T2D Other Tests - Other 
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Appendix Table 19. DID Results Across E&M Service Categories for Primary Care Physicians 
 E&M Office Visits By Patient Type 
E&M Office Visits By Visit Intensity (Time) (for 
Est. Patients) 
E&M 
Preventiv
e Visits 
 New 
Establishe
d 5 Min. 
10 
Min. 15 Min. 25 Min. 40 Min. 
- 
BETOS/CPT Code M1A M1B 99211 99212 99213 99214 99215 G0438 / G0439 
0 -1.16** 0.25* 0.27* -0.37 -0.97** -0.54 1.67*** 
ACO Treatment * 
Post (.18) (.53) (.13) (.15) (.30) (.48) (.66) (.49) 
2013 -
0.94*** 1.21*** 
-
0.27**
* 
-
0.47*** 
-
0.81*** 2.51*** 
-
1.14*** 0.92*** 
 (.06) (.17) (.04) (.06) (.11) (.16) (.23) (.18) 
2014 -1.51*** 0.25 
-
0.97**
* 
-
1.09*** 
-
3.03*** 4.38*** -0.80** 3.58*** 
(.08) (.25) (.06) (.09) (.16) (.23) (.35) (.22) 
Constant 11.75**
* 146.34*** 
4.53**
* 7.08*** 
55.56**
* 
83.93**
* 
29.53**
* 28.50*** 
 (.05) (.14) (.03) (.04) (.09) (.13) (.17) (.15) 
Fixed Effects NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI 
R2 0.85 0.95 0.9 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.86 
Unique Physicians 45,681 91,159 17,526 30,014 87,115 86,544 30,917 34,806 
N 137,04
3 273,478 
52,57
8 90,042 
261,34
5 
259,63
3 92,750 104,417 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2012-2014 Medicare Physician and other Supplier PUF. Standard errors 
clustered at the primary care service area (PCSA) level.  
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Appendix Table 20. DID Results Across Imaging and Testing Categories for Specialists 
 Testing Imaging 
 Lab Adv. 
Car. 
Stress 
Tests 
Other 
Car. 
Tests 
Stand. 
 
Adv. 
 
Non-
Brain 
CT 
Non-
Brain 
MRI 
BETOS/CPT Code T1 T2 T2B T2D I1 I2 I2B I2D 
-2.19** 2.20*** 0.43** 3.20*** -0.13 5.16*** 3.92*** 2.11** 
ACO Treatment * 
Post 
(1.04) (.70) (.13) (1.07) (.64) (1.34) (1.38) (.98) 
2013 -1.27*** -5.32*** -1.65** -7.56*** -0.93*** -4.62*** -1.89*** -3.66*** 
 (.28) (.24) (.05) (.39) (.11) (.43) (.46) (.30) 
2014 -2.68*** -6.06*** -2.0*** -8.48*** -2.07*** -7.46*** -2.12*** -5.65*** 
(.48) (.28) (.07) (.44) (.18) (.62) (.62) (.42) 
Constant 32.32**
* 
28.18**
* 
7.01**
* 
34.52**
* 
25.22**
* 
45.00**
* 
23.18**
* 
28.28**
* 
 (.22) (.16) (.04) (.26) (.10) (.31) (.32) (.22) 
Fixed Effects NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI 
R2 0.9 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.95 
Unique Physicians 45,832 51,330 13,201 33,250 62,621 23,923 17,765 16,519 
N 137,495 153,989 39,603 99,749 187,862 71,768 53,295 49,555 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2012-2014 Medicare Physician and other Supplier PUF. Standard errors 
clustered at the primary care service area (PCSA) level.  
 
 
119 
 
Appendix  Table 21. Triple Difference Results Across E&M Service Categories by ACO Governance Type 
 E&M Office Visits by Site 
E&M Office 
Visits 
By Patient 
Type 
E&M Office Visits By Visit Intensity (Visit Time) 
(for Est. Patients) 
 Office 
Facili
ty New 
Establi
shed 5 Min. 
10 
Min. 15 Min. 25 Min. 40 Min. 
BETOS/CPT 
Code 
M1 M2 M1A M1B 99211 99212 99213 99214 99215 
ACO * Post * 
System-Led -1.21** 1 -0.34 -1.64*** 0.08 0.14 -0.42 -1.39*** -0.08 
 (.49) (.86) (.23) (.36) (.23) (.14) (.28) (.51) (.72) 
ACO * Post * 
Jointly-Led  -0.83 0.02 0.32 -1.59** 0.24 -0.06 -1.00*** -0.09 1.01 
 (.63) (.96) (.25) (.72) (.26) (.18) (.34) (.58) (.80) 
ACO * Post * 
MD-Led  
-2.75*** 
-
4.97*
** 
-0.01 -2.81*** -0.08 0.14 -1.05** -1.01 -1.79 
 (.77) 
(1.28
) (.24) (.74) (.13) (.23) (.45) (.73) (1.20) 
2013 
0.90*** 
-
3.64*
** 
-
0.64*
** 
1.22*** 
-
0.21**
* 
-
0.48*** -0.33*** 1.65*** -1.01*** 
 (.10) (.17) (.03) (.09) (.03) (.03) (.06) (.10) (.18) 
2014 
2.10*** 
-
4.20*
** 
-
1.13*
** 
2.91*** 
-
0.76**
* 
-
0.76*** -0.40*** 4.16*** -0.21 
 (.14) (.24) (.05) (.13) (.04) (.05) (.09) (.14) (.23) 
Constant 110.44*** 83.17*** 
20.7
9*** 
97.45**
* 
3.81**
* 7.96*** 40.66*** 59.75*** 28.51*** 
 (.07) (.12) (.03) (.07) (.02) (.02) (.05) (.07) (.12) 
         
Fixed Effects NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI 
R2 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.96 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.92 
Unique 
Physicians          255,747  
       
142,
411  
      
184,
304  
        
250,83
6  
       
32,27
7  
       
88,434 
        
222,626  
         
207,434 
        
74,412  
N          
767,240  
       
427,
234  
         
552,
913  
         
752,50
9  
       
96,83
2  
       
265,30
1  
        
667,877  
         
622,303 
        
223,235 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001  
 Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2012-2014 Medicare Physician and other Supplier PUF. Note that the 
Public ACO dummy is omitted due to multicollinearity with physician-level fixed effects. Standard errors 
clustered at the primary care service area (PCSA) level. 
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Appendix Table 22. Triple Difference Results Across Aggregate Per Capita Utilization Measures by ACO 
Type and Internal Incentives 
 
Part B 
Payments 
Per Bene. 
Total Services Per 
Bene. 
ACO * Post * Low Internal Incentives* System-Led 1.85 -0.06 
 (2.92) (.18) 
ACO * Post * Medium Internal Incentives* System-Led -7.38*** -0.66*** 
 (2.67) (.16) 
ACO * Post * High Internal Incentives* System-Led -0.38 -0.53** 
 (3.93) (.24) 
ACO * Post * Unreported Internal Incentives* System-Led -8.03* -0.49** 
 (4.23) (.20) 
ACO * Post * Unreported Internal Incentives* Jointly-Led -13.37** -0.73** 
 (5.91) (.30) 
ACO * Post * Unreported Internal Incentives* Physician-Led -101.97*** -8.74*** 
 (31.38) (2.83) 
2013 -1.71*** 0.10*** 
 
(.53) (.03) 
2014 -0.68 0.60*** 
 (.75) (.06) 
Constant 
331.14*** 7.77*** 
(21.78) (.44) 
Fixed Effects NPI NPI 
R2 0.92 0.88 
Unique Physicians 392,400 392,400 
N 1,177,200 1,177,200 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2012-2014 Medicare Physician and other Supplier PUF. Standard errors 
clustered at the primary care service area (PCSA) level Treatment effects for non-system ACOs were 
included in the regression, but insignificant results for the low, medium, and high incentive groups were all 
insignificant and are not reported.  
 
Appendix Table 23 presents results from specifications investigating effects of ACO adoption on patient 
panel characteristics. Consistent with a hypothesis of advantageous selection of healthier, potentially 
more profitable patients by ACO physicians, adopting physicians are found on average to significantly 
increase the white and non-dual eligible share of patients within their beneficiary panels. The effect size 
of these increases, each approximately half a percentage point, is plausibly low given the relative 
freedom of physician choice provided to beneficiaries. However, no corresponding reductions are 
significantly estimated for the share of beneficiaries treated by the physician whom are black or dual-
eligible. The last two columns introduce the triple difference interaction terms for ACO organizational 
types. While the interaction terms were insignificant for the racial patient share measures (not presented), 
the dual eligibility measures are suggestive of some selection by both physician and system led ACOs.           
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Appendix Table 23. DID Results Across Patient Selection Measures 
 DID Estimates Triple Difference Estimates 
  % White Bene. 
% Black 
Bene. 
% Non-
Dual 
Eligible 
Bene. 
% Dual 
Eligible 
Bene. 
% Non-
Dual 
Eligible 
Bene. 
% Dual 
Eligible 
Bene. 
    
ACO Treatment * Post 0.007** 0 0.004** 0 0 0.07** 
ACO * Post * System-Led  - - - - 0.011* -0.005      
ACO * Post * Physician-Led  - - - - 0 -0.010*** 
2013 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.01*** -0.00*** 0.01*** -0.00*** 
2014 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.01*** 0.00*** -0.01*** 
Constant 0.62*** 0.07*** 0.64*** 0.25*** 0.64*** 0.25*** 
Fixed Effects NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI 
R2 0.88 0.83 0.9 0.84 0.84 0.91 
Unique Physicians 392,400 392,400 392,400 392,400 392,400 392,400 
N 1,177,200 1,177,200 1,177,200 1,177,200 1,177,200 1,177,200 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2012-2014 Medicare Physician and other Supplier PUF. Standard errors 
clustered at the primary care service area (PCSA) level. 
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Appendix Table 24. Triple Differences Results for PCP to Specialist Self-Referral Shares by Specialty 
Cardiology Surgery Emergency Gastroenterology Pulmonology Orthopedics Psychiatry 
ACO Treatment*Post 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0 0.006 
ACO * Post * System-Led 0.040*** 0.016* 0.028** 0.039*** 0.025* 0.040*** -0.001 
ACO* Post * Physician-Led  -0.018*** -0.008 -0.012 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.015* 
2011 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.007*** -0.001 
2012 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.005** 
2013 0.033*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.011*** 
2014 0.039*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.013*** 
Constant 0.196*** 0.135*** 0.175*** 0.132*** 0.142*** 0.189*** 0.092*** 
Fixed Effects NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI 
R2 0.95 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.93 
Unique Physicians 75,938 57,453 32,093 33,968 29,094 25,027 12,016 
N 379,690 287,265 160,465 169,840 145,470 125,135 60,080 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2010-2014 Medicare Physician Referral Data PUF. Standard errors clustered at the primary care service 
area (PCSA) level. 
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Appendix Table 25. DID Results for PCP to Organizational Provider Referrals 2010 - 2014 
Acute Care Hospital Home Health Skilled Nursing Facility Labs 
ACO Treatment*Post 9.112 3.583 6.408 30.00*** 
2011 21.630*** -6.528*** -2.709 -28.53*** 
2012 24.427* -12.136*** -23.042*** -68.48*** 
2013 -5.618 -20.664*** -55.921*** -94.84*** 
2014 -61.522*** -31.743*** -75.687*** -136.39** 
Constant 1583.49*** 220.03*** 608.31*** 987.61*** 
Fixed Effects NPI NPI NPI NPI 
R2 0.803 0.836 0.914 0.873 
Unique Physicians 116,493 58,222 41,662 101,231 
N 582,465 291,110 208,310 506,155 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2010-2014 Medicare Physician Referral Data PUF. Standard 
errors clustered at the primary care service area (PCSA) level. 
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Appendix Table 26. DID Results Across Aggregate Utilization and Marginal Treatment Measures 
w/ Selection Controls 
 Aggregate Utilization Measures 
Marginal Treatment 
Measures 
  
Total 
Unique 
Bene. 
Total 
Part B 
Payment
s ($) 
Total 
Services 
Part B 
Payme
nts Per 
Bene. 
Total 
Servic
es Per 
Bene. 
ACO Treatment * Post 
-0.25 -1675.35 -
492.26**
* 
-
6.96*** 
-
0.76*** 
 
(7.87) (1,083.3
9) 
(126.34) (1.98) (0.13) 
2013 10.74*
** 
1075.60* 90.21* -1.88 0.22* 
 (1.67) (459.39) (40.29) (1.01) (0.10) 
2014 16.31*
** 
3043.64*
** 
421.11**
* 
0.03 0.79*** 
 (1.83) (749.93) (59.71) (1.98) (0.13) 
2015 14.73*
** 
4731.44*
** 
799.18**
* 
0.71 1.62*** 
 (2.50) (967.60) (85.69) (2.55) (0.18) 
Market-Year Controls      
County Unemp. Rate By Year 0.07 80.23** 1.15 0.08 0 
 (0.07) (28.16) (2.80) (0.05) (0.00) 
County Median HH Income by Year 0 0.08 -0.02** 0 0 
 (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
County Part C Penetration Rate by Year 
-
0.06*** -15.82*** -0.33*** 0 0 
 (0.00) (0.99) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) 
County Part D Penetration Rate by Year 0 2.17*** 0.13* 0.00*** 0 
 (0.00) (0.64) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) 
County Percent Bene. that are Dual-Eligible 
by Year 
-
0.02*** -4.08** -0.26** 0 0 
 (0.00) (1.32) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) 
Physician-Panel-Year Controls    
Physician Panel % Dual Eligible by Year 
-3.53 
-
7007.8**
* 
-
488.03** 
-
14.17*
* -0.70** 
 
(2.86) 
(1,258.2
0) (167.95) (4.59) (0.26) 
Physician Panel % Non-White by Year 144.49
*** 
37673.3*
** 
1361.90
*** -1.82 0.62* 
 
(6.89) 
(2,001.7
2) (220.85) (6.70) (0.31) 
Physician Panel % w/ Afib. by Year 155.60
*** 
36278.7*
** 559.84* -0.97 -1.40* 
 (7.08) (2,202.6 (250.86) (7.91) (0.64) 
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1) 
Physician Panel % w/ Alzheimer's Disease 
by Year 
88.65*
** 
19645.59
*** -182.98 -1 
-
1.87*** 
 
(5.36) 
(1,946.4
0) (199.27) (7.37) (0.44) 
Physician Panel % w/ Asthma by Year 94.94*
** 
20015.88
*** -250.73 5.11 -2.05** 
 
(5.34) 
(2,078.3
3) (280.64) (7.06) (0.70) 
Physician Panel % w/Cancer by Year 160.08
*** 
40863.38
*** 
1400.63
*** 40.71 3.37*** 
 
(11.80)
(5,743.2
4) (368.07) (23.83) (0.99) 
Physician Panel % w/ CHF by Year -
37.46*
** 
-
14306.47
*** 
-
2400.41
*** -0.91 
-
3.29*** 
 
(4.29) 
(2,290.6
5) (224.46) (8.50) (0.40) 
Physician Panel % w/ CKD by Year -5.09 -2841.87 -195.07 5.82 -0.34 
 
(3.54) 
(1,551.6
0) (251.20) (6.00) (0.39) 
Physician Panel % w/ COPD by Year -
14.88*
** 
-
17175.52
*** 
1031.98
*** 
-
68.78*
** 1.26*** 
 
(4.21) 
(1,482.4
3) (144.76) (8.10) (0.31) 
Physician Panel % w/ Depression by Year 23.00*
** 
6315.46*
** 
277.16**
* 
25.27*
** 0.29 
 
(2.59) 
(1,307.1
6) (83.02) (7.51) (0.25) 
Physician Panel % w/ Diabets by Year 11.42*
* 2504.27 60.88 -9.91 0.25 
 
(3.82) 
(1,445.0
5) (152.37) (7.52) (0.49) 
Physician Panel % w/ Hyperl. by Year 
21.83* 
6059.84*
** 562.73** 0.89 0 
 
(8.99) 
(1,477.9
7) (211.81) (14.40) (0.54) 
Physician Panel % w/ Hypert. by Year 
3.76 
-
4652.37*
** 120.63 3.55 -0.12 
 
(10.29)
(1,311.2
8) (165.73) (13.55) (0.40) 
Physician Panel % w/ IHD by Year 
-3.11 
8669.29*
** 125.42 47.97 1.06 
 
(8.44) 
(1,991.4
8) (233.72) (26.06) (0.77) 
Physician Panel % w/ OST by Year 261.37
*** 
88575.14
*** 
3602.94
*** 
85.10*
** 5.25*** 
 
(7.53) 
(4,267.8
1) (557.65) (20.03) (0.91) 
Physician Panel % w/ RAOA by Year 42.47*
** 
8484.06*
** 176.45 25.29 0.6 
 
(8.93) 
(1,460.9
0) (157.90) (18.88) (0.41) 
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Physician Panel % w/ Sciot. by Year 264.57
*** 
57731.45
*** 
1419.89
*** -37.79 -0.51 
 
(7.49) 
(3,496.4
2) (197.74) (20.94) (0.68) 
Physician Panel % w/ Stroke by Year 
292.87
*** 
72305.06
*** 
1670.26
*** 
-
35.41*
* -0.85 
 
(9.94) 
(3,784.6
5) (423.63) (11.14) (0.83) 
Physician Panel - Beneficiary Average HCC 
Risk Score by Year 
-
37.81*
** 
-
3517.87*
** 3.6 
11.36*
** 0.23 
 
(2.49) 
(1,003.3
7) (63.39) (3.05) (0.15) 
Constant 611.62
*** 
152197.7
9*** 
4726.93
*** 
255.72
*** 
8.00*** 
 (26.29) (7,456.65) 
(654.35) (16.41) (1.04) 
Fixed Effects NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI 
R2 0.92 0.94 0.84 0.88 0.82 
Unique Physicians 392,400 392,400 392,400 
392,40
0 
392,40
0 
N 1,177,200 
1,177,20
0 
1,177,20
0 
1,177,
200 
1,177,
200 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2012-2014 Medicare Physician and other Supplier PUF. Standard 
errors clustered at the primary care service area (PCSA) level.  
 
Appendix Table 27. DID Results Across Aggregate Per Capita Utilization Measures w/ Selection 
Controls 
Dep. Variable Part B Payments Per Bene. Total Services Per Bene. 
 
All 
Physic
ians 
Primar
y Care 
Physic
ians 
Speci
alists 
All 
Physic
ians 
Primar
y Care 
Physic
ians 
Speci
alists 
ACO Treatment * Post 
-
6.96**
* 
4.42**
* 
-
15.84*
** 
-
0.76**
* -0.01 
-
1.21**
* 
 
(1.98) (1.22) (3.04) (0.13) (0.09) (0.21) 
2013 -1.88 -1 -2.34 0.22* 
0.25**
* 0.19 
 
(1.01) (0.96) (1.41) (0.10) (0.06) (0.13) 
2014 
0.03 
5.88**
* -1.07 
0.79**
* 
0.52**
* 
0.91**
* 
 (1.98) (1.35) (2.72) (0.13) (0.13) (0.18) 
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2015 
0.71 
17.26*
** -5.32 
1.62**
* 
2.28**
* 
1.32**
* 
 (2.55) (1.76) (3.55) (0.18) (0.21) (0.24) 
Market-Year Controls     
County Unemp. Rate By Year 0.12** 0.06 0 0.01 0 0.12** 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04)  
County Median HH Income by Year 0.00* 0 0 -0.00* 0 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
County Part C Penetration Rate by 
Year 
-
0.00** 0 0 0 0 
-
0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
County Part D Penetration Rate by 
Year 0.00** 0.00** 0 
-
0.00** 0 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
County Percent Bene. that are Dual-
Eligible by Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Physician Panel-Year Controls  
Physician Panel % Dual Eligible by 
Year 
-
14.17*
* -9.11 
-
16.43*
* 
-
0.70** 0.03 
-
1.08** 
 (4.59) (4.99) (6.32) (0.26) (0.27) (0.37) 
Physician Panel % Non-White by Year -1.82 4.58 -5.44 0.62* 0.14 0.85 
 (6.70) (6.51) 
(10.32
) (0.31) (0.20) (0.48) 
Physician Panel % w/ Afib. by Year -0.97 
25.24*
* -9.12 -1.40* -0.87 -1.75* 
 (7.91) (9.56) 
(10.64
) (0.64) (0.73) (0.89) 
Physician Panel % w/ Alzheimer's 
Disease by Year -1 -11.49 -0.56 
-
1.87**
* 
-
2.82**
* -1.04 
 (7.37) (9.14) (9.70) (0.44) (0.66) (0.59) 
Physician Panel % w/ Asthma by Year 5.11 
-
38.85*
** 
24.45*
* 
-
2.05** 
-
3.10**
* -1.52 
 (7.06) (9.63) (8.95) (0.70) (0.76) (0.96) 
Physician Panel % w/Cancer by Year 40.71 66.36* 30.38 
3.37**
* 2.38 
3.75**
* 
 
(23.83
) 
(26.00
) 
(30.25
) (0.99) (2.64) (1.04) 
Physician Panel % w/ CHF by Year -0.91 -12.46 3.81 
-
3.29**
* -0.26 
-
4.39**
* 
 (8.50) (8.63) 
(11.75
) (0.40) (0.41) (0.56) 
Physician Panel % w/ CKD by Year 5.82 -0.46 12.41 -0.34 
-
1.39**
* -0.35 
 (6.00) (7.92) (8.58) (0.39) (0.32) (0.53) 
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Physician Panel % w/ COPD by Year 
-
68.78*
** -5.34 
-
91.44*
** 
1.26**
* 0.05 
1.44**
* 
 (8.10) (5.88) 
(11.14
) (0.31) (0.39) (0.41) 
Physician Panel % w/ Depression by 
Year 
25.27*
** 
49.46*
** 12.31 0.29 
2.06**
* -0.31 
 (7.51) (6.64) 
(10.39
) (0.25) (0.37) (0.33) 
Physician Panel % w/ Diabets by Year -9.91 
14.14*
* 
-
33.21*
* 0.25 0.85** 0.24 
 (7.52) (5.41) 
(11.18
) (0.49) (0.30) (0.71) 
Physician Panel % w/ Hyperl. by Year 0.89 
19.97*
** -6.48 0 0.45 -0.27 
 
(14.40
) (5.90) 
(21.15
) (0.54) (0.37) (0.77) 
Physician Panel % w/ Hypert. by Year 3.55 
-
18.07* 12.49 -0.12 -0.26 -0.09 
 
(13.55
) (7.10) 
(18.56
) (0.40) (0.43) (0.52) 
Physician Panel % w/ IHD by Year 47.97 4.6 65.88 1.06 -0.05 1.53 
 
(26.06
) (7.10) 
(38.18
) (0.77) (0.40) (1.11) 
Physician Panel % w/ OST by Year 
85.10*
** 
77.97*
** 
85.36*
* 
5.25**
* 
3.71**
* 
5.99**
* 
 
(20.03
) (9.74) 
(29.22
) (0.91) (0.66) (1.31) 
Physician Panel % w/ RAOA by Year 25.29 
30.73*
** 23.36 0.6 0.66 0.59 
 
(18.88
) (6.98) 
(27.06
) (0.41) (0.45) (0.57) 
Physician Panel % w/ Sciot. by Year -37.79 -39.74 
-
42.25*
** -0.51 -1.27 -0.16 
 
(20.94
) 
(70.23
) 
(10.21
) (0.68) (1.76) (0.64) 
Physician Panel % w/ Stroke by Year 
-
35.41*
* 27.54 
-
56.10*
** -0.85 -0.74 -0.68 
 
(11.14
) 
(17.63
) 
(13.56
) (0.83) (0.94) (1.12) 
Physician Panel - Beneficiary Average 
HCC Risk Score by Year 
11.36*
** 
14.04*
* 
10.78*
* 0.23 -0.3 0.44* 
 (3.05) (4.55) (3.70) (0.15) (0.27) (0.18) 
Constant 
331.0
9*** 
263.3
9*** 
360.4
7*** 
7.78**
* 
6.53**
* 
8.30**
* 
 (.40) (.37) (.55) (.03) (.01) (.04) 
Fixed Effects 
NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI NPI 
R2 
0.92 0.87 0.92 0.88 0.88 0.88 
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Unique Physicians 
392,4
00 
118,9
77 
273,4
23 
392,4
00 
118,9
77 
273,4
23 
N 
1,177,
200 
356,9
31 
820,2
69 
1,177,
200 
356,9
31 
820,2
69 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 Source: 2014 SK&A OBP file, 2012-2014 Medicare Physician and other Supplier PUF. Standard 
errors clustered at the primary care service area (PCSA) level.  
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